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Abstract
In recent years, potable reuse applications have become more common due to population
growth and increased water demand, especially in communities with limited or variable water
resources. However, there are concerns about potential exposure to pathogens and chemical
compounds in treated wastewater. Therefore, advanced wastewater treatment processes are of
paramount importance in any potable reuse system. The overall aim of this study was to develop
and implement static and dynamic QMRAs to compare public health risk in various potable
reuse scenarios. Cryptosporidium, norovirus, adenovirus, and Salmonella were chosen as the
target pathogens. The research evaluated the performance of full advanced treatment (FAT)
trains consisting of reverse osmosis (RO) and advanced oxidation processes (AOPs), which are
required in California for planned IPR systems that directly inject recycled water into local
aquifers or discharge to surface water. The study also explored ozone-biological filtration as an
alternative for FAT trains by comparing its public health risk to that of the RO-based treatment
train. Treatment process performance and resultant public health risks were modeled using the
STELLA 10.1 system dynamics software package. The system dynamics model accounted for
the possibility of unit process failure and subsequent effects on downstream treatment process
performance (i.e., ‘domino effects’). The model also compared typical vs. outbreak scenarios and
identified the components and operational conditions that were most critical to minimizing
public health risks in each of the potable reuse paradigms.
The dynamic disease transmission model incorporated secondary transmission and
immunity through implementing different epidemiological states. In this study, dynamic disease
transmission model was focused on norovirus which is the most common cause of acute
gastroenteritis diseases in the US.
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This study indicated that combined annual risk of infection was lower in DPR systems
with direct distribution (median risk= 5.4×10-8 and 1.2×10-6 for ozone-based DPR and RO-based
DPR, respectively) compared to the IPR systems and DPR with blending. Generally, potable
reuse treatment trains with surface water utilization resulted in similar risk of infection which
exceeded the benchmark risk of 10-4. The model also identified 120 days and 150 days of storage
time at 10°C and 20°C of temperature as the most critical parameters in de facto reuse systems
when targeting Cryptosporidium and adenovirus, respectively. Included secondary transmission
and immunity resulted in up to 8 orders of magnitude higher risk of norovirus than the static
framework (depending on the treatment train). However, results of this study indicated that
potable reuse systems were sufficiently robust to handle the high concentration of norovirus
during outbreak conditions and that disease incidence of norovirus was mainly attributed to
secondary transmission pathway. However, these results may change if other pathogens are
considered in dynamic disease transmission model.
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Introduction
Climate change, population growth, urbanization, and increased water demands create

intense pressure on finite natural water resources. Consequently, the need for more efficient use
of water resources (i.e., conservation, reuse, and alternative water sources) is particularly critical
for communities with limited or variable water resources (Asano et al., 2007). Recently, water
reuse has become more common, especially in arid and semi-arid regions. It can also be
beneficial in coastal regions with saltwater intrusion and communities with compromised water
quality (Gerrity et al., 2013). Water reuse can be implemented to provide non-potable water for
industry and irrigation purposes or potable water for augmenting drinking water supplies (NRC,
2012). However, there are always concerns about potential exposure to pathogens and chemical
compounds in treated wastewater.
It is estimated that at least 9.1% of the global disease burden and 6.3% of all deaths are
due to waterborne diseases that could be prevented by improved sanitation and hygiene (Pruss et
al., 2008). It is widely recognized that water plays an important role in transporting microbial
contamination that contributes in disease transmission and outbreaks (LeChevallier & Au, 2004).
As a result, quantifying the microbial risk associated with exposure to contaminated water serves
as a fundamental component of public health protection.
Many indirect potable reuse (IPR) and direct potable reuse (DPR) projects throughout the
world employ reverse osmosis (RO) and an advanced oxidation process (AOP) to ensure
adequate protection of public health (CDPH, 2014). In California, this ‘full advanced treatment’
(FAT) train is required for direct injection in groundwater replenishment applications and for
surface water augmentation to address both known [e.g., pathogens and carcinogenic chemicals
such as N-nitrosodimethylamine (NDMA)] and unknown potential health risks. RO-based
1

treatment trains can achieve very low concentrations of total dissolved solids (TDS), which is
important for systems with high TDS inputs from local source waters and/or water softeners
(Venkatesan et al., 2011). In addition, RO is also effective in reducing the total organic carbon
(TOC) concentration in the finished product water, which aids in meeting stringent TOC
requirements (e.g., 0.5 mg/L of wastewater-derived TOC; CDPH, 2014). However,
implementation of RO is hindered by its high capital and operations and maintenance costs, high
energy consumption, and concerns related to brine disposal in inland applications. As a result,
some communities are already employing or exploring feasibility of ozone-biological filtration
systems as an alternative to FAT systems. Therefore, it is critical to address microbial risk
associated with alternative ozone-biological filtration systems to ensure public health protection.
Direct exposure to waterborne pathogenic microorganisms (i.e., primary transmission) is
one of the most important factors in risk estimation. Risk associated with primary transmission
can be calculated using published dose response functions coupled with pathogen doses based on
ingestion of contaminated water. However, there are other factors that play important roles in the
transmission of infectious diseases. Some studies have focused on secondary disease
transmission, while also acknowledging the importance of immunity in estimating the spread of
disease within a community (Brookhart et al., 2002; Eisenberg et al., 1996; Eisenberg et al.,
2004; Soller & Eisenberg, 2008). Secondary transmission includes person-person or personenvironment-person transmission (Soller & Eisenberg, 2008). These secondary transmission
pathways can lead to significantly increased infection rates for certain pathogens (Eisenberg et
al., 2004).
The current study aimed to incorporate each of these components into a potable reuse
QMRA. The QMRA was developed using a system dynamics platform (STELLA 10.1, ISEE
2

Systems, Lebanon, NH) and allowed for assessments of the equivalency of potable reuse systems
and treatment trains, the relative significance of treatment failures on water quality and public
health, and the relative significance of primary versus secondary disease transmission pathways
in the context of potable reuse. The system dynamics model was validated based on suggestions
in Sterman (2000). These tests included structure assessment, dimensional consistency,
parameter assessment, integration error (time step and numerical integration method), behavior
reproduction, extreme condition tests, and sensitivity analyses.
This dissertation includes a literature review followed by three interdependent chapters that
build upon information learned during earlier phases of the research:
•

Chapter 3 focused on Cryptosporidium risk associated with de facto reuse, planned IPR,
and DPR systems employing ozone-biofiltration treatment trains. The contents of this
chapter were published in Water Research: “Amoueyan, E., Ahmad, S., Eisenberg, J. N.,
Pecson, B., & Gerrity, D. (2017). Quantifying pathogen risks associated with potable
reuse: A risk assessment case study for Cryptosporidium. Water Research, 119, 252266.” References to Amoueyan et al. (2017) throughout the dissertation refer to this
publication and to Chapter 3 of this dissertation.

•

Chapter 4 expanded the static QMRA model to include a direct comparison of the potable
reuse systems in Chapter 3 with RO-based treatment trains. Chapter 4 focused on four
pathogens: Cryptosporidium, norovirus, adenovirus, and Salmonella because of their
importance to gastroenteritis worldwide. This chapter will soon be submitted for
publication. References to Amoueyan et al. (2018) later in the dissertation refer to
Chapter 4 of this dissertation.
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•

Chapter 5 expanded the static QMRA framework to the dynamic level to incorporate
multiple disease transmission pathways and time-dependent distributed delays for critical
epidemiological states, such as post-infection immunity. This chapter focused on
norovirus as the target pathogen because it is highly contagious so secondary
transmission is known to be a critical factor for propagation of norovirus through a
community.
The following sections describe the research questions and corresponding hypotheses that

were addressed in this study:
1.1

Quantifying and comparing public health risks associated with different potable
reuse treatment trains
RQ1: How do public health risks vary by potable reuse paradigm (i.e., IPR vs. DPR), by
treatment train (e.g., ozone-biofiltration vs. RO-based treatment trains), and by different
target pathogens?
H1: Potable reuse systems are safe and sustainable alternatives to conventional drinking
water and can reliably meet a benchmark annual risk of 10-4. Also, ozone-biofiltration is
equivalent to RO-based treatment trains with respect to public health protection. Different
waterborne pathogens pose different risk of infection depending on the treatment unit
processes employed in each of the potable reuse systems. As previous studies (Forss &
Ander, 2011) reported that risk of infection in potable reuse system was driven by
Cryptosporidium, the hypothesis is that Cryptosporidium results in higher risk than other
pathogens in potable reuse systems.

1.2

Evaluating the effects of unit process failures on public health risk
RQ2: How do unit process failures affect treatment train performance and public health?
4

H2: Failure in one or more treatment barriers will adversely affect the overall performance
of the treatment train and lead to unacceptably high risk of infection.
Assuming the various treatment processes are operating as intended, one can estimate the
log removal/inactivation credits expected for each pathogen in each potable reuse system
using experimental/published data. However, failures during advanced treatment may
have a significant detrimental impact on the total log removal/inactivation of pathogens.
To address this issue, the potential impacts of process failures were incorporated into the
model to evaluate whether the treatment trains are sufficiently robust to adequately protect
public health during sub-optimal operation. The hypothesis is that IPR treatment trains are
less sensitive to failure in treatment processes and the additional storage time provided in
environmental buffer could compensate for the effect of failure.
1.3

Determining critical conditions affecting public health risk
RQ3: What are the most significant design/operational parameters affecting public health
risk?
H3: Sensitivity analysis can be performed to find the most significant
parameters/operational conditions and best inform the decision-making process in
development of design or operational criteria for different potable reuse treatment trains.
The hypothesis is that environmental buffers in IPR systems play an important role in
public health protection.

1.4

Impacts of secondary disease transmission and pathogen-shedding from infected
individuals on overall public health risk
RQ4: How do secondary disease transmission and post-infection immunity affect public
health?
5

H4: Inclusion of secondary disease transmission leads to an increased risk of infection due
to a greater number of pathogen-shedding individuals in the community. Higher number of
infectious individuals would lead to higher concentration of pathogen shedding into the
wastewater and ultimately higher concentration of pathogen in final drinking water.
Incorporating post-infection immunity decreases disease incidence among the community
compared to the condition with no immunity to the disease.
The answers to these research questions will aid in identifying the most critical
parameters/operational conditions in implementation of potable reuse systems; therefore,
contribute to the improvement of the decision-making processes in development, operational
designs, and the overall reliability of potable reuse systems.

6

2
2.1

Background and literature review
Potable reuse
Generally, there are two types of potable reuse systems: indirect potable reuse (IPR) and

direct potable reuse (DPR). Both systems use advanced treated wastewater for drinking purposes.
The key difference is the use of an environmental buffer as a discharge or blending point in IPR
systems which also acts as a psychological barrier (Khan, 2013; USEPA, 2012), while the DPR
system utilizes additional engineered treatment processes, expanded monitoring efforts, or an
engineered storage buffer to compensate for reduced response retention time (Tchobanoglous et
al., 2015). In addition to providing new source of drinking water, employing advanced
wastewater treatment processes in potable reuse applications can also decrease the adverse
effects of discharging conventionally treated wastewater into ‘pristine’ water resources (Gerrity
et al., 2014). A common form of IPR is known as unplanned IPR or de facto reuse (Rice et al.,
2013; Rice et al., 2015), in which intake water to drinking water treatment plants is withdrawn
from a water body that receives effluent from an upstream wastewater treatment plant. Although
these systems are employing potable reuse, they are not officially recognized as reuse projects.
Therefore, they may not have plans or permits specifically addressing the augmentation of the
downstream community’s source water with wastewater effluent (Cotruvo & Bell, 2014). Fig.
2.1 illustrates a schematic diagram of potable reuse paradigms.
First DPR system was implemented in Windhoek, Namibia, in which the reclaimed water
is blended with the treated water downstream of the drinking water treatment facility and within
the drinking water distribution system (NRC, 2012; Tchobanoglous et al., 2015). Since, no
relationship could be found between diarrheal diseases or mortalities in the community and
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exposure to drinking water, this system could serve as a successful development of potable reuse
project with no environmental buffer (NRC, 2012).

Figure 2-1. Schematic diagram of potable reuse paradigms.
Solid lines represent travel of water through an IPR system, and dashed lines represent travel of water
through a DPR system (Gerrity et al., 2013).

At this time, Texas is the only state in the US with existing DPR system (Big Spring)
(Tchobanoglous et al., 2015; WHO, 2017), while IPR systems are more widespread throughout
the US states in California, Nevada, Arizona, Texas, Virginia, Georgia, and Florida which are
implemented based on state regulations and guidelines or regulated on a case-by-case basis
(Tchobanoglous et al., 2015)
Different potable reuse systems throughout the world that are successfully implemented
are listed in Table 2.1.

8

Table 2-1. Potable reuse projects throughout the world
Potable Reuse Project

Potable Reuse
Application

Montebello Forebay,
California, USA

IPR with groundwater
replenishment

Goreangab plant,
Windhoek, Namibia

DPR

Orange County,
California, USA
Hueco Bolson recharge
project, El Paso Water
Utilities, Texas, USA
NEWater, Singapore

IPR with groundwater
replenishment
IPR with groundwater
replenishment

UOSA, Fairfax county,
Virginia, USA

IPR with surface water
augmentation
IPR with surface water
augmentation

Big Spring, Texas, USA

DPR

Beenyup groundwater
replenishment scheme,
Perth, Australia
Gwinnett County,
Georgia, USA

IPR with groundwater
replenishment

2.2

IPR with surface water
augmentation

Treatment process
(after secondary
treatment)
Media filtration, SAT,
Cl2

Reference

O3, DAF, rapid sand
filtration, O3, BAC,
GAC, UF, Cl2
Cl2, MF, RO, AOP
(UV/H2O2)
PAC, lime clarification,
media filtration, O3,
GAC, O3, Cl2
UF, RO, UV

Tchobanoglous
et al. (2015)

Lime clarification, media
filtration, GAC, Cl2,
chloramination

Gerrity et al.
(2013)

MF, RO, AOP
(UV/H2O2), blending,
media filtration, Cl2
UF, RO, UV

Tchobanoglous
et al. (2015)

Chemical phosphorus
removal, UF, O3, GAC

Gerrity et al.
(2013)

Sloss et al. (1996)

Tchobanoglous
et al. (2015)
Gerrity et al.
(2013)
WHO (2017)

WHO (2017)

Microbial criteria
One of the primary concerns in potable reuse applications is potential exposure to

pathogenic microorganisms in the final product water. At this time, no federal regulations have
been established specifically for DPR. The California Division of Drinking Water (DDW) and
the National Water Research Institute (NWRI) recently established stringent
requirements/guidelines for pathogen removal in potable reuse applications to achieve the
benchmark risk of 10-4 per person per year (CDPH, 2014). Both frameworks specify 12-log and
10-log reductions for viruses and Cryptosporidium, respectively, while DDW also requires 10-
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log reduction of Giardia and NWRI recommends 9-log reduction of bacteria. The recommended
guideline may vary statewide and on a case by case basis. Although, there is no specific
guideline in Texas for DPR projects, Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ)
requires at least 8- 5.5- 6 log reductions of viruses, Cryptosporidium, and Giardia, respectively,
after secondary treatment of wastewater (TWDB, 2015). Higher log removals may be required
based on site-specific data. For example, TCEQ requires 9- 5.5- 8 log reductions of virus,
Cryptosporidium, and Giardia, respectively, for the Wichita Falls DPR project (Tchobanoglous
et al., 2015). However, since the recommended guidelines by TCEQ utilizes secondary treated
wastewater as the starting point and does not give any credit to conventional wastewater
treatment as California and NWRI criteria do, it is likely to achieve the same quality of water as
California and NWRI at the end point. Expert panel recommended any of these approaches (i.e.,
NWRI expert panel approach, California IPR approach, or TCEQ DPR approach) could be
adopted by New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) for DPR projects on a case by case
basis (NWRI, 2016b). Australian guidelines for water recycling utilizes a health target of 10 -6
DALYs pppy (Disability adjusted life years per person per year) which requires 8.1- 9.5- 8 log
reductions of Campylobacter, viruses, and Cryptosporidium, respectively, for untreated
wastewater. Because of these extensive levels of treatment, potable reuse systems must rely on
robust and redundant barriers achieving high disinfectant doses, reliable physical removal (e.g.,
media or membrane filtration), and/or prolonged aquifer storage (Gerrity et al., 2014). In theory,
many of these barriers are capable of achieving these treatment benchmarks under optimal
conditions, but periodic operational upsets or even complete failures might have significant
adverse impacts on public health. Moreover, there is significant uncertainty in determining
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appropriate operational targets for certain parameters, specifically dilution ratio and storage time
in environmental buffers.
Depending on the process included in each treatment train, different log removals of
pathogens may be achieved. Pathogen log reduction credits for different treatment processes are
shown in Table 2.2.
Table 2-2. Pathogen log removal credits for different treatment processes
Treatment unit Process
Conventional activated sludge (CAS)
Microfiltration (MF)
Ultrafiltration (UF)
Reverse Osmosis (RO)
Biological Activated Carbon (BAC)
UV/AOP
Ozone (min CT=1 mg*min/l)

Free chlorine
a

Virus
1b
0a
1a
1.5a
0a
6a
5a
6a

Expected Log reduction Credits
Giardia Cryptosporidium Total coliform bacteriab
0b
0b
2
a
a
4
4
4
4a
4a
4
a
a
1.5
1.5
2
a
a
0
0
0
6a
6a
6
a
a
3
0
4
3a
0a
4

Tchobanoglous et al. (2015)
Trussell et al. (2016)

b

2.3

Reliability framework
Many potable reuse treatment trains are capable of satisfying public health requirements

during periods of optimal performance. However, there is always the possibility of a failure in
one or more treatment barriers that could affect the performance of downstream processes (i.e., a
‘domino effect’) and the overall log removals in a treatment train. With the widespread
implementation of potable reuse, it is important to fully understand the “4Rs” framework in
relation to public health (Fig. 2.2): reliability (providing a safe and reliable source of drinking
water) through redundancy (multi-barrier approach based on additional treatment or monitoring),
robustness (significant attenuation of a broad range of contaminants), and resiliency (automated
response to failures during treatment) (Pecson et al., 2015). The fundamental goal of the 4Rs
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approach is to reduce the frequency and severity of system failures and to properly respond to
failures if they occur.

Failure Prevention

Failure Response

2-2. Representation
a reliability framework
for potable
reuse systems
Figure 1.Figure
Representation
of aofreliability
framework
for potable

Evaluating failure modes in a wastewater treatment plant and their associated
consequences was first described in Mallory & Waller (1973). More recently, Forss & Ander
(2011) conducted a comprehensive QMRA that studied the effects of treatment process failures
in a DPR application. Beyond that study, there are few frameworks for incorporating treatment
process failures into potable reuse QMRAs so the associated implications for water quality and
public health are unclear.
Characterizing the significance of treatment process failure is critical for comparisons of
IPR and DPR. According to NRC (2012), environmental buffers may not always be necessary to
provide adequate public health protection. Instead, advanced treatment processes may allow for
purified water to be delivered directly into a drinking water distribution system. On the other
hand, a recent study indicated that blending advanced treated water with raw surface water
upstream of a conventional drinking water treatment plant may still offer significant reductions
12

in public health risks (Soller et al., 2016). As a result, further investigations are required to fully
understand the impact of environmental buffers in water quality.
2.4

Alternative ozone-biofiltration treatment trains
Due to sustainability concerns with RO (Gerrity et al., 2014), some communities are

already employing or exploring the feasibility of ozone-biofiltration (Gerrity et al., 2013), as this
treatment combination is equally capable of satisfying most public health criteria (Trussell et al.,
2016). Ozone-biofiltration is unable to remove TDS without the use of RO or significant
blending ratios, but some systems with low-TDS source waters may not require TDS reduction—
even in DPR applications. Also, in the presence of precursors, there is a potential formation of
disinfection by-products (DBPs) during ozonation (Gerrity et al., 2014). However, the public
health risks associated with ozone-biofiltration need to be better characterized and
communicated to overcome the perception (or reality) of RO as a superior treatment process.
Using O3-BAC as an alternative for RO-based treatment trains (i.e., MF-RO-UV/H2O2) could
save up to $51 million in capital cost and up to $4.3 million in O&M costs (Gerrity et al., 2014)
Several existing (or recently decommissioned) ozone-biofiltration trains are shown in
Fig. 2.3 (Gerrity et al, 2013). The treatment train in Figure2.3A is employed in Gwinnett County,
GA, USA (also includes lime softening). The treatment train in Figure 2.3B was employed in
Gerringong, New South Wales, Australia, but has recently been decommissioned. The treatment
train in Figure 2.3C is employed in El Paso, Texas, USA (also includes PAC in secondary
treatment process and lime softening). Specifically, Figure 2.3A represents the advanced
treatment train for planned IPR, and Figure 2.3B is similar to the advanced treatment train for
DPR.
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Figure 2-3. Examples ozone-based treatment trains for the production of high quality product water for
potable reuse applications

There is insufficient evidence to determine whether potable reuse potentially poses
greater risks than more conventional drinking water systems, or whether potable reuse is actually
a safer and more reliable option. Additional studies are needed to address these questions, with
the ultimate goal of informing future regulatory and operational decision-making processes. One
tool that is often used to aid in these decision-making processes, particularly in the context of
public health, is a quantitative microbial risk assessment (QMRA), which is an iterative
modeling approach that relies on statistical probabilities to assess the risks posed by exposure to
one or more pathogenic microorganisms.
2.5

Quantitative Microbial Risk Assessment (QMRA)
Health risk and probability of infection associated with exposure to a pathogen in drinking

water can be determined by a quantitative microbial risk assessment (QMRA) (Haas et al., 2015).
QMRA is a powerful tool, particularly in potable reuse applications, because it employs
mathematical models to evaluate the performance and reliability of water reuse systems. The
results of the QMRA can be used to characterize the overall public health risks, identify adverse
outcomes, and ultimately aid in risk management, risk communication, and decision-making
(Beaudequin et al., 2015). A general framework for QMRA consists of four fundamental steps
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including: 1) problem formulation and hazard identification which collects general information
about the microbial agent (pathogens) and the adverse health effects, 2) exposure assessment
which estimate the probability of infection given a known dose of pathogens using mathematical
dose-response relationships, 3) dose-response assessment which estimates the pathogen dose
corresponding to the expected pathogen exposure, and 4) risk characterization which integrates
information from the previous steps to estimate the risk of infection and characterize the
significance of the risk within a specific context (Petterson et al., 2006).
Generally, there are two types of QMRAs: static and dynamic. The key difference between
these two models is time dependency, which means the number of individuals susceptible to
infection is time-invariant in a static model and time-variant in a dynamic model. Comparison
between static and dynamic QMRA is shown in Table 2.3. Both static and dynamic QMRAs have
been used to facilitate decision making in municipal, recreational, and agricultural applications
(Soller et al., 2006; Olivieri et al., 2014a; Olivieri et al., 2014b). QMRAs have also been used to
evaluate risks associated with de facto reuse along the Trinity River (Wu, 2015), hypothetical IPR
scenarios (NRC, 2012), and even DPR (Forss & Ander, 2011; Soller et al., 2016).
Ames et al. (2014) conducted a static QMRA to evaluate the effect of wet weather
overflows on the effluent from the wastewater treatment plant in Oakland, California and the
quality of San Francisco Bay receiving water. The annual risk due to exposure to adenovirus and
Giardia spp. was estimated which resulted in more than one order-of-magnitude below the EPA
benchmark level for recreation events expect for the worse case outfall location.

15

Table 2-3. Comparison of static and dynamic QMRA
Static QMRA

Dynamic QMRA

The number of individuals susceptible to infection is
time invariant

The number of individuals susceptible to infection is
time variant

Direct exposure (environment-to-person)

Direct (environment-to-person) and indirect
exposure (person-to-person/ person-to-environmentto-person)

Individual-based risk

Population-based risk

Potential for secondary transmission of infection or
disease is typically not considered or assumed as a
constant factor if it is.

Potential for secondary transmission of infection or
disease is considered and the magnitude of
transmission is a function of susceptible, infected
and immune population.

Immunity to infection from microbial agents is
typically not considered.

Exposed individuals may not be susceptible to
infection or disease because they may already be
infected or may be immune from infection due to
prior exposure.

Dose-response function is the critical health
component.

The dose-response function is important; however,
factors specific to the transmission of infectious
diseases may also be important.

Table adapted from Olivieri et al. (2014b)
The California Department of Public Health (CDPH) has performed a static QMRA to
assess the public health risk associated with increasing the use of recycled water for irrigation
purposes (Olivieri et al., 2014). The QMRA resulted in median annual risk in the range of 10-810-4 for enteric viruses, Cryptosporidium, Giardia, and E. coli which was compliant with the
benchmark risk.
Forss & Ander, 2011 conducted a comprehensive static QMRA in the New Goreangab
water reclamation plant in Windhoek, Namibia. The study evaluated microbiological quality of
water under different operational conditions including optimal, sub-optima, and outbreak
condition. Ozonation and ultrafiltration (UF) processes were found to have significant impact on
reduction of Giardia and Cryptosporidium, respectively. The study also proposed the use of UV
light as an effective process for further removal of Cryptosporidium especially during outbreak
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conditions. It has been suggested that incorporating more realistic failure times in QMRA
framework would result in more accurate results.
More recently, Soller et al. (2017) and Soller et al. (2018) have performed QMRA to
evaluate public health risk associated with DPR systems. They identified NoV as a pathogen of
concern which may drive the risk in DPR systems given specific treatment processes. Also, results
indicated that FAT systems require either high doses of UV disinfection or blending upstream of
drinking water treatment facility to achieve the benchmark risk of infection due to exposure to
NoV. Likewise, it was suggested that treatment trains which do not employ RO in advanced
treatment processes, needs to either provide advanced oxidation process with high doses of UV or
blending upstream of drinking water treatment facility to achieve the benchmark risk of infection
due to exposure to Cryptosporidium.
Chaudhary et al. (2017) evaluated microbial risk associated with IPR and DPR systems
using a QMRA approach. The study indicated that DPR systems generally pose lower risk of
infection than de facto reuse system and that potable reuse systems which utilized surface water
as a discharge/blending point for advanced treated wastewater resulted in similar risk than de facto
reuse systems. This showed that concentration of pathogens in upstream surface water was the
dominant factor in estimating risk of infection.
The dynamic disease transmission model was first designed and implemented by Eisenberg
et al., 1996 which included different epidemiological states of the disease. Soller et al. (2003)
performed the QMRA dynamic model in the City of Stockton, California to evaluate the beneficial
effects on public health implementing an additional wastewater treatment during winter when
discharge of secondary treated effluent into the San Joauin River can cause health risk associated
to recreation events. The level of viral gastroenteritis was used to compare the effect of the
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additional filtration process. Other dynamic QMRA studies are utilized in Newport Bay, Orange
County, California (Soller et al., 2006) and in Mamala Bay, Hawaii (Cooper et al., 1996) to
evaluate the public health risk associated to recreational exposure. Eisenberg et al. (1996)
employed a dynamic disease transmission model to evaluate the risk of giardiasis by swimming in
the recreational reservoirs which were augmented by reclaimed water. Several studies performed
dynamic QMRA to evaluate cryptosporidiosis outbreak in Milwaukee (Eisenberg et al., 1998;
Eisenberg et al., 2005; Brookhart et al., 2002; Soller and Eisenberg, 2008). Eisenberg et al. (2004)
evaluated microbial health risks associated with exposure to biosolids-amended soil which
demonstrated that secondary transmission of disease play an important role in disease incidence.
The incidence of disease increases at higher rates of secondary transmission.
2.6

System Dynamics
System dynamics (SD) models are important tools to analyze the structure and behavior

of the complex systems and to evaluate the effect of different policies on management of the
problem (Pejic Bach & Ceric, 2007). System dynamics models need to be developed in several
steps. First, the problem and its importance are identified. Spatial scale, temporal scale, and key
variables and concepts must be defined (Stermen, 2000; Park, 2014). During the second step,
initial hypothesis is generated, feedback processes is discovered, and cause and effect
relationships between different system elements are represented using causal loop diagrams
(Stermen, 2000; Park, 2014). In the third step, a computer simulation model is developed based
on the relationships between the system’s components, initial conditions, and estimation of
parameters. In the fourth step, the model is tested to compare the temporal behavior of the
system with the recorded behavior of the system. Other evaluation tests are also conducted such
as extreme condition tests (to evaluate the robustness of the model), sensitivity analysis (to
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evaluate the behavior of the model with uncertainty in parameters and initial conditions),
integration error, etc. (Pejic Bach & Ceric, 2007; Stermen, 2000; Park, 2014). In the last step, the
behavior of the system is analyzed under different scenarios and policy options that may arise in
the future to compare the effect of different policies and to find out whether there is any
interaction between them (Stermen, 2000; Park, 2014). System dynamics is a mathematical
simulation methodology that describes the complex effects of the system elements and their
inter-relationships using stocks, flows, convertors, and arrows. Different modeling software is
being used for system dynamic methodology such as Vensim, STELLA, DYNAMO, Analytica,
Powersim, etc (Park et al., 2014; Simonovic & Rajasekaram, 2004). The concept of SD is first
propounded by Forrester (1958) to analyze the behavior of an industrial organization and to
improve management control. More recently, SD has also been applied for environmental
problems such as water resources management including reservoir operations and flood
predictions and managements (Ahmad and Simonovic 2000; 2001; 2004; 2006), wastewater
treatment and reuse (Park et al., 2014), various water applications (Tamaddun et al., 2018; Chen
et al., 2017; Ahmad 2016; Mirchi et al., 2012), environmental management applications
(Amoueyan et al., 2017; Venkatesan et al., 2011a,b; Rusuli et al., 2015), water resources
problems in Lake Mead and the Las Vegas water supply system (Stave 2003; Nussbaum et al.,
2015), effects of climate change on water resources (Dawadi et al., 2012, 2013; Zhang et al.,
2016), water resources vulnerability and water allocations (Wu et al., 2013; Qaiser et al., 2011,
2013), carbon footprint of water projects (Shrestha et al., 2011, 2012), water and land availability
and usage for solar systems (Bukhary et al., 2017), water conservation (Ahmad and Prashar
2010) and energy planning (Moumoni et al. 2014). Other examples in this field include: the
CanadaWater model developed by Simonovic & Rajasekaram (2004) which deals with water
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resource problems in Canada that takes into consideration the available water resources,
wastewater treatment, economic and population growth, energy generation and food production;
and application of the SD methodology using LINGO as a linear programming procedure for
sustainable development of water resources in China focusing on water recycling by Xiang et al.
(2013).
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3.1

Abstract
This study evaluated the reliability and equivalency of three different potable reuse

paradigms: (1) surface water augmentation via de facto reuse with conventional wastewater
treatment; (2) surface water augmentation via planned indirect potable reuse (IPR) with
ultrafiltration, pre-ozone, biological activated carbon (BAC), and post-ozone; and (3) direct
potable reuse (DPR) with ultrafiltration, ozone, BAC, and UV disinfection. A quantitative
microbial risk assessment (QMRA) was performed to (1) quantify the risk of infection from
Cryptosporidium oocysts; (2) compare the risks associated with different potable reuse systems
under optimal and sub-optimal conditions; and (3) identify critical model/operational parameters
based on sensitivity analyses. The annual risks of infection associated with the de facto and
planned IPR systems were generally consistent with those of conventional drinking water
systems [mean of (9.4±0.3)×10-5 to (4.5±0.1)×10-4], while DPR was clearly superior [mean of
(6.1±67)×10-9 during sub-optimal operation]. Because the advanced treatment train in the
planned IPR system was highly effective in reducing Cryptosporidium concentrations, the
associated risks were generally dominated by the pathogen loading already present in the surface
water. As a result, risks generally decreased with higher recycled water contributions (RWCs).
Advanced treatment failures were generally inconsequential either due to the robustness of the
advanced treatment train (i.e., DPR) or resiliency provided by the environmental buffer (i.e.,
planned IPR). Storage time in the environmental buffer was important for the de facto reuse
system, and the model indicated a critical storage time of approximately 105 days. Storage times
shorter than the critical value resulted in significant increases in risk. The conclusions from this
study can be used to inform regulatory decision making and aid in the development of design or
operational criteria for IPR and DPR systems.
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3.2

Introduction
In recent years, indirect potable reuse (IPR) and direct potable reuse (DPR) have become

more common due to population growth and increased water demand, especially in communities
with limited or variable water resources. A historically common form of IPR is known as
unplanned or de facto reuse (Rice et al., 2013; Rice et al., 2015), in which the source water for a
drinking water treatment plant (DWTP) is impacted by treated wastewater effluent from an
upstream community. These systems may not have permits specifically addressing augmentation
of source water with treated wastewater (Cotruvo & Bell, 2014), and they may not satisfy recent
potable reuse guidelines/regulations addressing the chemical and microbial risks posed by this
practice. Planned IPR and DPR systems explicitly acknowledge these risks and, as a result,
generally employ advanced water and/or wastewater treatment processes to ensure adequate
protection of public health.
The primary distinction between IPR and DPR is that IPR incorporates an environmental
buffer as a discharge and blending point (USEPA, 2012). The environmental buffer provides
natural treatment barriers and is also used as a psychological barrier to improve public perception
(Khan, 2013). DPR replaces the environmental buffer with additional treatment, monitoring,
and/or the inclusion of an engineered storage buffer (Leverenz et al., 2011; Tchobanoglous et al.,
2015). The engineered storage buffer is intended to provide response retention time to react to
failures in the advanced treatment train, which are identified by monitoring critical control points
(Tchobanoglous et al., 2011; NWRI, 2016a). Although advanced treatment may be adequate to
deliver purified water directly into a drinking water distribution system, a recent study indicates
that blending with raw water upstream of a conventional drinking water treatment plant may still
offer significant reductions in public health risks (Soller et al., 2016).
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Existing regulatory frameworks for IPR or DPR require specific treatment trains and/or
compliance with stringent water quality metrics. For example, the California Division of
Drinking Water (DDW) requires “full advanced treatment” (FAT) consisting of reverse osmosis
(RO) and an advanced oxidation process (AOP) for planned IPR systems that directly inject
recycled water into local aquifers (CDPH, 2014) or rely on surface water augmentation (NWRI,
2016b). Many other IPR projects throughout the world (e.g., Arizona, Singapore, and Australia)
also employ RO and UV or UV/H2O2 to ensure adequate protection of public health (Gerrity et
al., 2013). This treatment train has been shown to be effective in addressing known public health
risks (Trussell et al., 2016) and is assumed to be sufficiently robust to mitigate unknown public
health risks (CDPH, 2014), at least from a microbial standpoint. RO-based treatment trains can
also achieve very low concentrations of total dissolved solids (TDS) and total organic carbon
(TOC), which is important for achieving 0.5 mg/L of wastewater-derived TOC in California
(CDPH, 2014). Due to sustainability concerns with RO (Gerrity et al., 2014), some communities
are already employing or exploring the feasibility of ozone-biofiltration (Gerrity et al., 2013), as
this treatment combination is equally capable of satisfying most public health criteria (Trussell et
al., 2016). Ozone-biofiltration is unable to remove TDS without the use of RO or significant
blending ratios, but some systems with low-TDS source waters may not require TDS reduction—
even in DPR applications. However, the public health risks associated with ozone-biofiltration
need to be better characterized and communicated to overcome the perception (or reality) of RO
as a superior treatment process.
One of the primary drivers for the design of potable reuse treatment trains is mitigating
risks associated with water-borne pathogens. Based on literature compiled in Trussell et al.
(2013), a panel of public health experts recommended 12-10-9-log reduction of viruses,
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Cryptosporidium, and total coliform bacteria, respectively, for potable reuse systems targeting
annual risks of infection of 10-4 (NWRI, 2013). These recommendations are also consistent with
the California DDW’s 12-10-10-log reduction requirements for viruses, Cryptosporidium, and
Giardia, respectively (CDPH, 2014). Many potable reuse treatment trains are capable of
satisfying these pathogen requirements during periods of optimal performance. However, there is
always the possibility of a failure in one or more treatment barriers that could affect the
performance of downstream processes (i.e., a ‘domino effect’) and the overall log removals in a
treatment train. With the widespread implementation of potable reuse, it is important to fully
understand the “reliability” (Pecson et al., 2015) and “equivalency” (Trussell et al., 2016) of the
various treatment paradigms and to identify critical operational conditions.
One way to achieve this goal is to perform a quantitative microbial risk assessment
(QMRA), in which experimental data can be combined with mathematical models and statistical
probabilities to estimate the risk of infection associated with a particular microbial hazard (Haas
& Rose, 1995). The results of the QMRA can be used to characterize overall public health risks,
identify adverse outcomes, and ultimately aid in risk management, risk communication, and
decision making (Beaudequin et al., 2015; Petterson and Ashbolt, 2016). Both static (timeinvariant) and dynamic (time-variant) QMRAs have been used to facilitate decision making in
municipal, recreational, and agricultural applications (Soller et al., 2006; Olivieri et al., 2014a;
Olivieri et al., 2014b). QMRAs have also been used to evaluate risks associated with de facto
reuse along the Trinity River (Wu, 2015; Lim et al., 2016), hypothetical IPR scenarios (NRC,
2012), and even DPR (Forss & Ander, 2011; Soller et al., 2016).
The current study expands the QMRA knowledge base for potable reuse through the use
of a system dynamics platform. System dynamics is a non-linear, mathematical simulation of
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complex, interrelated system elements, which are represented as ‘stocks’, ‘flows’, ‘convertors’,
and ‘arrows’ (Text S7; Forrester, 1958). This non-linear approach has been used to model water
resources management and water quality scenarios (Stave, 2003; Venkatesan et al., 2011a;
Dawadi & Ahmad, 2013; Rehan et al., 2013; Wu et al., 2013a); climate change impacts on water
resources (Dawadi & Ahmad, 2012; Zhang et al., 2016; Simonovic & Rajasekaram, 2004); the
water-energy nexus (Shrestha et al., 2011; 2012); and even recycled water applications
(Venkatesan et al., 2011b; Qaiser et al., 2013; Xiang et al., 2013). Winz et al. (2009) and Mirchi
et al. (2012) provide detailed reviews of system dynamics applications related to water resources.
System dynamics can also be used to model temporal variability in potable reuse
applications, including changes in population structure, water quality, and treatment process
performance. As such, the main objective of this study was to develop a system dynamics model
to quantify the risk of cryptosporidiosis from ingestion of drinking water and to compare the
risks associated with three different potable reuse systems: (1) surface water augmentation via de
facto reuse with conventional wastewater treatment; (2) surface water augmentation via planned
IPR with ultrafiltration, pre-ozone, BAC, and post-ozone; and (3) DPR with ultrafiltration,
ozone, BAC, and UV disinfection. This model focused on quantifying and comparing baseline
risks, determining critical values for some design/operational parameters (e.g., reservoir storage
time), and evaluating sensitivity to water quality, operational conditions, and treatment failure.
Three different scenarios encompassing a range of bin classifications were considered for the de
facto reuse and planned IPR systems, and two different scenarios (or treatment objectives) were
considered for the UV disinfection process in the DPR system: Cryptosporidium inactivation and
NDMA attenuation. This model also serves as the foundation for future dynamic models
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incorporating disease transmission and secondary exposure pathways, thereby closing the loop
between finished drinking water and raw wastewater.
3.3

Methodology

3.3.1 Risk Calculations
Cryptosporidium was identified as the hazard for this QMRA. Exposure to
Cryptosporidium was limited to primary pathways (i.e., ingestion via drinking water) and did not
consider secondary exposure to infected individuals or fomites. The final concentration of
Cryptosporidium was calculated based on initial concentrations in raw wastewater and log
reduction estimates for engineered treatment processes and the environmental buffer (when
applicable). An exponential dose response model (Eq. 3.1) was used to estimate the daily
probability of infection due to ingestion of treated drinking water (Teunis et al., 1997; Zhang et
al., 2012).
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑓,𝑑 = 1 − 𝑒 −𝑟𝐶𝑤

(Eq. 3.1)

where, Pinf,d = daily probability of infection
r = dose response (infectivity) parameter, oocysts-1
C = oocyst concentration in ingested drinking water, oocysts/L
w = daily water consumption rate, L.
In this study, a daily water consumption rate of 2 L/day was assumed (USEPA, 2004;
WHO, 2008), although the USEPA recently increased its default drinking water consumption
rate to 2.4 L/day based on community ingestion at the 90th percentile (USEPA, 2015a).
A value of 0.00419 oocysts-1 (Barbeau et al., 2000; Zhang et al., 2012) was selected as
the dose response parameter for the current study, but a range of values has been reported in the
literature: 0.0022 oocysts-1 (Messner & Berger, 2016); 0.0572 oocysts-1 (Messner et al., 2001);
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and 0.09 oocysts-1 (USEPA, 2006c). The current study addressed this uncertainty by assessing
the sensitivity of the model to this published range. It should also be noted that alternative
Cryptosporidium dose response models (e.g., fractional Poisson, beta-Poisson, exponential with
immunity) were recently proposed by Messner & Berger (2016), but these were not considered
in the current study.
The annual risk of infection was then calculated using Eq. 3.2 (Karavarsamis &
Hamilton, 2010).
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑓,𝑎 = 1 − ∏365
𝑖=1 (1 − 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑓,𝑑 )𝑖

(Eq. 3.2)

where, Pinf,a = annual probability of infection.
Several different frameworks were used to compare the risks posed by the different
potable reuse systems. An annual risk of 10-4 has been used as a benchmark in previous studies
(Regli et al., 1991; Ryu et al., 2007; NWRI, 2013; Trussell et al., 2013; CDPH, 2014; Soller et
al., 2016), but it is not the formal basis for federal drinking water regulations for
Cryptosporidium in the United States (U.S.). Instead, the Long Term 2 Enhanced Surface Water
Treatment Rule (LT2) classifies source waters into different categories, or bins, based on their
average Cryptosporidium concentrations. Drinking water utilities must then achieve the
Cryptosporidium log reductions required by their bin classifications (USEPA, 2010a). This study
compared the annual risks of infection calculated by Eq. 2 against the risks associated with
compliance with LT2. A summary of baseline LT2 risk estimates is included in the
Supplementary Information (SI) in Figure S1.
The experimental treatment trains were also evaluated against the WHO guidelines for
drinking water quality, which are based on disease burden and disability adjusted life years
(DALYs). WHO recommends a target of 10-6 DALYs/person-year (WHO, 2008). The disease
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burden for Cryptosporidium was calculated according to Eqs. 3.3 and 3.4 (Zhang et al., 2012;
Health Canada, 2012).
𝑅 = 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑓,𝑎 × 𝑆 × 𝐼

(Eq. 3.3)

𝐷=𝑅 × 𝜔

(Eq. 3.4)

where, R = risk of illness per year for an individual
Pinf,a = probability of infection per year (see Eq. 3.2)
S = proportion of population susceptible to infection
I = proportion of population that develops symptomatic illness after infection
D = disease burden, DALYs/person-year
𝜔 = health burden, DALYs/case
In addition to the LT2 and WHO frameworks, this study also considered the 10-log
reduction target for Cryptosporidium (NWRI, 2013; CDPH, 2014) in determining appropriate
operational conditions for the treatment trains described later. The constants used in the
aforementioned equations are summarized in Table 3.1.
3.3.2 System Dynamics Model
A general description of system dynamics is provided in the SI in Text S7. Probabilities
of infection were based on daily simulations of a STELLA 10.1 (ISEE Systems, Lebanon, NH)
system dynamics model over a duration of 365 days. Statistical analyses were based on the
results of 10,000 model iterations (Barreto & Howland, 2005; Martorell et al., 2008). For the de
facto reuse and planned IPR systems, typical Cryptosporidium concentrations were assumed to
be present in the upstream surface water feeding the community (described later), and these
systems were also augmented with treated wastewater discharges from within the community.
This is slightly different from the original definition of de facto reuse (i.e., upstream community
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impacting a downstream community), but it allows for simplification of the model while still
maintaining the principal element of de facto reuse (i.e., limited treatment prior to environmental
discharge).
Table 3-1. Summary of the parameters and values used in the system dynamics model
Parameter
Risk
calculations

I
S
ω

Description
Proportion of symptomatic illness
Susceptible proportion of population
Health burden of Cryptosporidium

Value
0.7
100%
0.0017

Units
unitless
unitless
DALYs/case

Reference
Zhang et al. (2012)
Zhang et al. (2012)
Health Canada (2012)

r

Infectivity parameter

0.00419

oocysts-1

w
Cc
O3/TOC
TOCWW
TOCUF
O3
IOD
𝑘o 3
t O3
T
CT

Daily water consumption rate
Influent oocyst concentration
O3/TOC ratio
TOC concentration in 2° effluent
TOC concentration in UF filtrate
Applied ozone dose
Instantaneous ozone demand
First order ozone decay rate constant
Ozone contact time
Temperature
Ozone CT

2
Lognormal (78, 112)3
1.1
7.2
6.3
6.9
4.0
0.54
5
25
5.0

L/per-day
oocysts/L
mgO3/mgC
mgC/L
mgC/L
mg/L
mg/L
min -1
min
°C
mg-min/L

Barbeau et al. (2000); (Ryu, Alum,
Mena, & Abbaszadegan, 2007)
WHO (2008)
Rose et al. (2005)
Gerrity et al. (2014)
Gamage et al. (2013)
Trussell et al. (2016)
Calculated
Text S3
Text S3
Text S3
Assumed
Text S3

Post-ozone1

O3 CT
O3
t O3
T

Ozone CT
Applied ozone dose
Ozone contact time
Temperature

10
5.1
30
25

mg-min/L
mg/L
min
°C

Text S3
Calculated (based on target O3 CT)
Assumed (complete ozone decay)
Assumed

Environmental
buffer

𝑘4℃
λ
Tsw

Oocyst decay rate constant at 4ºC
Dimensionless temperature modifier
Temperature of surface water
Baseline condition
Critical condition
Recycled water contribution
Storage time
Baseline condition
Critical condition
UV incident (maximum) intensity
UV average intensity
UV path length
UV absorbance of ozonated UF
effluent
UV dose
UV exposure time
Oocyst inactivation rate constant

0.0093
0.095

day-1
unitless

Peng et al. (2008)
Peng et al. (2008)

20
10
20%

°C
°C
unitless

Assumed [based on Peng et al. (2008)]
Assumed (based on sensitivity analysis)
Assumed [based on Rice et al. (2013)]

270
105
25
11.4
10
0.080

days
days
mW/cm2
mJ/cm2
cm
cm-1

(Wu, 2015)
Assumed (based on sensitivity analysis)
Assumed (based on commercial system)
Calculated (Eq. 13)
Assumed [based on Lee et al. (2016)]
Text S5

80
7.0
0.243

mJ/cm2
seconds
(mJ/cm2)-1

NWRI (2012)
Calculated (Eq. 14)
Hijnen et al. (2006)

Wastewater
Pre-ozone1

RWC
t sw
UV2

I0
IAVG
x
kA
D
tUV
𝑘UV

1

Additional details in Text S2-S4; 2Additional details in Text S5-S6; 3(Mean, Standard Deviation) with
μ = 3.80 and σ = 1.06

The additional Cryptosporidium from the treated wastewater was determined from typical
raw wastewater concentrations (see Table 3.1) combined with output (i.e., treatment
performance, failure mode, etc.) from the model simulation. In the de facto reuse and planned
IPR systems, the degree of treatment incorporated into each scenario differed based on LT2 bin
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classification requirements (described later). For the DPR system, there was no upstream surface
water so all drinking water was provided by the advanced treated recycled water from within the
community. The various water systems are depicted in Figure 3.1, and the unit processes used in
each treatment train are depicted in Fig 3.2.

Figure 3-1. Potable reuse systems considered in this study (A) de facto reuse with upstream base loading
of Cryptosporidium, (B) planned IPR with upstream base loading of Cryptosporidium, and (C) ‘closedloop’ DPR. The wastewater-derived loadings of Cryptosporidium in (A) and (B) were modeled based on
recycled water contributions, and the upstream base loadings of Cryptosporidium were modeled with
three hypothetical scenarios (see Table 3.2). The AWWTPs differ based on the order of the unit processes
and the final disinfection step: ozone for IPR and UV for DPR (see Figure 3.2). *WWTP = conventional
wastewater treatment plant, SW = surface water, DWTP = conventional drinking water treatment plant, AWWTP =
advanced wastewater treatment plant

Figure 3-2. The treatment processes included in each sector of the system dynamics model
(A) conventional wastewater treatment plant, (B) conventional drinking water treatment plant, (C)
advanced wastewater treatment plant for the planned IPR system, and (D) advanced wastewater treatment
plant for the DPR system. The operational conditions and expected performance of each unit process is
summarized in Table 3.1.
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The STELLA model included five different interconnected ‘sectors’ representing the
major model components: (1) a conventional and advanced (if applicable) wastewater treatment
plant; (2) a conventional drinking water treatment plant (for the IPR systems only); (3) the
probability of infection calculated from the final Cryptosporidium concentration in the finished
drinking water; (4) the bin classification, which was used to define the log removal credit for the
conventional drinking water treatment plant in accordance with the LT2; and (5) the risk of
infection and disease burden. Concentrations of Cryptosporidium in raw sewage and upstream
surface water were modeled as probability distributions, the advanced treatment processes (e.g.,
pre-ozonation, post-ozonation, and UV disinfection) were modeled with dynamic algorithms
(described later), and the remaining parameters and treatment processes were modeled using
equations and output from the model or as point estimates when relevant data were not available
in the literature. The system dynamics model was validated based on suggestions in Sterman
(2000). These tests included structure assessment, dimensional consistency, parameter
assessment, integration error (numerical integration method), behavior reproduction, and
sensitivity analyses.
3.3.2.1 Conventional Wastewater Treatment Plant
Each of the potable reuse systems was modeled with a sector representing a conventional
wastewater treatment plant (WWTP), which was assumed to include primary sedimentation, an
activated sludge process, and secondary sedimentation (Figure 3.2A). Disinfection was omitted
to make the model applicable to facilities that do not employ final disinfection or facilities that
employ disinfection achieving minimal inactivation of Cryptosporidium oocysts (e.g.,
chlorination or chloramination). The concentration of Cryptosporidium in the raw wastewater
was estimated as a lognormal distribution with a mean of 78 oocysts/L and a standard deviation
33

of 112 oocysts/L (μ = 3.80 and σ = 1.06) (Rose et al., 2005). To account for reports of higher
Cryptosporidium concentrations [e.g., mean of 242 oocysts/L in Robertson et al. (2006)], the
current study included a sensitivity analysis on this parameter (described later).
Some recent studies recommend no Cryptosporidium credit for conventional WWTPs
due to the lack of published data describing possible correlations between removal/inactivation
of Cryptosporidium and secondary effluent water quality (Tchobanoglous et al., 2015). However,
in this study, a constant 1-log removal credit was used as a conservative point estimate for
WWTP removal (Rose et al., 2005).
3.3.2.2 Planned Indirect Potable Reuse – Advanced Wastewater Treatment Plant #1
In addition to the conventional WWTP sector, the planned IPR system included a sector
representing an advanced WWTP employing ultrafiltration (UF), pre-ozonation, BAC, and postozonation (Figure 3.2C). This treatment train may be considered unsuitable for DPR because it
may not consistently achieve the recommended 10-log reduction for Cryptosporidium unless
high ozone CT values are achieved in both ozone steps—likely resulting in elevated bromate
concentrations.
UF is considered a reliable barrier against nearly all pathogens, particularly larger
microbes such as Cryptosporidium (Jacangelo et al., 1995), and current regulatory frameworks
award 4-log removal for microfiltration (MF) or UF (Tchobanoglous et al., 2015). Ozonation has
been shown to be highly effective in converting complex bulk organic matter into simpler, more
biodegradable compounds, which improves overall TOC removal during subsequent biofiltration
processes (Snyder et al., 2014). Ozone is also effective in destroying a wide range of trace
organic compounds (TOrCs) (Lee et al., 2013). Therefore, pre-ozonation is often employed for
these treatment objectives, and disinfection is an ancillary benefit. Although BAC has not been
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shown to play an important role in pathogen attenuation, it has significant impacts on TOC
reduction (Reungoat et al., 2010; Trussell et al., 2016), attenuation of N-nitrosodimethylamine
(NDMA) (Gerrity et al., 2015; Trussell et al., 2016), and TOrC removal (Reungoat et al., 2010;
Gerrity et al., 2011). In contrast with the pre-ozonation step, post-ozonation for final disinfection
is typically controlled and monitored based on disinfection objectives.
For pre-ozonation, ozone dosing was based on O3/TOC ratio because this parameter
achieves similar relative treatment efficacy in diverse wastewater qualities (Lee et al., 2013). To
extend this concept to disinfection efficacy, particularly for Cryptosporidium, it was necessary to
develop estimates for instantaneous ozone demand (IOD) and the ozone decay rate constant as a
function of O3/TOC ratio. These parameters were then coupled with contact time and wastewater
temperature to estimate ozone CT and log inactivation. The IOD and the ozone decay rate
constant were determined according to Eqs. 3.5 and 3.6, respectively. These equations were
developed based on previous bench-scale ozone experiments in five different secondary effluents
(Gamage et al., 2013; Snyder et al., 2014). Additional details are provided in the SI in Text S2
and Text S3.
𝑂

0.6679

3
𝐼𝑂𝐷 = 𝑇𝑂𝐶 × 0.6025 × (𝑇𝑂𝐶
)

R2 = 0.93 (Eq. 3.5)

where, IOD = instantaneous ozone demand, mg/L
𝑂3
𝑇𝑂𝐶
𝑂3
𝑇𝑂𝐶

≤ 0.25

𝑘𝑜3 = 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑

> 0.25

3
𝑘𝑜3 = 𝑇𝑂𝐶 × 0.1001 × (𝑇𝑂𝐶
)

(Eq. 3.6a)
𝑂

−1.605

R2 = 0.71 (Eq. 3.6b)

where, 𝑘𝑜3 = first order ozone decay rate constant, min-1.
The ozone residual was modeled according to Eq. 3.7 using the wastewater-specific
operational and kinetic parameters from Eqs. 3.5 and 3.6.
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𝑂

3
𝑂3 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 = [(𝑇𝑂𝐶
) × 𝑇𝑂𝐶 − 𝐼𝑂𝐷] × 𝑒 −𝑘𝑜3 𝑡

(Eq. 3.7)

where, 𝑡 = contact time, min.
The ozone CT was then calculated using Eq. 3.8 (based on integration of Eq. 3.7).
𝑂3 𝐶𝑇 =

𝑂
[( 3 )× 𝑇𝑂𝐶−𝐼𝑂𝐷]
𝑇𝑂𝐶

𝑘𝑂3

× (1 − 𝑒 −𝑘𝑂3 𝑡 )

(Eq. 3.8)

where, 𝑂3 𝐶𝑇 = product of ozone residual and contact time, mg-min/L.
Finally, Cryptosporidium log removal was calculated using the ozone dose response
relationship described in Eq. 3.9 (USEPA, 2010a). This assumes that drinking water models for
ozone disinfection are also applicable to wastewater treatment applications.
Cryptosporidium Log Credit = 0.0397 × 1.09757𝑇 × 𝑂3 𝐶𝑇

(Eq. 3.9)

where, T = water temperature, ºC (between 0.5ºC and 25ºC) (USEPA, 2010a).
In contrast with the pre-ozonation step, the primary objective of post-ozonation is
disinfection. As such, a potable reuse facility will likely operate the post-ozone step to achieve a
specific ozone CT value. Instead of using the O3/TOC approach described above, an ozone CT
value of 10 mg-min/L (Text S3) and temperature of 25°C were assumed, and Eq. 3.9 was used to
calculate the corresponding Cryptosporidium log credit for post-ozonation. Other ozone dosing
parameters were then calculated using the equations described previously. Additional details
related to ozone efficacy during normal and failure modes are provided in the SI in Text S3 and
Text S4, and a schematic diagram of the advanced wastewater treatment plant is shown in Figure
S9 in Text S7. Model parameters used for the baseline condition (e.g., TOC, O3/TOC, contact
time) are summarized in Table 3.1.
3.3.2.3 Conventional Drinking Water Treatment Train
The conventional drinking water treatment plant was included for the de facto reuse and
planned IPR systems. In these systems, Cryptosporidium oocysts at the drinking water intake
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originated in (1) the upstream surface water and (2) the local wastewater discharge. The final
concentration of Cryptosporidium oocysts at the drinking water intake accounted for both
dilution of the treated wastewater in the surface water and Cryptosporidium die-off during
storage. The Cryptosporidium concentration in the upstream surface water—typically linked to
upstream wastewater discharges, livestock operations, etc.—was assumed to be one of three
uniform distributions based on published data for 66 surface water treatment plants in the U.S.
(Table 3.2; LeChevallier et al., 1991). These were assumed to represent the concentrations
detected at the drinking water intake when no local wastewater was discharged into the source
water.
Table 3-2. Surface water Cryptosporidium concentrations and associated bin classifications.
Scenario

Cryptosporidium concentrations Bin classification
Baseline
assumed for this study
(Cryptosporidium concentration treatment
(oocysts/L)1
in oocysts/L)2
credit3
1
Uniform Distribution
Bin 1 (<0.075)
3 logs
[0.002,0.075]
2
Uniform Distribution [0.075,1]
3 logs
Bin 2 (≥0.075 and <1)
3
Uniform Distribution [3,112.75]
Bin 4 (≥3)
3 logs
1
LeChevallier et al. (1991) and [min, max]; 2USEPA (2010a); 3Assumes conventional filtration

Additional
treatment
requirement3
0 log
1 log
2.5 logs

For the local-wastewater-derived Cryptosporidium loadings, the de facto reuse and
planned IPR models allowed for varying percent contributions of treated wastewater into the
local surface water (i.e., the recycled water contribution or RWC). The extent of wastewater
influence in U.S. surface waters has been shown to vary considerably over time (Rice et al.,
2013). In 1980, the U.S EPA determined that the 25 most impacted municipal water utilities
received wastewater contributions ranging from 2% to 16% of their overall supply (USEPA,
1980). More recently, Rice et al. (2013) reported increases in de facto reuse for 17 of those 25
cities, with an average RWC of 68% and a maximum of 100% during extended periods of dry
weather. Moreover, California is likely to require a dilution ratio of at least 1:10 or 1:100,
depending on log credits awarded to the engineered treatment trains, for surface water
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augmentation (NWRI, 2016b). To account for these ranges, a slider bar was added to the
STELLA model to allow for user-specified RWC values from 0% to 100%. The baseline
condition (i.e., RWC of 20%) was selected based on Rice et al. (2015), in which six of nine
drinking water systems had RWCs of at least 20% under low flow conditions.
To evaluate the impact of retention time in the environmental buffer on pathogen die-off,
a slider bar was added to the model to allow for changes in mean storage time from 0-365 days.
For the current study, the baseline condition was assumed to be a mean storage time of 270 days
to coincide with a case study of the Trinity River in Texas (Wu, 2015), although a ‘critical’
condition of 105 days was also evaluated (described later). According to California DDW’s
recommended design criteria for surface water augmentation, retention times should not be less
than 2-4 months in order to allow for sufficient response time for operational upsets (NWRI,
2016b). Currently, there is a paucity of published literature documenting actual hydraulic
retention times of wastewater-impacted drinking water reservoirs. Once additional tracer study
and/or hydrodynamic modeling data are available, the mean retention time approach could be
replaced with a more representative retention time distribution.
Die-off in the reservoir was quantified using a Cryptosporidium decay rate constant
calculated with Eq. 3.10. The temperature correction is valid from 4ºC to 37ºC, which is the
typical temperature range for most aquatic environments (Peng et al., 2008). Because
Cryptosporidium is a large protozoan parasite, settling may lead to significant reductions in
oocyst concentrations during long storage periods. However, settling was not specifically
addressed in this study because of the site-specific nature of this removal mechanism, including
velocity profiles, intake elevations, etc.
𝑘𝑇 = 𝑘4℃ 𝑒 𝜆(𝑇𝑠𝑤 −4)
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(Eq. 3.10)

where, kT = first order die-off rate constant for Cryptosporidium at temperature Tsw, day-1
𝑘4℃ = first order die-off rate constant for Cryptosporidium at 4ºC, day-1
λ = dimensionless modifier of temperature
𝑇𝑠𝑤 = Temperature of the surface water, ºC.
The temperature-specific rate constant was then used in conjunction with Eq. 3.11 to
determine the concentration of infectious, local-wastewater-derived Cryptosporidium remaining
at the end of the storage period (Brookes et al., 2004).
𝐶𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑦 = 𝐶𝑒𝑓𝑓 × 𝑒 −𝑘𝑇 𝑡𝑠𝑤

(Eq. 3.11)

where, Cdecay = concentration of local-wastewater-derived Cryptosporidium after die-off,
oocysts/L
Ceff = concentration of Cryptosporidium in treated wastewater, oocysts/L
𝑡𝑠𝑤 = storage time in the surface water, days.
The upstream loading of Cryptosporidium was not affected by storage time in the model
because it was assumed that the storage time was already reflected in the concentration
previously detected at the intake prior to the discharge of locally treated wastewater. Therefore,
the final concentration of Cryptosporidium detected at the intake was determined based on a
mass balance approach assuming complete mixing (Wu, 2015; Eq. 3.12).
𝐶𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒 = 𝐶𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑦 × 𝑅𝑊𝐶 + 𝐶𝑆𝑊 × (1 − 𝑅𝑊𝐶)

(Eq. 3.12)

where, Cintake = concentration of Cryptosporidium at drinking water intake, oocysts/L
CSW = concentration of Cryptosporidium from upstream surface water, oocysts/L
RWC = recycled water contribution.
The log removal of Cryptosporidium oocysts during conventional drinking water
treatment was then determined in accordance with LT2 (Table 3.2), which resulted in the final
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concentration in the finished drinking water consumed by the public. The conventional filtration
process was credited with 3.0-log removal (USEPA, 2010a), and any additional log credits
required by the LT2 bin classification were assumed to be achieved by a disinfection process.
The corresponding bin classifications and treatment requirements, as described by the LT2, are
summarized in Table 3.2. A schematic diagram of the conventional drinking water treatment
plant is shown in Figure S10 in Text S7.
3.3.2.4 Direct Potable Reuse – Advanced Wastewater Treatment Plant #2
The DPR system (i.e., no surface water inputs) included UF, O3, BAC, and UV (Figure
3.2D). This treatment train has been identified in the literature as a viable option for DPR
(Trussell et al., 2016). UV is included for final disinfection in the DPR system because it is
considered more robust when targeting Cryptosporidium inactivation. High dose UV is also
effective as a final polishing step for NDMA photolysis and can be used for the attenuation of
other trace organic contaminants (Lee et al., 2016). Chlorination would presumably be used for
residual disinfection and to prevent pathogen regrowth in distribution systems, but residual
chlorination was assumed to have no impact on Cryptosporidium concentrations. Therefore, no
log removal credits were attributed to the engineered storage buffer.
The UF and BAC systems were modeled in a similar fashion to the planned IPR system,
and the ozone process was modeled consistent with the aforementioned pre-ozonation step.
Therefore, only UV was unique to the DPR treatment train. Major operational parameters for UV
disinfection include incident UV intensity, path length, and absorptivity of the water matrix,
which collectively affect the average UV intensity in the reactor. The values assumed for this
study are summarized in Table 3.1. For the absorptivity of the water matrix, typical values were
assumed for a nitrified effluent (i.e., after conventional wastewater treatment) and a filtered
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nitrified effluent (i.e., after UF). The reduction in UV absorbance achieved by pre-ozonation
(Gerrity et al., 2012) was also considered in the model and is described in greater detail in Text
S5. The treatment objective for the UV disinfection process was set to either Cryptosporidium
inactivation (baseline condition) or NDMA photolysis (NDMA scenario) (described later).
Average UV intensity in the reactor was determined by Eq. 3.13 (Chen et al., 2006), the
UV dose was calculated by Eq. 3.14, and the corresponding log inactivation was calculated with
Eq. 3.15, assuming first order kinetics (Hijnen et al., 2006). Relevant assumptions and constants
are summarized in Table 3.1.
′

Iavg = 𝐼0 ×

(1−𝑒 −𝑘𝐴 𝑥 )
′𝑥
𝑘𝐴

(1−10−𝑘𝐴 𝑥 )

= 𝐼0 × 2.303 × 𝑘

𝐴𝑥

(Eq. 3.13)

where, Iavg = average UV254 intensity in the system, mW/cm2
I0 = incident (maximum) UV254 intensity, mW/cm2
𝑘𝐴′ = base e absorptivity of the water matrix at 254 nm, cm-1
𝑘𝐴 = base 10 absorptivity of the water matrix at 254 nm, cm-1
x = reactor path length, cm.
𝐷 = 𝐼𝑎𝑣𝑔 × t 𝑈𝑉

(Eq. 3.14)
𝑁

Cryptosporidium Log Credit = −𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑁 ) = 𝑘𝑈𝑉 × D
0

(Eq. 3.15)

where, D = UV254 dose, mJ/cm2
t 𝑈𝑉 = exposure time, s
𝑘𝑈𝑉 = UV254 inactivation rate constant, (mJ/cm2)-1.
With respect to public health, additional water quality parameters, specifically
disinfection byproducts, must be considered in a DPR system and might impact the operational
conditions in the treatment facility. For this particular DPR treatment train, problematic
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disinfection byproducts might include bromate formed during pre-ozonation, NDMA formed in
the presence of chloramine (e.g., to control UF biofouling) or ozone, and trihalomethanes and
haloacetic acids formed after exposure to chlorine in the engineered storage buffer and
distribution system. Because of the pathogen focus of this study, these were not considered in the
model (with the exception of NDMA).
Either Cryptosporidium or NDMA can be targeted by the UV process in the model by
changing a control switch. With the Cryptosporidium treatment objective (baseline condition),
the model assumed a target UV dose of 80 mJ/cm2 (NWRI, 2012). With respect to NDMA,
recent studies suggest that NDMA formation during ozonation may be problematic in some
wastewater matrices (Gerrity et al., 2015). A downstream BAC process may achieve significant
attenuation (Gerrity et al., 2015; Trussell et al., 2016), but high-dose UV photolysis (i.e., >100
mJ/cm2) might still be warranted (Lee et al., 2016; Gerrity et al., 2016). For the NDMA scenario,
the model assumed an NDMA concentration of 50 ng/L and a target reduction of 90% to achieve
the California notification level of <10 ng/L (CDPH, 2014) with a 5-ng/L buffer, thereby
requiring a UV dose of 512 mJ/cm2 (Lee et al., 2016). For these target UV doses (i.e., 80 mJ/cm2
or 512 mJ/cm2), corresponding exposure times (7 sec and 45 sec, respectively) were calculated
using Eqs. 13-14 and the UV-specific parameters listed in Table 3.1. Finally, the log credit for
UV was limited to 6 logs regardless of the treatment objective and theoretical log reductions
(Table S8), as required by CDPH (2014). Additional details related to UV disinfection efficacy
during normal and failure modes are provided in Text S6. A schematic diagram of the DPR
treatment train is shown in Figure S11 in Text S7.
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3.3.2.5 Advanced Treatment Failure Framework
Assuming the various treatment processes are operating as intended, one can estimate the
log removal/inactivation credits expected for each potable reuse system, as summarized in Table
3.3. The planned IPR and DPR treatment trains can theoretically achieve the 10-log reduction
requirement without the environmental buffer, while the de facto reuse system is highly sensitive
to the efficacy of the environmental buffer. However, failures during advanced treatment may
have a significant detrimental impact on the total log removal in Table 3.3. To address this issue,
the potential impacts of process failures were incorporated into the model to evaluate whether the
treatment trains were sufficiently robust to adequately protect public health during sub-optimal
operation.
Table 3-3. Assumed or calculated Cryptosporidium log removal credits for the baseline condition under
optimal operational conditions (i.e., no failures).
Process
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Baseline Total10

de facto Reuse
WWTP
1.02
EB
TBD3
DWTP
3.0-5.51

4.0 – 6.5

Planned IPR
WWTP
1.02
UF
4.04
O3
2.05
BAC
06
O3
4.17
EB
TBD3
DWTP
3.0-5.51
14.1 – 16.6

DPR
WWTP
UF
O3
BAC
UV
ESB

1.02
4.04
2.05
06
6.08
09

13.0

1

Based on LT2 and corresponding bin classification for a drinking water treatment plant with conventional
filtration (Table 3.2); 2Rose et al, 2004; 3Credit for environmental buffer determined by die off calculation (Eq.
11) and dilution (Eq. 12); 44-log credit awarded assuming satisfactory pressure decay test (Tchobanoglous et
al., 2015); 5Determined based on Eq. 9; 6No credit granted to BAC (Tchobanoglous et al., 2015); 7Determined
based on Eq. 9; 8Assumes UV dose of 80 mJ/cm2 (NWRI, 2012) but limited to a maximum credit of 6 logs
(CDPH, 2014); 9No credit awarded for engineered storage buffer assuming chlorine as residual disinfectant;
10
Excludes environmental buffer

Table 3.4 summarizes the expected log credits during ideal operation and the modified
log removal credits during failure mode for the critical unit processes in this study. The
probabilities of failure for the UF and pre-ozone processes were based on a fault tree analysis
and historical data from the DPR system in Namibia (Forss & Ander, 2011). The probability of
failure for the post-ozonation process was based on a statistical distribution of historical ozone
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CT values in Burns (2015) (Text S4). Due to a lack of failure data in the literature, an arbitrary
failure probability of 0.01 was assumed for UV (Text S6), and BAC failures were not
considered. Also, the model assumed a worst-case scenario (i.e., 0-log credit) for individual
process failures.
Table 3-4. Cryptosporidium reduction efficacy and probabilities of failure in different treatment
processes.
Log Removal
during
Ideal Operation

Probability
of
Failure

Log Removal Credit during Specified Failure(s)6
UF
failure

Pre-O3
failure

UF+Pre-O3
failure

Post-O3
failure

UV
Failure

UF

4.01

0.00282

0

4.0

0

4.0

4.0

Pre-O3

2.0

0.00212

1.4

0

0

2.0

2.0

Post-O3

4.1

0.0003253

2.7

1.0

0.6

0

N/A

UV

6.04

0.015

6.04

6.04

6.04

N/A

0

Treatment
Process

1

Tchobanoglous et al. (2015); 2Forss & Ander (2011); 3Burns (2015) and Text S4; 4Assumed maximum
credit (CDPH, 2014); 5Arbitrary value due to lack of data but a sensitivity analysis was performed to
evaluate the significance of this value (Text S6); 6Text S4 and S6

Table 3.4 also summarizes the effects of compound failures, as described in Text S4-S6.
For example, UF failures not only eliminated the 4-log removal credit for UF, but they also
decreased the efficacy of the pre- and post-ozone processes in the planned IPR system and the
pre-ozone and UV processes in the DPR system. Specifically, UF failures caused increases in
TOC concentration in the UF filtrate. Assuming constant applied ozone doses, this led to
decreased O3/TOC ratios for pre-ozonation (IPR and DPR) and post-ozonation (IPR only).
Moreover, this led to lower ozone CT values (IPR and DPR) and lower UV doses due to the
increase in UV254 absorbance of the water matrix (DPR). The model also considered the
possibility of simultaneous failures of UF and pre-ozonation, for example, which led to a
decrease in log inactivation from 4.1 (no failure scenario) to 0.6 (UF and pre-ozone failure) for
the post-ozonation process. Even with simultaneous failures of the upstream UF and ozone
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processes, the UV process in the DPR system was still able to achieve greater than 6-log
inactivation based on the calculated UV doses during failure modes (30 mJ/cm2 and 194
mJ/cm2), although NDMA attenuation decreased significantly (Tables S7-S8). Higher turbidities
(e.g., due to UF failure) can also affect UV performance by scattering UV light and shielding
target pathogens, but turbidity spikes were not considered in the model.
3.3.3 Sensitivity Analyses
To evaluate the significance of the various treatment processes, operational conditions,
and parameter uncertainty, sensitivity analyses were performed on a subset of model inputs: (i)
wastewater loading of Cryptosporidium, (ii) treatment process failures, (iii) reservoir storage
time, (iv) recycled water contribution, (v) the temperature of the surface water, and (vi) the dose
response parameter. Factor sensitivity (FS) values were calculated according to Eq. 3.16 to
provide direct quantitative comparisons for the sensitivity analyses (Zwietering and Van Gerwen,
2000). FS values indicate the log10 ratio of the revised model output versus the baseline
condition: large negative values (e.g., less than -0.3) indicate notable decreases in risk, large
positive values (e.g., greater than 0.3) indicate notable increases in risk, and small values indicate
minimal changes in risk.
𝑃

𝐹𝑆 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔10 (𝑃 𝑥 )
𝐵𝐿

where, Px = risk of infection for the modified condition
PBL = risk of infection for the baseline condition.
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(Eq. 3.16)

3.4

Results and Discussion

3.4.1 Quantification of Cryptosporidium Oocysts for the Baseline Condition
Six different water qualities were characterized for the baseline condition: (1) raw sewage;
(2) conventionally treated wastewater; (3) finished drinking water in the de facto reuse system;
4) finished drinking water in the IPR system; 5) advanced treated wastewater in the IPR system
(i.e., before blending); and 6) finished drinking water in DPR system. Figure 3.3 compares the
concentrations of Cryptosporidium oocysts for these water qualities using scenario 1 (bin 1
surface water) as an example. The analysis of variance (ANOVA) test followed by multiple
comparison analysis test (Tukey-Kramer post hoc test) indicated that the concentrations
of Cryptosporidium oocysts in the various waters were significantly different (p<0.05), except
for the finished drinking waters in the de facto reuse and planned IPR systems. The
environmental buffer clearly improved the quality of the conventionally treated wastewater as a
result of pathogen die-off and dilution, thereby improving the finished drinking water quality in
the de facto reuse system. However, the environmental buffer led to a significant deterioration in
water quality for planned IPR. The occurrence of Cryptosporidium in the upstream surface water
controlled the risk calculation in both IPR systems.
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Figure 3-3. Concentration of Cryptosporidium oocysts in raw wastewater and the finished water from
different treatment trains for the baseline condition (storage time of 270 days at a temperature of 20°C).

The model proved to be highly sensitive to storage time because pathogen die-off offset
the limited reduction of Cryptosporidium in the de facto reuse system, and pathogen die-off also
offset potential spikes in Cryptosporidium during failures in the planned IPR system. Despite
higher concentrations of Cryptosporidium in the upstream surface water in scenarios 2 (Figure
S12) and 3 (Figure S13), similar outcomes were observed. These results support the previous
National Research Council suggestion that some engineered potable reuse systems might achieve
similar or superior water quality compared to traditional systems incorporating environmental
buffers (NRC, 2012).
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3.4.2 Quantification of Public Health Risk for the Baseline Condition
The annual probabilities of infection and DALYs for both optimal and sub-optimal
conditions are presented in Table 3.5. Because the model did not consider failures in
conventional wastewater or drinking water treatment, there are no results for sub-optimal
operation for de facto reuse. Blending the de facto and planned IPR product waters with
upstream surface water resulted in nearly identical annual risks of infection (mean of 9.4×10-5 4.5×10-4) and DALYs (mean of 1.1×10-7 - 5.3×10-7), with the ranges representing results for the
three bin scenarios. The small confidence levels in Table 3.5 also indicate that daily fluctuations
in wastewater loadings had minimal impact on risk. Figure 3.4 illustrates how the modeled risks
for the potable reuse scenarios under sub-optimal operation compare to the LT2 framework for
conventional drinking water applications. The model suggests that under baseline conditions, the
risks associated with de facto reuse and planned IPR are consistent with traditional bin 1, bin 2,
or bin 4 drinking water systems. It is important to emphasize that the risks associated with
planned IPR are elevated due to mixing with upstream surface water and not due to inadequate
treatment or wastewater influence from within the community. Because of the dominance of the
upstream surface water, advanced treatment failures were inconsequential for the planned IPR
system, resulting in nearly identical annual risks of infection and DALYs for optimal and suboptimal performance (Table 3.5). Although the impacts of process failure were more apparent for
the DPR system, the overall risks for DPR were still at least three orders of magnitude lower than
the LT2 framework and the 10-4 benchmark during sub-optimal operation.
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Table 3-5. Statistical analysis of probability of infection per year and disease burden for optimal (i.e., no
failures) and sub-optimal operation for the baseline condition. Values are based on the results from
10,000 model iterations.
Optimal operation
Statistics

de facto (Unplanned Indirect
Potable Reuse)
Scenario 12 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
9.4E-05
1.3E-04
4.5E-04
2.7E-06
3.4E-06
1.3E-05
5.3E-08
6.8E-08
2.5E-07
8.4E-05
1.2E-04
4.0E-04
9.0E-05
1.3E-04
4.3E-04
9.4E-05
1.3E-04
4.5E-04
9.9E-05
1.4E-04
4.7E-04
1.1E-04
1.5E-04
5.0E-04

Pinf,y
Mean
St. Dev.
95% Confidence (±)
Minimum
5th Percentile
50th Percentile
95th Percentile
Maximum
Disease Burden1
Mean
1.1E-07
1.6E-07
5.3E-07
St. Dev.
3.3E-09
4.0E-09
1.5E-08
95% Confidence (±) 6.4E-11
8.1E-11
3.0E-10
Sub-optimal operation
de facto (Unplanned Indirect
Statistics
Potable Reuse)3
Pinf,y
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Mean
St. Dev.
95% Confidence (±) Minimum
5th Percentile
50th Percentile
95th Percentile
Maximum
Disease Burden1
Mean
St. Dev.
95% Confidence (±) -

1

Scenario 1
9.4E-05
2.7E-06
5.3E-08
8.3E-05
9.0E-05
9.4E-05
9.9E-05
1.0E-04

Scenario 2
1.3E-04
3.4E-06
6.7E-08
1.2E-04
1.3E-04
1.3E-04
1.4E-04
1.4E-04

Scenario 3
4.5E-04
1.3E-05
2.5E-07
4.0E-04
4.3E-04
4.5E-04
4.7E-04
5.0E-04

Direct
Potable
Reuse
2.2E-11
1.8E-12
3.5E-14
1.9E-11
2.0E-11
2.3E-11
2.5E-11
2.8E-11

1.1E-07
3.2E-09
6.3E-11

1.6E-07
4.1E-09
8.0E-11

5.3E-07
1.5E-08
3.0E-10

2.7E-16
2.7E-15
5.3E-17

Planned Indirect Potable Reuse

Scenario 1
9.4E-05
2.7E-06
5.3E-07
8.4E-05
9.0E-05
9.4E-05
9.9E-05
1.0E-04

Scenario 2
1.3E-04
3.4E-06
6.7E-07
1.2E-04
1.3E-04
1.3E-04
1.4E-04
1.5E-04

Scenario 3
4.5E-04
1.3E-05
2.5E-06
4.1E-04
4.3E-04
4.5E-04
4.7E-04
5.1E-04

Direct
Potable
Reuse
6.1E-09
6.7E-08
1.3E-09
2.2E-11
3.4E-11
3.3E-10
1.9E-08
5.0E-06

1.1E-07
3.2E-09
6.3E-10

1.6E-07
4.1E-09
8.0E-10

5.3E-07
1.5E-08
3.0E-09

7.2E-12
7.9E-11
1.6E-12

Planned Indirect Potable Reuse

Disease burden in DALYs per person per year
Scenarios refer to bin classifications (see Table 3.2); scenarios do not apply to direct potable reuse because
there is no surface water influence
3
Model did not consider failures for conventional drinking water treatment or conventional wastewater
treatment
2
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Figure 3-4. Comparison of annual risk of infection from the system dynamics model during sub-optimal
operation with calculated risks based on the LT2 framework. The scenarios refer to the varying
concentrations of Cryptosporidium in the upstream surface water (see Table 3.2), and the results are
calculated for the baseline and critical conditions (see Table 3.1). Datasets denoted with an “a” reflect
baseline conditions, and datasets denoted with a “b” reflect critical conditions (i.e., 105 days of storage
time and a temperature of 10°C).

3.4.3 Water Resource Management and Policy Implications
Sensitivity analyses were performed to identify the most influential parameters in each
treatment train and to assess the implications of various management and regulatory/policy
measures. The results for the sensitivity analyses were then used to identify ‘critical’ conditions
based on observed changes in model output.
3.4.3.1 Effects of Increased Wastewater Loading of Cryptosporidium
Variability in wastewater loading of Cryptosporidium was evaluated in the context of an
outbreak scenario. This study defined an outbreak as a 1-log increase in the raw wastewater
concentration. This assumption is supported by Haas & Rose (1995), who showed a 10-fold
50

increase in Cryptosporidium concentration in finished water during the 1993 Milwaukee
outbreak, and also by Trussell et al. (2013), who estimated 10-fold to 100-fold increases in raw
wastewater concentration during outbreak conditions. The 1-log increase also allows for
consideration of studies [e.g., Robertson et al. (2006)] reporting higher Cryptosporidium
concentrations than Rose et al. (2005). Even though higher concentrations of Cryptosporidium in
the raw wastewater were expected to result in higher risks of infection, model output for the IPR
systems indicated that at least 270 days of reservoir storage time at 20°C was sufficient to
completely buffer the effects of the outbreak. The outbreak condition increased the risk for DPR
by a factor of 10, but the final risk (≈4×10-8) was still well below the 10-4 benchmark. The
corresponding factor sensitivity values are summarized in Table 3.6.
Table 3-6. Summary of factor sensitivity (FS) values for the sensitivity analyses on wastewater
Cryptosporidium concentrations (i.e., outbreak condition) and process failure. FS values indicate the log10
ratio of the revised model output versus the baseline condition: large negative values (e.g., less than -0.3)
indicate notable decreases in risk, large positive values (e.g., greater than 0.3) indicate notable increases
in risk, and small values (e.g., greater than -0.3 and less than 0.3) indicate minimal changes in risk. For
example, an FS value of 0.3 indicates the risk has increased by a factor of 2 due to the change.

Revised
Condition

de facto Reuse
Scenario Scenario Scenario
1
2
3
Outbreak
1.2E-02 1.2E-02 1.0E-03
UF Failure N/A
N/A
N/A
Pre-O3
N/A
N/A
N/A
Failure
Post-O3
N/A
N/A
N/A
Failure
UV
N/A
N/A
N/A
Failure

Planned IPR
Scenario Scenario Scenario
1
2
3
1.2E-03 2.9E-03 2.8E-03
1.2E-08 3.3E-10 0.0E+00
2.0E-09 0.0E+00 0.0E+00

DPR

0.0E+00

0.0E+00

0.0E+00

2.0E+00

N/A

N/A

N/A

6.0E+00

1.5E+00
4.6E+00
N/A

*Bold values indicate that the risk increased/decreased by more than a factor of 2 relative to the baseline
condition.
**All FS values in this table are positive, which indicates increases in risk for all systems and for all scenarios.

3.4.3.2 Effects of Failures during Advanced Treatment for Planned IPR and DPR
The factor sensitivity values associated with specific process failures are summarized in
Table 3.6 for the three planned IPR systems and the DPR system. Planned IPR scenario 3, which
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was classified as a bin 4 surface water system, had the highest risk of infection for the baseline
condition but was completely insensitive to process failures. Again, the higher baseline risk was
due to the higher upstream surface water loading of Cryptosporidium, and the system’s lack of
sensitivity to failure was due to increased resiliency linked to the environmental buffer and the
greater removal requirements for the conventional drinking water treatment plant. Although
extremely minor, UF failure had the greatest impact on risk for scenarios 1 and 2 because of the
immediate reduction in log credits for UF and the ‘domino effects’ on downstream processes.
Therefore, the effects of process failures in all planned IPR scenarios were negligible because the
failures were sufficiently mitigated by the 270 days of storage in the environmental buffer.
Because of the reduced resiliency of the DPR treatment train, process failures resulted in
significant increases in annual risk, particularly during a UV failure. However, the DPR system
had sufficient treatment redundancy to achieve the 10-4 annual risk benchmark even during
process failures.
3.4.3.3 Effects of Reservoir Storage Time
Because of the high level of treatment provided by the planned IPR treatment train,
reservoir storage time had a negligible impact on annual risk during normal operation. Because
this was highly dependent on Cryptosporidium loadings in the upstream surface water, discharge
to a ‘pristine’ source water would yield different results. For the de facto reuse system, storage
times shorter than 270 days led to higher risks of infection (Figure 3.5). A ‘critical’ threshold
(i.e., FS>0.3) occurred between 90 and 180 days of storage for surface water scenarios 1 and 2,
but even zero days of storage had minimal impact on scenario 3 because of the high upstream
surface water loading and robust treatment provided at the drinking water treatment plant.
Therefore, 105 days was selected as the target storage time for the ‘critical condition’ analysis
52

(described later). It is important to note that the current model does not account for non-ideal
flow conditions, such as short-circuiting, which could significantly reduce storage times for some
parcels of water. Therefore, it is important to verify whether mean retention time is a reasonably
accurate hydrodynamic representation of real-world systems.

Figure 3-5. Sensitivity analysis on reservoir storage time for the three scenarios of the de facto
reuse system (storage time had negligible impact on the planned IPR system). The asterisk indicates the
reservoir storage time for the baseline condition (270 days). Bold values indicate that the risk
increased/decreased by more than a factor of 2 relative to the baseline condition. FS = factor sensitivity
value.

3.4.3.4 Effects of Recycled Water Contribution
Figure 3.6 illustrates the relationship between RWC and annual risk of infection for de
facto reuse and planned IPR. For the planned IPR system, higher RWCs led to reduced annual
risk of infection regardless of storage time—from a 25% reduction for a 40% RWC to a 75%
reduction for an 80% RWC (Figure 3.6B). The same results were observed for de facto reuse
with a storage time of 270 days, but results were significantly different for de facto reuse with a
105-day storage time (Figure 3.6A). For the less contaminated bin 1 surface water (scenario 1),
the annual risk of infection increased by a factor of 1.2-1.6 for RWCs of 40-80%. On the other
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hand, the more contaminated surface waters in scenarios 2 and 3 were characterized by
decreased risks of infection—actually lower than the risks for scenario 1—as the RWC increased
to 80%. These results suggest that the relative impacts of RWC are highly dependent on other
system variables, including storage time and bin classification.

Figure 3-6. Sensitivity analysis on recycled water contribution
for (A) de facto reuse system with 105 days of storage time and (B) de facto reuse with 270 days of
storage time or planned IPR with either 105 or 270 days of storage time. The asterisk indicates the RWC
for the baseline condition (20%). Bold values indicate that the risk increased/decreased by more than a
factor of 2 relative to the baseline condition. FS = factor sensitivity value.

3.4.3.5 Effects of Temperature in the Environmental Buffer
Because the planned IPR system was insensitive to operational changes in the
environmental buffer, changes in reservoir temperature had no significant impacts on annual risk.
Figure 3.7 illustrates the results of the sensitivity analysis for temperature in the de facto reuse
system. The annual risk of infection was less sensitive to temperature changes when coupled
with 270 days of storage time (Figure 3.7B) versus 105 days of storage time (Figure 3.7A).
However, for both 105 days and 270 days, the annual risk of infection increased by a factor of 10
in scenario 1 (i.e., bin 1 surface water) when the temperature dropped from 20°C (baseline
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condition) to 5°C. This is attributable to the reduction in die-off of wastewater-derived
Cryptosporidium at the lower reservoir temperature coupled with the lack of additional treatment
at the conventional drinking water treatment plant. The temperature effects were less pronounced
for scenarios 2 and 3, which included additional treatment at the drinking water treatment plant
in accordance with LT2. For scenario 1, notably higher risks were also observed for temperatures
of 10°C, but the risks decreased relative to the baseline condition for temperatures greater than
20°C. A temperature of 10°C was selected for the ‘critical’ condition analysis.

Figure 3-7. Sensitivity analysis on temperature in the environmental buffer for the de facto reuse system
(A) 105 days of storage time and (B) 270 days of storage time. The asterisk indicates the reservoir
temperature for the baseline condition (20°C). Bold values indicate that the risk increased/decreased by
more than a factor of 2 relative to the baseline condition. FS = factor sensitivity value.

3.4.3.6 Analysis of the Critical Condition
Figure 3.8 illustrates the Cryptosporidium oocyst concentrations in the various water
matrices for the critical conditions, specifically a storage time of 105 days at a temperature of
10°C, for scenario 1. The corresponding data for scenarios 2 and 3 are provided in Figures S14
and S15. Because the IPR (before blending) and DPR product waters were not influenced by the
critical condition, their concentrations remained largely unchanged from the baseline condition
for all three scenarios. The final IPR drinking water (after blending) was also similar due to the
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high quality of the advanced treated wastewater and the dominance of the upstream surface
water. The final drinking water in the scenario 1 de facto reuse system exhibited the greatest
change—an approximate 10-fold increase in Cryptosporidium concentration—due to the reduced
buffering capacity of the reservoir and the lower level of treatment at the drinking water
treatment plant. The additional log reduction credits for the drinking water treatment plant in
scenarios 2 and 3 were able to compensate for the reduction in die-off in the environmental
buffer. The corresponding annual risks of infection for the critical condition are illustrated and
compared against the LT2 framework in Figure 3.4.

Figure 3-8. Concentration of Cryptosporidium oocysts in raw wastewater and the finished water from
different treatment trains for the ‘critical’ condition
(storage time of 105 days at a temperature of 10°C).
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3.4.4 Sensitivity Analysis on the Dose Response Parameter
Figure 3.9 illustrates the result of the sensitivity analysis on the Cryptosporidium dose
response parameter for the baseline condition (i.e., temperature of 20°C and a storage time of
270 days under sub-optimal operation). As expected, higher dose response parameters resulted in
higher annual risks of infection, and the increases were nearly proportional to the ratio of the
modified and original r values for the low Cryptosporidium concentrations/doses expected in the
finished drinking waters. For dose response parameters of 0.0572 and 0.09 oocysts-1, the annual
risks of infection for all IPR scenarios exceeded the 10-4 benchmark by at least one order of
magnitude, but the annual risk for DPR (~9×10-8) was still well below the 10-4 benchmark.
Therefore, uncertainty in the dose response parameter did not necessarily impact relative
differences between the potable reuse systems, but there was a significant impact on absolute
risk values.
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Figure 3-9. Sensitivity analysis on dose response parameter for the baseline condition
(temperature of 20°C and storage time of 270 days). The asterisk indicates the baseline dose
response parameter of 0.00419 oocysts-1, and the dashed line represents the benchmark annual risk
of 10-4.

3.5

Conclusion
The risks associated with the de facto and planned IPR systems were generally consistent

with those of conventional drinking water systems, while DPR was clearly superior. Because the
advanced treatment train in the planned IPR system was highly effective in reducing
Cryptosporidium concentrations, the associated risks were generally dominated by upstream
surface water conditions. Moreover, risks generally decreased with higher recycled water
contributions (RWCs), except for the bin 1 de facto reuse system with short reservoir storage
times. Outbreak conditions and advanced treatment failures were generally inconsequential, at
least with respect to Cryptosporidium, either due to the robustness of the advanced treatment
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train (i.e., DPR) or resiliency provided by the environmental buffer (i.e., planned IPR). Storage
time in the environmental buffer was important for the de facto reuse system, and the model
indicated a critical storage time of approximately 105 days, although this was also temperaturedependent. A critical condition consisting of a 105-day storage time in the environmental buffer
at a temperature of 10°C resulted in a significant difference between planned IPR and de facto
reuse for a bin 1 system, with de facto reuse exhibiting a 10-fold higher annual risk of infection.
This is attributable to the reduced treatment provided by the bin 1 drinking water treatment plant,
which reduced the resiliency of the system. Therefore, the bin 2 and bin 4 de facto reuse systems
generally exhibit higher risks of infection for storage times longer than 105 days, regardless of
temperature, but bin 1 may exhibit higher risks when shorter storage times are coupled with
colder temperatures.
The conclusions developed from the model output can be used by stakeholders to better
understand the role of various operational parameters on public health risks in diverse potable
reuse systems. Moreover, the data from this study can be used to inform regulatory decision
making and aid in the development of design or operational criteria for IPR and DPR systems.
Future modeling efforts would benefit from a more comprehensive characterization of temporal
variability in advanced treatment process efficacy. Although failures in the planned IPR and
DPR treatment trains were generally inconsequential for the overall Cryptosporidium risk
calculations, model accuracy could be improved by incorporating statistical distributions of
process efficacy rather than using ‘absolute’ failures (i.e., worst-case scenarios). Moreover, the
implications of process failure—and other critical parameters—might change when modeling
risks associated with other pathogens, such as norovirus. Finally, there is a need to better
understand the hydrodynamics of drinking water reservoirs to allow for more accurate modeling
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of the environmental buffer, particularly considering that storage time was a critical parameter
for some potable reuse systems.
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4.1

Introduction
Evaluating the microbiological quality of drinking water is critically important for

ensuring adequate public health protection, particularly in potable reuse applications.
Cryptosporidium, norovirus (NoV), adenovirus (AdV), and Salmonella, all of which can be
transmitted via the fecal-oral route, are some of the main etiological agents of gastroenteritis
worldwide (National Research Council, 2012). NoV, AdV, and Salmonella are also listed on the
United States (U.S.) Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Contaminant Candidate List
(CCL4), thereby identifying these pathogens for priority research (USEPA, 2015b).
Despite the importance of these pathogens in the context of public health, the industry
lacks information on their survival in the environment and attenuation through some treatment
processes. For example, quantification of NoV infectivity has been elusive due to the
ineffectiveness of conventional cell culture methods. Instead, studies have relied on MS2 (Lee &
Ko, 2013), feline calicivirus (FCV) (Doultree et al., 1999; Duizer et al., 2004; Nuanualsuwan and
Cliver, 2003; Thurston-Enriquez et al., 2005; Abbaszadegan et al., 2007) and murine norovirus
(MNV) (Karst et al., 2003; Katayama et al., 2006; Lee et al., 2008; Lim et al., 2010; Wu, 2015)
as viral surrogates, or used a probabilistic approach to estimate viral inactivation based on
genome damage (Pecson et al., 2011). Recently, MNV has been identified as a valuable
surrogate for evaluating NoV survival in the environment (Bae & Schwab, 2008; Cannon et al.,
2006; Hirneisen & Kniel, 2013; Yi et al., 2016), but incomplete characterization still requires the
use of other surrogates such as MS2 in some instances.
Because of the challenging nature of pathogen detection, particularly in highly treated
water, the drinking water and potable reuse industries generally rely on log removal values
(LRVs) to ensure adequate protection of public health (Pecson et al., 2015). For potable reuse,
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the “12-10-10” LRV framework initially implemented in California is now being adopted by
other states (EPA, 2017). An independent panel of public health experts also supported the
adoption of this framework with two minor exceptions: they noted that satisfying the
Cryptosporidium LRV would presumably satisfy the LRV for Giardia, which is generally more
susceptible to treatment, and that a 9-log total coliform LRV might be warranted to address
concerns related to Salmonella. Therefore, they proposed a “12-10-9” framework (NWRI, 2013)
for viruses, Cryptosporidium, and total coliform bacteria as a surrogate for Salmonella. These log
reductions are based on raw sewage as the source water, while the “8-5.5-6” framework for
viruses, Cryptosporidium, and Giardia in Texas uses pathogen levels in the presumably more
consistent secondary wastewater effluent as the basis for treatment train design (TWDB, 2015).
Because they all target a 10-4 annual risk of infection, experts suggested that New Mexico could
adopt any of these frameworks for future DPR projects (NWRI, 2016c). On the other hand,
Australia and the World Health Organization (WHO) proposed a target of 10-6 disability adjusted
life years (DALYs) per person per year, which corresponds with a 10-3 annual risk of infection
and LRVs of 9.5-8-8.1 for viruses, Cryptosporidium, and Campylobacter in untreated
wastewater (NRMMC-EPHC-NHMRC, 2008).
Previous studies have performed quantitative microbial risk assessments (QMRAs) to
evaluate public health risks associated with indirect potable reuse (IPR) (Olivieri et al., 1999;
Lim et al., 2017) and direct potable reuse (DPR) (Pecson et al., 2017; Soller et al., 2017), but
there are few direct comparisons of IPR and DPR using the same QMRA framework (Chaudhry
et al., 2017), particularly studies that simultaneously compare treatment trains in de facto reuse,
planned IPR, and DPR applications (Amoueyan et al., 2017). Many studies emphasize treatment
trains employing high-pressure membrane filtration [i.e., nanofiltration (NF) or reverse osmosis
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(RO)] (Chaudhry et al., 2017), and some studies focus on alternative treatment trains relying on
ozone-biofiltration (Amoueyan et al., 2017), while few studies include both (Soller et al., 2017).
While most employ a stochastic Monte Carlo approach to address parameter variability, few
studies have described the potential impacts of process failure (Pecson et al., 2017) and
associated ‘domino effects’ (Amoueyan et al., 2017) on risk estimates.
Each study is characterized by various strengths and limitations, but, more importantly,
the unique attributes of each QMRA approach allow one to reach important conclusions
regarding the safety and reliability of potable reuse treatment train design. For example,
Amoueyan et al. (2017) found that the upstream surface water concentration of Cryptosporidium
oocysts was the dominant factor in IPR applications, assuming wastewater-derived
Cryptosporidium was attenuated with sufficient storage time in the environmental buffer. The
existing QMRA literature generally agrees that potable reuse treatment trains are adequately
protective of public health, particularly when compared with conventional drinking water
applications. However, it has also been demonstrated that a small number of daily risk spikes for
certain pathogens may cause disproportionate increases in annual risk under certain conditions
(e.g., low UV doses) or when using alternative dose response models (Soller et al., 2017).
Therefore, additional QMRA studies are still warranted to characterize the relative impacts of
parameter variability and uncertainty across a wide range of pathogens and treatment train
scenarios.
As such, the main objective of this study was to perform a QMRA to estimate health risks
associated with Cryptosporidium, NoV, AdV, and Salmonella that could potentially occur in the
finished drinking water of de facto reuse, planned IPR, and DPR systems employing ozonebiofiltration or RO-based treatment trains. The stochastic nature of observed LRVs was captured
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with a Monte Carlo approach and published statistical distributions of treatment process
performance. Short-term failures and associated ‘domino effects’ were also incorporated into the
model framework. Therefore, the results of this study allow for a comprehensive evaluation of
treatment train ‘equivalence’ in the context of protozoan, viral, and bacterial pathogen exposure.
Specifically, this study expands upon Amoueyan et al. (2017) by including additional pathogens
and a direct comparison of ‘full advanced treatment’ (FAT) [i.e., treatment trains employing RO
and an advanced oxidation process (AOP)] vs. ozone-biofiltration. This study will also aid in
characterizing the relative risks posed by planned potable reuse vs. de facto reuse in the U.S.,
thereby allowing for a determination of the adequacy of current Safe Drinking Water Act
(SDWA) safeguards given the ubiquity of wastewater-impacted source waters (Rice et al., 2013).
4.2

Methodology

4.2.1 Potable reuse systems and treatment trains
Figure 4.1 summarizes the seven de facto reuse, planned IPR, and DPR systems
considered in this study. These were selected to encompass the spectrum of potable reuse
systems currently in use, under design/construction, or under consideration for future projects.
Potable reuse treatment trains with UV disinfection (i.e., TT2, TT4, TT5,TT6, TT7) were
assumed to employ low-dose UV targeting disinfection. In addition to the unit processes listed in
Figure 4.1, the IPR systems (TT1-TT4) accounted for the effects of dilution and storage time in
their respective environmental buffers. The surface water augmentation/blending systems (TT1,
TT3, TT4, and TT5) employed conventional drinking water treatment with chlorine disinfection
prior to distribution, and the groundwater replenishment system (TT2) employed chlorination
upon withdrawal from the aquifer. LRVs for the unit processes are described later.
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Figure 4-1. Treatment processes included in each potable reuse system.
The conventional WWTP included only secondary wastewater treatment. The surface water
augmentation/blending treatment trains (TT1, TT3, TT4, TT5) employed a conventional drinking water
treatment plant with chlorine disinfection prior to distribution. The groundwater replenishment treatment
train (TT2) included chlorine disinfection upon withdrawal from the aquifer. MF = microfiltration, UF =
ultrafiltration, RO = reverse osmosis, UV = ultraviolet disinfection, BAC = biological activated carbon,
Cl2 = free chlorine disinfection, ESB = engineered storage buffer.

4.2.2 Target pathogens and raw wastewater concentrations
Cryptosporidium, NoV, AdV, and Salmonella were selected as the target pathogens for
the QMRA because they account for most of the waterborne gastroenteritis cases in the U.S.
(Craun et al., 2006; National Research Council, 2012). Cryptosporidium and AdV are also
common drivers for treatment train design due to their demonstrated resistance to oxidative
(USEPA, 2006a) and UV disinfection processes (Gerba et al., 2002), respectively. Inclusion of
disinfectant resistant pathogens in a QMRA is recommended to mitigate uncertainties by

66

addressing ‘extreme’ hazards (Gerba et al., 2018). Salmonella was also included in the current
study based on the aforementioned recommendation of public health experts (NWRI, 2013).
Transmission of the target pathogens may occur either through direct contact with a host
or through contaminated surfaces, food, or water (Rzeżutka & Cook, 2004), but this study
addressed only the primary exposure route via contaminated drinking water. Historically, NoV
infections have generally been transmitted through contaminated food (Percival et al., 2013), but
a recent QMRA indicated that NoV may be a concern for potable reuse as well (Soller et al.,
2018), thereby justifying its inclusion in the current study. Salmonella has also been associated
with foodborne disease but is more frequently transmitted through contaminated water
(Lemarchand & Lebaron, 2003; WHO, 2008). Data on pathogen occurrence in various water
matrices was collected from the literature and described with best-fit probability distribution
functions (PDFs), which are summarized in Table 4.1 and illustrated along with the
corresponding cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) in Figures S1-S3. Cryptosporidium
concentrations were based on immunomagnetic separation and immunofluorescence assay
microscopy (i.e., U.S. EPA Method 1623) (Rose et al., 2005), NoV and AdV concentrations
were based on genome copy data (described below), and Salmonella concentrations were based
on most probable number (MPN) culture methods (Koivunen et al., 2003; Lemarchand &
Lebaron, 2003).
Detection and quantification of NoV in different water matrices (e.g., sewage, surface
water, and groundwater) is typically accomplished with quantitative polymerase chain reaction
(qPCR), and concentrations are reported based on genome copies (gc) (Lodder & de Roda
Husman, 2005; Borchardt et al., 2012; Eftim et al., 2017). Some studies suggest that using
genomes copies as a surrogate for infectious viral particles may overestimate risk estimates when
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performing a QMRA (Abel et al., 2017), but Gerba et al. (2018) recommended continued use of
qPCR-based data until a more appropriate alternative was developed. For culturable viruses,
genome copies may provide a relatively accurate estimate of infectious particles in early stages
of wastewater treatment, and some studies show that ratios of infectious particles to genome
copies can range from 1/700 for AdV 40/41 (McBride et al., 2013; Lim et al., 2015) to 1/7 for
AdV serotype 1 (Parker et al., 2017). Therefore, the use of genome copy data can be justified in
some contexts, particularly in the absence of infectivity data (e.g., NoV), when ratios of
infectious particles to genome copies are expected to be high (e.g., in raw sewage), or when
additional conservatism is preferred (e.g., potable reuse).
Table 4-1. Statistical distributions of pathogen occurrence in different water sources (WW = raw
wastewater, SW = surface water, and GW = groundwater). The Cryptosporidium surface water
distributions are provided for a bin 1 (S1), bin 2 (S2), and bin 4 (S3) surface water. The corresponding
probability distribution functions and cumulative distribution functions are shown in Figures S1-S3.
Pathogen
Cryptosporidium

NoV

AdV

Salmonella

Water
WW
SW (S1)
SW (S2)
SW (S3)
GW

Concentration
Lognormala (101.89, 102.05)
Uniformb (10-2.70,10-1.12)
Uniformb (10-1.12, 100.00)
Uniformb (100.48, 102.05)
0

Unit
oocysts/L

WW
SW
GW
WW
SW
GW
WW

Normalc (103.95, 101.11)
Lognormald (102.95, 103.22)
Uniformb (0, 10-0.22)
Uniformb (103.25, 108.62)
Uniformb (102.94, 103.88)
Uniformb (10-1.11, 101.00)
Weibulle (10-0.44, 103.36)

gc/L

SW
GW

Uniformb (10-0.22, 102.63)
0

gc/L

MPN/L

(mean, standard deviation) with μ = 3.80 and σ = 1.06
(minimum, maximum)
c
(mean, standard deviation)
d
(mean, standard deviation) with μ = 6.04 and σ = 1.22
e
(shape, scale)
a

b
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Reference
Rose et al. (2005)
LeChevallier et al. (1991); USEPA (2010)
LeChevallier et al. (1991); USEPA (2010)
LeChevallier et al. (1991); USEPA (2010)
Lodder & de Roda Husman (2005); Ogorzaly et al.
(2010)
Eftim et al. (2017)
Lodder & de Roda Husman (2005)
Borchardt et al. (2012)
Hewitt et al. (2011)
Jiang et al. (2001)
Borchardt et al. (2012); Allard & Vantarakis (2017)
Koivunen et al. (2003); Lemarchand & Lebaron
(2003)
Lemarchand & Lebaron (2003)
Lodder & de Roda Husman (2005); Ogorzaly et al.
(2010)

Studies have reported mean NoV concentrations in raw wastewater as high as 7.70 log10
gc/L, but the corresponding sample sizes have been limited (Simmons et al., 2011) or based on
small-scale applications such as a single office building (Jahne, 2017) (additional discussion in
Text S1). With a more comprehensive review of the literature, Eftim et al. (2017) reported a
mean concentration of 3.95 log10 gc/L and standard deviation of 1.10 log10 gc/L for pooled NoV
genogroups (NoV GI and GII; Table 4.1). Although studies have reported infectivity data for
AdV in wastewater (Hewitt et al., 2011; Hurst et al., 1988), few studies have reported infectivity
data for source waters. To maintain consistency, genome copy data were used to describe AdV
occurrence in raw wastewater, surface water, and groundwater (Table 4.1) (Jiang et al., 2001;
Hewitt et al., 2011; Borchardt et al., 2012; Allard & Vantarakis, 2017).
4.2.3 Source water concentrations for target pathogens
4.2.3.1 Surface water
The de facto reuse system (TT1), the planned IPR systems with surface water
augmentation (TT3 and TT4), and the DPR system with surface water blending (TT5) were all
influenced by pathogen concentrations in the upstream surface water. Consistent with Amoueyan
et al. (2017), the upstream surface water concentration of Cryptosporidium oocysts was based on
the bin classification system established by the U.S. EPA’s Long Term 2 Enhanced Surface
Water Treatment Rule (LT2ESWTR) and occurrence data in LeChevallier et al. (1991). Using
data for typical virus concentrations in surface water (Choi & Jiang, 2005; Haramoto et al., 2007;
Jiang et al., 2001; Lodder & de Roda Husman, 2005; Katayama et al., 2017), a lognormal
distribution was fit to NoV (Lodder & de Roda Husman, 2005), and a uniform distribution was
fit to human AdV serotypes 40 and 41 (Jiang et al., 2001). A uniform distribution was also fit to
published Salmonella concentrations in surface water (Byappanahalli et al., 2009; Haley et al.,
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2009; Jyoti et al., 2010; Lemarchand & Lebaron, 2003; Levantesi et al., 2012). The distributions
are summarized in Table 4.1, and the corresponding PDFs and CDFs are illustrated in Figure S2.
4.2.3.2 Groundwater
The planned IPR system employing groundwater replenishment was influenced by
pathogen concentrations in the diluent groundwater. Although groundwater is less likely to be
contaminated by bacteria and protozoa, albeit with some exceptions (Salvadori et al., 2009),
groundwater systems are known to be susceptible to viral contamination (Ogorzaly et al., 2010;
Rzeżutka & Cook, 2004). This is related to the longer survival of viral pathogens compared to
fecal bacteria and the smaller sizes of viruses, which make them more likely to pass through the
soil and reach the aquifer (Hijnen et al., 2005; Ogorzaly et al., 2010; Pang et al., 2005; Rzeżutka
& Cook, 2004). In this study, uniform distributions were assumed for the diluent groundwater
concentrations of NoV (Borchardt et al., 2012) and AdV (Borchardt et al., 2012; Allard &
Vantarakis, 2017), while Cryptosporidium and Salmonella occurrence was assumed to be
negligible. The distributions are summarized in Table 4.1, and the corresponding PDFs and
CDFs are illustrated in Figure S3.
4.2.4 Pathogen log reduction values for the environmental buffer
This study focused on recycled water contribution (RWC), storage time, and temperature
as the most important factors affecting pathogen dilution and die-off in the environmental buffer.
All parameters related to pathogen dilution and die-off are summarized in Table 4.2. Surface
water RWC was based on Rice et al. (2015), which evaluated nine source waters and found that
six had RWCs of at least 20%, and a 270-day storage time was assumed for the surface water
environmental buffer, consistent with the Trinity River in Texas (Wu, 2015). The groundwater
RWC was based on data from Sloss et al. (1996), which indicated that the mean RWC for 66
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groundwater replenishment sites at the Montebello Forebay was ~15% (Sloss et al., 1996; Text
S2). California requires no less than 2 months of storage in groundwater replenishment systems
(CDPH, 2014), so 2 months was also assumed for the baseline condition in the current study.
Table 4-2. Summary of model parameters for the environmental buffer baseline condition. All rate
constants are base e.
Water
GW

SW

a

Parameter
TGW
RWCGW
tGW
kCrypto,GW,10°C
kNoV,GW,10°C
kAdV,GW,10°C
kSalmonella,GW,10°C
TSW
RWCSW
tSW
kCrypto,SW,20°C
kNoV,SW,20°C
kAdV,SW,20°C
kSalmonella,SW,20°C

Description
Temperature
Recycled water contribution
Storage time
Inactivation rate constant
Inactivation rate constant
Inactivation rate constant
Inactivation rate constant
Temperature
Recycled water contribution
Storage time
Inactivation rate constant
Inactivation rate constant
Inactivation rate constant
Inactivation rate constant

Value
10°C
15%
2 months
0.014 d-1
0.055 d-1
0.029 d-1
0.138 d-1
20°C
20%
270 days
0.043 d-1
0.875 d-1
0.036 d-1
0.349 d-1

Reference
Nevecherya et al. (2005); Ogorzaly et al. (2010)
Calculateda
CDPH (2014)
Calculatedb
Calculatedb
Calculatedb
Bitton et al. (1983)
Peng et al. (2008)
Rice et al. (2015)
Wu (2015)
Calculatedb
Calculatedb
Calculatedb
Calculatedb

Calculated based on Text S2; Sloss et al. (1996)
Calculated with Eq. 2 and the parameters in Table 4.3

b

Several studies have evaluated survival (i.e., inactivation kinetics) of Cryptosporidium
(Peng et al., 2008), viruses (Yates & Gerba, 1983; Yates et al., 1985; Nevecherya et al., 2005;
Lee et al., 2008; Ogorzaly et al., 2010; Rigotto et al., 2011; Wu, 2015), and Salmonella (Bitton et
al., 1983; Nevecherya et al., 2005; Pachepsky et al., 2014; Sjorgen, 1994) in the environment.
Cryptosporidium is known to be highly persistent in the environment (Rzeżutka & Cook, 2004),
with base e inactivation rate constants of k4°C = 0.0051 d-1 for groundwater and k4°C = 0.0093 d-1
for surface water (Peng et al., 2008). Inactivation rate constants for other temperatures can be
determined with Eq. 4.1 and dimensionless temperature modifiers of 0.158 for groundwater and
0.095 for surface water (Peng et al., 2008).
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𝑘𝐶𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑜,𝑇 = 𝑘𝐶𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑜,4 𝑒 𝜆(𝑇−4)

(Eq. 4.1)

where, kCrypto,T = base e Cryptosporidium inactivation rate constant at T°C (day-1),
kCrypto,4°C = base e Cryptosporidium inactivation rate constant at 4°C (day -1),
λ = dimensionless temperature modifier,
T = temperature of the surface water or groundwater (°C).
Data generated from Eq. 4.1 can be used in conjunction with Eq. 4.2 to calculate
activation energy and the Arrhenius equation constant, which can then be used as an alternative
approach for determining temperature-specific inactivation rate constants. This framework was
specifically needed for the other target pathogens but is also presented for Cryptosporidium in
Table 4.3.
Table 4-3. First order rate constants (base e) and associated Arrhenius equation parameters (Eq. 2) for
Cryptosporidium, norovirus, adenovirus, and Salmonella inactivation (i.e., die-off) in groundwater and
surface water.

Parameter
k4ºC (d-1)
k10ºC (d-1)
k19ºC (d-1)
k20ºC (d-1)
k25ºC (d-1)
Ea (kJ/mole)h
Ch

Cryptosporidium
GWa
SWa
0.005
0.009
0.013
0.016
0.055
0.039
0.064
0.043
0.141
0.068
108.22
65.07
41.69
23.56

Norovirus
GWb
SWc
0.024
0.173
0.053
-0.176
-0.201
-0.394
1.382
91.94
67.96
36.15
27.75

a

Adenovirus
GWd
SWe
0.018
--0.007
-0.030
0.064
---54.85
111.94
19.77
42.60

Calculated with Eq. 1 (Peng et al., 2008)
Calculated with Eq. 3 (Nevecherya et al., 2005) with MS2 as a surrogate
c
Yang & Griffiths (2013) with MS2 as a surrogate
d
Ogorzaly et al. (2010)
e
Rigotto et al. (2011)
f
Bitton et al. (1983)
g
Pachepsky et al. (2014)
h
Calculated with Eq. 3
b
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Salmonella
GWf
SWg
--0.138
0.187
---0.347
--N/A
42.66
N/A
16.45

The Cryptosporidium inactivation rate constants for the baseline conditions in the current
study (i.e., 10°C for groundwater and 20°C for surface water) are summarized in Table 4.2.
−𝐸𝑎

𝑙𝑛 𝑘 = (

𝑅

1

) (𝑇) + 𝐶

(Eq. 4.2)

where, k = base e inactivation rate constant (d-1),
Ea = activation energy (kJ/mole),
R = universal gas constant = 0.008314 kJ/mole-K,
C = Arrhenius equation constant,
T = temperature (K).
Due to a lack of infectivity data, MS2 inactivation was used as a surrogate for NoV in the
current study. Eq. 4.3 was proposed by Nevecherya et al. (2005) for determining the MS2
inactivation rate constant in groundwater as a function of temperature. Base e MS2 inactivation
rate constants were also reported by Yang & Griffiths (2013) for surface water: 0.173 d-1 and
1.382 d-1 for temperatures of 4°C and 25°C, respectively. Published data for AdV inactivation
are also summarized in Table 4.3 (Ogorzaly et al., 2010; Rigotto et al., 2011). These virus
models and rate constants were then used in conjunction with Eq. 4.2 to determine the
corresponding Arrhenius equation parameters and ultimately the inactivation rate constants for
the baseline conditions in the current study, which are summarized in Table 4.2.
log(1/𝑘) = 1.862 − 0.0583 × T

(Eq. 4.3)

where, k = base e MS2 inactivation rate constant (assumed for NoV as well), day-1
T = temperature of groundwater, ºC (valid from 4-23ºC)
As a point of comparison, California awards a 1-log virus credit for each month of
storage/travel time in the aquifer. This is consistent with the MS2 inactivation rate constant
determined with Eq. 3 for a temperature of ~13ºC. However, when evaluating lower
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temperatures or other viruses (e.g., AdV), the die-off rate may deviate from the California
framework, as illustrated in Figure 4.2.

Figure 4-2. Estimated log reduction of (a) norovirus and (b) adenovirus in groundwater as a function of
travel time and temperature

The following base e inactivation rate constants were reported for Salmonella in surface
water by Pachepsky et al. (2014): 0.187 d-1 and 0.347 d-1 for temperatures of 10°C and at 20°C,
respectively. On the other hand, there is a paucity of data describing Salmonella inactivation in
groundwater (Sjorgen, 1994; Gorden & Toze, 2003), and those existing studies may not be
representative and/or applicable to environmental survival according to John and Rose (2005).
Therefore, due to a lack of data, a base e inactivation rate constant of 0.138 day-1, which was
determined for Salmonella in groundwater at temperatures ranging from 10-12°C (Bitton et al.,
1983), was assumed for this study.
4.2.5 Pathogen log reduction values for engineered treatment processes
When sufficient data were available in the literature, a probabilistic approach (i.e., a
statistical distribution on the LRV) was used to estimate pathogen removal/inactivation by each
engineered treatment process in the aforementioned treatment trains. In the case of insufficient
data for a particular pathogen, relevant surrogates were used, and in the case of limited data for
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treatment reliability, point estimates were used for the expected LRV. These data, along with
typical probabilities of failure, are summarized in Table 4.4 and described in greater detail
below. Because the data in Table 4.4 represent observed treatment performance, they may differ
from the typical regulatory credit awarded to each treatment process. Regulatory credits are
summarized in Table S2 for comparison.
Table 4-4. Assumed pathogen log reduction values (LRVs) for engineered treatment processes for an
assumed temperature of 25°C. N = normal distribution and U = uniform distribution.
Treatment
Probability
LRVs
Cryptosporidium Norovirus
Adenovirus
Salmonella
process
of failure
WWTP CAS
-N (1.58, 1.30)e
N (1.20, 0.78)f
N (2.34, 1.20)g
N (3.23, 0.76)e
r
r
r
DWTP Filter
-3
2
2
N/A
r
q
q
DWTP Cl2
-0
2
2
U (2.30, 3.15)p
r
r
r
GW Cl2
-0
4
4
U (2.30, 3.15)p
a
h,n
d
d
MF
0.0028
N (4.60, 0.96)
U (1.50, 3.30)
U (2.40, 4.90)
N (5.96, 1.47)h,n
a
h,k
h,i
d,o
UF
0.0028
N (5.52, 0.51)
N (4.00, 0.10)
4.9
N (4.80, 0.60)h
d
h
h,l
d
RO
0.00009
N (4.50, 0.73)
N (4.30, 0.34)
U (2.70, 6.50)
N (6.00, 0.60)m
d
d
d
BAC
-U (0.00, 0.85)
U (0.00, 1.00)
U (0.00, 0.60)
U (0.50, 2.00)d
a
Pre-O3
0.0021
Determined based on ozone CT (Eqs.4-6); O3 CT= 5 (mg-min/L)c
b,c
Post-O3
0.000325
Determined based on ozone CT (Eqs. 4-6); O3 CT= 10 (mg-min/L)c
d
UV
0.0002
Determined based on UV dose (Eq. 7); UV dose = 80 (mJ/cm2)s
ESB Cl2
-0r
6t
6t
U (2.30, 3.15)p
a

Forss and Ander (2011); bBurns (2015); cAmoueyan et al. (2017); dSoller et al. (2017); eOttoson
et al. (2006) with E. coli as a surrogate for Salmonella; fLodder et al. (2005); gHaramoto et al. (2007);
h
Chaudhary et al. (2017); iMatsushita et al. (2013); kBeauchamp et al. (2011); lGovernal & Gerba (1999)
with MS2 as a surrogate; mGerba et al. (1997); nHong et al. (2001); oQui et al. (2015); pFrancy et al.
(2012); qUSEPA (1991); rUSEPA (2006a); sNWRI (2012); tSalveson et al. (2016)

4.2.5.1 Conventional wastewater and drinking water treatment plant
For the conventional wastewater treatment plant, normal distributions were assumed for
the LRVs for Cryptosporidium (Ottoson et al., 2006), NoV (Lodder et al., 2005), AdV
(Haramoto et al., 2007), and Salmonella (Ottoson et al., 2006) based on typical data for a
conventional activated sludge (CAS) process; no tertiary treatment was assumed.
For the conventional drinking water treatment plant, specifically conventional filtration, a
3-log credit was awarded for Cryptosporidium and a 2-log credit was awarded for NoV and AdV
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for consistency with the U.S. EPA’s Surface Water Treatment Rules (SWTRs) (USEPA, 1991).
An additional 2-log credit was awarded for NoV and AdV for final disinfection with free
chlorine to achieve the 4 total logs required by the U.S. EPA’s SWTR. For TT2 with
groundwater replenishment, free chlorine was assumed to achieve 4-log NoV and AdV
inactivation consistent with the U.S. EPA’s Ground Water Rule (USEPA, 2006a). For
Salmonella, no LRV was awarded for conventional filtration, but inactivation by free chlorine
was assumed to follow a uniform distribution (Francy et al., 2012).
4.2.5.2 Low-pressure (MF/UF) and high-pressure (RO) membrane technologies
According to WHO (2008), MF is expected to remove 3 to 4 logs of bacteria and
protozoa but less than 1 log of viruses. More recent studies have reported 1.5 to 3.3-log removal
of NoV with MF, 2.4 to 4.9-log removal of AdV with MF (Soller et al., 2017), up to 4.9-log
removal of AdV with UF (Qui et al., 2015), and up to 9-log removal of Salmonella using MF
(Chaudhry et al., 2017; Hong et al., 2001). During nominal operation, both MF and UF are
capable of serving as absolute barriers for protozoan cysts (Hong et al., 2001; LeChevallier &
Au, 2004; Reardon et al., 2005). Although the primary benefit of RO membranes is the removal
of total dissolved solids (TDS), they are also capable of achieving significant pathogen
attenuation, although the ability to demonstrate RO membrane integrity with suitable surrogate
parameters often limits the corresponding regulatory LRV to ~2 logs (NRC, 2012). In practice,
RO membranes are able to achieve up to 6.5-log removal of MS2 phage (Chaudhary et al., 2017;
Governal & Gerba, 1999) and more than 6-log removal of bacteria (Gerba et al., 1997).
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4.2.5.3 Disinfection processes
4.2.5.3.1 Ozonation
Log inactivation during ozonation was based on an ozone CT framework and assumed
CT values of 5 mg-min/L and 10 mg-min/L for pre-ozone and post-ozone, respectively
(Amoueyan et al., 2017). These CT values were used in conjunction with temperature-dependent
equations for the inactivation of Cryptosporidium (Eq. 4.4) and viruses (Eq. 4.5) (USEPA,
2010). Thurston-Enriquez et al. (2005) indicated that 4-log inactivation of AdV and FCV (a
surrogate for NoV) could be achieved at 5°C with ozone Ct values of 0.60 mg-min/L and 0.03
mg-min/L, respectively, which are much lower than the 1.2 mg-min/L required for generalized
viruses at 5°C (Eq. 4.5; USEPA, 2010). Therefore, the U.S. EPA equations were assumed to
represent a potentially conservative estimate of viral inactivation for this QMRA.
Cryptosporidium Log Credit = 0.0397 × (1.09757)Temp × CT

(Eq. 4.4)

Virus Log Credit = 2.1744 × (1.0726)Temp × CT

(Eq. 4.5)

where, CT = product of ozone residual and contact time (mg-min/L),
Temp = temperature (°C)
Disinfection kinetics for Salmonella are poorly defined in the literature, thereby
necessitating the use of bacterial surrogates such as E. coli. The Chick-Watson model (Eq. 4.6)
was fit to ozone disinfection data for E. coli from Zuma et al. (2009), which resulted in a base e
inactivation rate constant of 0.32 (mg-min/L)-1. Temperature effects were not considered because
studies have shown that temperature (0ºC to 30º) does not have a significant impact on bacterial
inactivation kinetics (Kinman & Rempel, 1975; Zuma et al., 2009). Additional details related to
this calculation are provided in Text S4.
𝑁

𝑙𝑛 𝑁 = −𝑘 × 𝐶𝑇
0
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(Eq. 4.6)

where, 𝑘 = base e Chick-Watson inactivation rate constant [(mg-min/L)-1]
CT = ozone CT value (mg-min/L)
Collectively, these CT values and models resulted in estimated Cryptosporidium, NoV,
AdV, and Salmonella LRVs of 2, 6, 6, and 1.5 for pre-ozonation and 4.1, 6, 6, and 3.2 for postozonation, respectively, under nominal operating conditions and a wastewater temperature of
25°C.
4.2.5.3.2 Chlorine
Chlorination is known to be ineffective for Cryptosporidium inactivation so an LRV of 0
was assumed (USEPA, 2006a). The USEPA CT guideline (USEPA, 1991), which requires 3 mgmin/L at 20°C and 6 mg-min/L at 10°C for 4-log virus inactivation, was used as the basis for
modeling viral LRVs with chlorination in surface water and groundwater, respectively. Also, for
the engineered storage buffer (ESB) in the DPR systems, a conservative value of 18 mg-min/L
was assumed for 6-log virus inactivation (Salveson et al., 2016). Francy et al. (2012) studied
chlorination of secondary effluent at four wastewater treatment plants and observed a minimum
log removal of 2.30 and a maximum log removal of 3.15 for E. coli. Due to lack of data on log
inactivation of Salmonella, these values were used as a uniform distribution for Salmonella
inactivation with free chlorine.
4.2.5.3.3 UV disinfection
Eq. 7 can be used in conjunction with the following base 10 rate constants to calculate
expected LRVs for UV disinfection systems. Cryptosporidium [0.243 (mJ/cm2)-1; Hijnen et al.,
2006] and Salmonella [0.515 (mJ/cm2)-1; Hijnen et al., 2006] are considered to be highly
susceptible to UV inactivation, while AdV [0.024 (mJ/cm2)-1; Hijnen et al., 2006] is often the
driver for the design of UV disinfection systems in drinking water applications. Although
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reliable infectivity assays are not yet available for NoV, experiments with MNV [0.150
(mJ/cm2)-1; Text S5] indicate that NoV is likely highly susceptible to UV disinfection (Lee al.,
2008). As recommended by NWRI (2012), a target UV dose of 80 mJ/cm2 was assumed in the
model, but pathogen removal was limited to 6 logs, in accordance with CDPH (2014). Although
some potable reuse systems employ UV doses aimed at NDMA photolysis (e.g., >100 mJ/cm2)
(Amoueyan et al. 2017), the 80-mJ/cm2 disinfection dose was assumed for conservatism.
Moreover, treatment process failures and associated ‘domino effects’ were considered based on
changes in UV254 absorbance. Additional details related to this UV failure framework are
available in Amoueyan et al. (2017) and Text S6.
𝑁

−𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑁 ) = 𝑘𝑈𝑉 × D
0

(Eq. 4.7)

where, 𝑘𝑈𝑉 = base 10 UV254 inactivation rate constant (mJ/cm2)-1,
D = UV254 dose (mJ/cm2).
4.2.6 Dose response models
Table 4.5 summarizes the various parameters used to estimate daily risk and DALYs per
illness assuming 2 L of daily drinking water consumption (USEPA, 2004; WHO, 2008). An
exponential dose response model was used for Cryptosporidium (Eq. 4.8; USEPA, 2006b) and
AdV (Eq. 4.8; Crabtree et al., 1997; Heerden et al., 2005), fractional Poisson was used for NoV
(Eq. 4.9; Messner et al., 2014), and beta Poisson was used for Salmonella (Eq. 10; Haas et al.,
1999; Soller et al., 2016). Estimating daily risk of AdV infection requires conversion of genome
copy data to an infectious dose using a tissue culture infective dose (TCID50) conversion factor
of 1/700 TCID50/gc (Lim et al., 2015; McBride et al., 2013).
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Table 4-5. List of parameters used for dose response assessment and risk characterization calculations.
Description
Parameters
Dose-response parameters
Cryptosporidium
r = 0.09
Norovirus
P = 0.722; µ = 1106
Adenovirus
r = 0.4172
Salmonella
α = 0.3126; β = 2884
Adenovirus conversion factor
1/700
Health Burden
Cryptosporidium
0.0017
Norovirus
0.00095
Adenovirus
0.0534
Salmonella
0.068
Conditional probability of illness given an infection
Cryptosporidium

(𝑃𝑖𝑙𝑙 |𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑓 )

𝐶𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑜

Reference

oocysts-1
unitless; gc
unitless
unitless
TCID50/gc

USEPA (2006b)
Messner et al. (2014)
Heerden et al. (2005); Haas et al. (1999)
Haas et al. (1999); Soller et al. (2016)
McBride et al. (2013); Lim et al. (2015)

DALYs/case
DALYs/case
DALYs/case
DALYs/case

Health Canada. (2012)
Kemmeren et al. (2006)
Gaunt et al. (2011)
Calculateda

= 0.7

Adenovirus

Ƞ = 2.55×10-3; 𝑟𝑖𝑙𝑙,𝑁𝑜𝑉 =
0.086
(𝑃𝑖𝑙𝑙 |𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑓 )
= 0.5

Salmonella

(𝑃𝑖𝑙𝑙 |𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑓 )

Norovirus

Unit

Zhang et al. (2012)
Teunis et al. (2008)
McBride et al. (2013); Lim et al. (2015)

𝐴𝑑𝑉

𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎

Jertborn et al. (1990); Calculatedb

= 0.41

a

Additional details in Text S7
Based on symptomatic illness and total infection (Text S7)
gc= genome copies
b

It should also be noted that the AdV dose response model was developed based on AdV
aerosol exposure through the inhalation route. Since there is a higher probability of infection
through aerosols than ingestion, the use of an inhalation dose response model likely leads to a
conservative risk estimate (USEPA, 2010b). The implications of using alternative dose response
models [e.g., the fractional Poisson model for Cryptosporidium (Eq. 4.9) proposed by Messner et
al. (2016)] was evaluated through sensitivity analysis.
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑓,𝑑 = 1 − 𝑒 −𝑟×𝐷𝑜𝑠𝑒

(Eq. 4.8)

where, Pinf,d = daily probability of infection,
r = dose response parameter,
Dose = pathogen dose (oocysts for Cryptosporidium or TCID50 for AdV)
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑓,𝑑 = 𝑃 × (1 − 𝑒

−

𝐷𝑜𝑠𝑒
𝜇

)

(Eq. 4.9)

where, P = fraction of susceptibles (P = 0.722 for NoV and 0.737 for Cryptosporidium)
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μ = mean aggregate size (μ = 1106 for NoV and 1 for Cryptosporidium)
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑓,𝑑 = 1 − (1 +

𝐷𝑜𝑠𝑒 −𝛼
)
𝛽

(Eq. 4.10)

where, α and β = beta Poisson dose response parameters
4.2.7 Risk characterization
The outcomes of this study for pathogen-specific annual risk (risk due to exposure to
each target pathogen individually) (Eq. 4.11) and the combined annual risk (cumulative risk due
to exposure to all pathogens) (Eq. 4.12) were compared against the benchmark risk of 10-4
infection per person per year and the WHO guideline for disease burden of 10-6 DALYs per
person per year. All parameters used in the dose response assessment and risk calculations are
summarized in Table 4.5.
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑓,𝑎 = 1 − ∏365
𝑖=1(1 − 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑓,𝑑 )𝑖

(Eq. 4.11)

where, Pinf,a = annual probability of infection.
𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙,

𝑖𝑛𝑓,𝑎

365
365
= 1 − (∏365
𝑖=1 [1 − 𝑃𝐶𝑟𝑦𝑝−𝑖𝑛𝑓,𝑑 ]𝑖 × ∏𝑖=1[1 − 𝑃𝑁𝑜𝑉−𝑖𝑛𝑓,𝑑 ]𝑖 × ∏𝑖=1[1 −

𝑃𝐴𝑑𝑉−𝑖𝑛𝑓,𝑑 ]𝑖 × ∏365
𝑖=1[1 − 𝑃𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑜𝑒𝑛𝑙𝑙𝑎−𝑖𝑛𝑓,𝑑 ]𝑖 )

(Eq. 4.12)

Disease burden (Eq. 4.13) was computed based on annual risk of illness and published
health burdens for the target pathogens when available (Health Canada, 2012; Gaunt et al., 2011;
Kemmeren et al., 2006), as summarized in Table 4.5.
𝐷𝐵 = 𝑃𝑖𝑙𝑙,𝑎 × 𝐻𝐵
where, DB = disease burden (DALYs/person-year),
𝑃𝑖𝑙𝑙,𝑎 = annual risk of illness for an individual,
HB = health burden (DALY/case).
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(Eq. 4.13)

Annual risk of illness can be defined as the proportion of infectious individuals who
develop symptomatic infection (Eq. 4.14).
𝑃𝑖𝑙𝑙 = 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑓 × (𝑃𝑖𝑙𝑙 |𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑓 )

(Eq. 4.14)

where, (Pill|Pinf) = conditional probability of illness given an infection.
The conditional probability of illness given an infection has been reported as a point
estimate for Cryptosporidium and adenovirus (Lim et al., 2015) and as a function of intake dose
for norovirus (Teunis et al., 1999; Teunis et al., 2008), as described in Eq. 4.15.
𝑃𝑖𝑙𝑙,𝑁𝑜𝑉 |𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑓,𝑁𝑜𝑉 = 1 − (1 + ƞ × 𝐶𝑁𝑜𝑉 𝑤)−𝑟𝑖𝑙𝑙,𝑁𝑜𝑉

(Eq. 4.15)

where, ƞ and 𝑟𝑖𝑙𝑙,𝑁𝑜𝑉 = parameters of the distribution for the duration of infection,
CNoV = concentration of norovirus in ingested drinking water (gc/L),
w = daily water consumption rate (L).
The health burden and conditional probability of illness given an infection due to
exposure to Salmonella was not available in the literature so Eq. 4.16 was used in conjunction
with published information for relevant parameters (Jertborn et al., 1990; Health Canada, 2012)
(Text S7).
𝐻𝐵 = 𝑌𝐿𝐷 + 𝐿𝑌𝐿

(Eq. 4.16)

where, YLD = years lived with disability
LYL = life years lost due to mortality
4.2.8 Model platform and simulation approach
The STELLA 10.1 (ISEE Systems, Lebanon, NH) system dynamics platform was used to
develop the model. The model was simulated with a Monte Carlo approach over 365 days and
with 10,000 iterations. To evaluate parameter uncertainty, sensitivity analyses were conducted on
the following parameters: (1) wastewater loading of pathogens (i.e., an outbreak condition), (2)
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water temperature in the environmental buffer, (3) storage time in the environmental buffer, (4)
recycled water contribution (RWC), and (5) dose-response model (i.e., Cryptosporidium). Factor
sensitivity (FS) was used to quantify sensitivity (Zwietering and Van Gerwen, 2000; Amoueyan
et al., 2017), according to Eq. 4.17. FS values greater than 0.3 and less than -0.3 indicated
significant changes in risk.
𝑃

𝐹𝑆 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔10 (𝑃 𝑥 )
𝐵𝐿

(Eq. 4.17)

where, Px = risk of infection for the modified condition
PBL = risk of infection for the baseline condition.
4.3

Results and discussion

4.3.1 Comparison of public health risk for different potable reuse treatment trains
Pathogen LRV probability distribution functions for all potable reuse systems (assuming
no failures) are shown in Figure 4.3. Under these ‘optimal’ conditions, all planned IPR and DPR
treatment train achieved the 12-10-9-log reduction of viruses, Cryptosporidium, and bacteria,
respectively, recommended by NWRI (2013). However, the LRV in the de facto reuse system
was not compared with NWRI requirement since this treatment train was not ‘officially’
recognized as a reuse project. The impact of environmental buffers in attenuation of pathogens
was not included in Figure 4.3.
The annual risk of infection was calculated for each of the target pathogens separately
and also for the combined effect of all pathogens under both optimal and sub-optimal operation.
The results for optimal operation are provided in Table S9, and the results for sub-optimal
operation are summarized in Figure 4.4 and Table 4.6. A direct comparison of optimal and suboptimal operation are shown in Figure S6. Infection risks for DPR treatment trains (TT6 and
TT7) or IPR with FAT and groundwater replenishment (TT2) were typically less than the
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benchmark risk of 10-4 for each individual pathogens and also for the combined risk of all
pathogens. The only exception was for the maximum annual risk for AdV in TT7 (max = 7.3×1004

), which was due to AdV’s resistance to UV disinfection. Although TT6 also employed UV

disinfection but UF and pre-ozonation prior to UV could sufficiently attenuate AdV
concentration in TT6. TT2 was shown to be very effective for mitigating risks associated with
Cryptosporidium and Salmonella, which is consistent with NRC (2012). TT2 was also effective
for NoV and AdV, but MF process could achieve higher LRV of AdV compared to NoV.
Therefore, the annual risk of infection due to AdV was less than NoV for this treatment train
(mean= 7.8×10-6 and SD= 2.5×10-7 for AdV; mean = 1.2×10-5 and SD = 3.7×10-7 for NoV).
Except for TT2, the risk associated with AdV was greater than for NoV. This was due to the
higher concentrations of AdV in the water matrices and AdV’s greater resistance to natural dieoff and UV disinfection.
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Table 4-6. Summary of infection risk and disease burden due to exposure to target pathogens in each
treatment train during sub-optimal operation.
Pathogen

Annual Risk of Infection
min
P5
median
P95
TT1, TT3, TT4, TT5 (surface water discharge or blending)
Crypto (S1)
1.8E-03 1.9E-03
2.0E-03
2.1E-03
Crypto (S2)
2.6E-03 2.7E-03
2.8E-03
2.9E-03
Crypto (S3)
8.7E-03 9.1E-03
9.6E-03
1.0E-02
NoV
2.6E-04 2.9E-04
3.4E-04
4.0E-04
AdV
1.1E-03 1.2E-03
1.2E-03
1.3E-03
Salmonella
8.0E-04 8.7E-04
1.0E-03
1.2E-03
Combined
5.0E-03 5.2E-03
5.4E-03
5.6E-03
TT2 (FAT with groundwater replenishment)
Crypto
4.0E-14 3.9E-13
3.6E-12
9.9E-11
NoV
1.1E-05 1.2E-05
1.2E-05
1.3E-05
AdV
5.0E-06 5.3E-06
5.6E-06
6.3E-06
Salmonella
0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
Combined
1.6E-05 1.7E-05
1.8E-05
1.9E-05
TT6 (DPR with ozone-BAC and direct distribution)
Crypto
1.4E-11 2.2E-11
8.5E-10
2.6E-07
NoV
0.0E+00 0.0E+00
8.2E-14
9.5E-12
AdV
2.7E-11 4.6E-11
1.8E-08
4.4E-06
Salmonella
0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
2.4E-13
Combined
6.0E-11 1.0E-10
5.4E-08
4.4E-06
TT7 (DPR with FAT and direct distribution)
Crypto
4.5E-12 8.6E-12
3.7E-11
2.5E-09
NoV
0.0
1.0E-12
1.4E-12
3.1E-11
AdV
1.5E-07 4.5E-07
1.2E-06
1.5E-05
Salmonella
0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
Combined
1.5E-07 4.5E-07
1.2E-06
1.5E-05

Disease Burden
median
P95

max

min

P5

2.2E-03
3.1E-03
1.1E-02

2.2E-06
3.0E-06
1.0E-05

2.3E-06
3.2E-06
1.1E-05

2.4E-06
3.4E-06
1.1E-05

2.5E-06
3.5E-06
1.2E-05

2.6E-06
3.6E-06
1.3E-05

4.5E-04
1.3E-03
1.3E-03
5.7E-03

7.6E-14
3.0E-05
2.2E-05
-

1.3E-13
3.1E-05
2.4E-05
-

2.2E-13
3.3E-05
2.8E-05
-

4.9E-13
3.4E-05
3.2E-05
-

1.7E-12
3.5E-05
3.6E-05
-

6.3E-7
1.3E-05
5.5E-05
0.0E+00
6.7E-05

4.7E-17
1.2E-16
1.3E-07
0.0E+00
-

4.6E-16
1.3E-16
1.4E-07
0.0E+00
-

4.3E-15
1.4E-16
1.5E-07
0.0E+00
-

1.2E-13
1.5E-16
1.7E-07
0.0E+00
-

7.5E-10
1.6E-16
1.5E-06
0.0E+00
-

3.6E-06
1.3E-06
6.7E-05
1.4E-10
6.7E-05

1.7E-14
0.0E+00
0.0E+00
0.0E+00
-

2.6E-14
0.0E+00
1.2E-12
0.0E+00
-

1.0E-12
0.0E+00
4.7E-10
0.0E+00
-

3.1E-10
0.0E+00
1.2E-07
6.8E-15
-

4.2E-09
0.0E+00
1.8E-06
4.0E-12
-

7.7E-05
1.0E-07
7.3E-04
5.4E-14
7.3E-04

5.4E-15
0.0E+00
4.0E-09
0.0E+00
-

1.0E-14
0.0E+00
1.2E-08
0.0E+00
-

4.4E-14
0.0E+00
3.3E-08
0.0E+00
-

3.0E-12
0.0E+00
4.1E-07
0.0E+00
-

9.1E-08
0.0E+00
1.9E-05
1.5E-15
-
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max

Figure 4.3. Log reduction of target pathogens in potable reuse treatment trains during optimal operation
(i.e., no failure). Pathogen attenuation in environmental buffers was not calculated in LRV. The LRVs for
de facto reuse was shown as a comparison with other treatment trains. However, it was not compared with
the recommended 12-10-9 LRVs since it is not officially recognized as a reuse project.
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Figure 4.4. Annual risk of infection due to exposure to (A) Cryptosporidium, (B) norovirus, (C)
adenovirus, and (D) Salmonella during sub-optimal operation. The risk for Salmonella with TT2 was
below what could be assessed by the model and was calculated as zero. Also, the “+” for TT6 and TT7
indicates the maximum risk for Salmonella; the corresponding min, 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles ranged
from 0 to 8.4×10-15).

All of the treatment trains employing either surface water discharge (IPR: TT1, TT3, and
TT4) or blending (DPR: TT5), exhibited identical results for annual risk for all pathogens, with
values exceeding the 10-4 annual risk benchmark. This indicates that the risks for these treatment
trains were dominated by pathogen concentrations in the upstream surface water. Previous
studies reported similar results (Amoueyan et al., 2017; Chaudhary et al., 2017). On the other
hand, risks associated with the DPR systems with direct distribution (TT6 and TT7) were up to
10 orders of magnitudes lower than the surface water systems for all pathogens.
The results of combined risk for all pathogens (Table 4.6) showed that TT2 (IPR with
FAT and groundwater replenishment) and TT6 (DPR with ozone-biofiltration and direct
distribution) were below the 10-4 benchmark at all times, while the combined risk for TT7
complied with the 10-4 benchmark at the 95th percentile but exceeded the benchmark with its
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maximum value. However, TT7 was still more reliable than the surface water IPR systems. TT6
was superior to all other treatment trains with combined annual risk ranging from 6.0×10-11 to
6.7×10-5.
Figure 4.5 illustrates the calculated disease burdens for each of the treatment trains and
for each target pathogen. When the infection risks of NoV were translated to disease burdens,
they all fell below the WHO’s recommended threshold of 10-6 DALYs per person per year. In
contrast, the disease burdens of Cryptosporidium, AdV, and Salmonella for the surface water
treatment trains (TT1, TT3, TT4 and TT5) all exceeded the recommended threshold. The disease
burdens were the lowest in the DPR systems with direct distribution (TT6 and TT7) and IPR
with groundwater replenishment (TT2) although the maximum values for AdV still exceeded the
10-6 benchmark.

Figure 4-5. Disease burden due to exposure to (A) Cryptosporidium, (B) norovirus, (C) adenovirus, and
(D) Salmonella during sub-optimal operation.
Disease burdens for Salmonella with TT2 and norovirus with TT6 and TT7 were below what could be
assessed by the model and was calculated as zero. Also, the “+” for TT6 and TT7 indicates the maximum
disease burden for Salmonella; the corresponding min, 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles ranged from 0 to
2.3×10-16).
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4.3.2 Results of sensitivity analyses
4.3.2.1 Impact of wastewater loading of pathogens (outbreak conditions)
With respect to Cryptosporidium, outbreak conditions have previously been defined as a
1-log increase in the raw wastewater concentration, in accordance with published data for the
1993 Milwaukee outbreak (Haas and Rose, 1995). The results for the IPR systems (TT1-TT4)
showed that with sufficient storage time (i.e., at least 270 days at 20ºC in surface water and 2
months at 10°C in groundwater), the impacts of higher wastewater loadings could be entirely
mitigated (Figure S7). DPR systems with direct distribution (TT6 and TT7) were significantly
impacted by an increase in Cryptosporidium concentration, and the risks increased proportionally
by a factor of 10. Nevertheless, the final risks for the DPR systems (6.7×10-10 and 7.7×10-10 for
TT6 and TT7, respectively) were still several orders of magnitude lower than the benchmark risk
(Table 4.7). DPR with blending upstream of the drinking water treatment facility (TT5) achieved
similar results as IPR systems with surface water augmentation.
Table 4-7. Impact of wastewater loading (outbreak conditions) on annual risk of infection during suboptimal operation. Corresponding graphs are shown in Figure S7-S10.
Train
TT1
TT2
TT6
TT7

Cryptosporidium
Normal
Outbreak
NS
NS
NS
NS
6.7E-11
6.7E-10
7.6E-11
7.7E-10

Norovirus
Normal
Outbreak
NS
NS
NS
NS
1.5E-09
2.5E-08
2.8E-10
1.9E-07

Adenovirusb
Normal
Outbreak
1.2E-03
8.0E-02b
5.5E-06
4.5E-04b
1.3E-10
1.3E-06b
1.1E-06
1.1E-04c

Salmonella
Normal
Outbreak
NS
NS
NS
NS
0.0E+00
2.2E-10d
NS
NS

Note: TT3, TT4, and TT5 were not impacted by outbreak conditions and therefore are not
included in this table.
a
NS = not significant
b
These results are for 4-log increase in adenovirus concentration in wastewater.
c
These results are for 2-log increase in adenovirus concentration in wastewater which resulted in
a risk above 10-4 benchmark.
d
These results are for 5-log increase in Salmonella concentration in wastewater.
With respect to NoV, outbreaks have been linked to 5-log increases in wastewater
concentrations (Barker et al., 2013). This simulated increase resulted in only a 1-log increase in
risk for TT6 (DPR with ozone-BAC and direct distribution) and a 3-log increase for TT7 (DPR
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with FAT and direct distribution) (Table 4.7). Similar to Cryptosporidium, the IPR systems
(TT1-TT4) and the DPR system with blending (TT5) were not significantly impacted by higher
concentrations of NoV.
Due to a lack of data on AdV outbreaks, wastewater concentrations were increased by 1
to 5 logs for consistency with Cryptosporidium and NoV, respectively. The results showed that
the DPR systems with direct distribution (TT6 and TT7) were impacted the most by an AdV
outbreak (Table 4.7 and Figure S9). With only a 2-log increase in AdV concentration in
wastewater, the risk of infection in TT7 (≈1.1×10-04) exceeded the benchmark risk. This was due
to the high level of resistance of AdV to UV disinfection. However, in TT6, UF and preozonation prior to UV could sufficiently attenuate AdV concentration. Similar results were
obtained for TT2 (IPR with FAT and groundwater replenishment) when the concentration of
adenovirus increased by 4 logs. The greater robustness of TT2 compared to TT7 was due to the
additional attenuation achieved by inactivation in the environmental buffer. However, the
benchmark risk was still exceeded with the 4-log increase in AdV concentration because AdV is
more stable in the environment than other viruses, as shown previously in Figure 4.2. Also,
although TT1 (de facto reuse) was significantly impacted by a 3-log increase in AdV
concentration, the other IPR systems (TT3 and TT4) and the DPR system with surface water
blending (TT5) were not impacted by the outbreak, even with a 5-log increase in AdV
concentration. However, it should be noted that the risk for AdV in TT1, TT3, TT4, and TT5 had
already exceeded the 10-4 benchmark risk for the baseline condition (i.e., in the absence of an
outbreak). Thus, it can be concluded that TT6 was the most robust treatment train during an
outbreak of AdV.
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Similar to AdV, outbreaks of Salmonella have resulted in a wide range of published
wastewater concentrations (Blaser et al., 1982; Teunis et al., 2010). Therefore, Salmonella risk
during an outbreak was also modeled based on 1 to 5-log increases in wastewater concentration
(Figure S10). The results showed that only TT6 was significantly impacted by increases in
Salmonella concentration (i.e., 4-log increase in annual risk for a 5-log increase in Salmonella
concentration). The exclusivity of the effect to TT6 was due to lower LRVs for the ozonebiofiltration treatment train (as compared with FAT) coupled with the absence of an
environmental buffer (as compared with IPR) to compensate for the higher Salmonella
concentrations. Nevertheless, the final Salmonella risk for all treatment trains, including TT6,
was still well below the 10-4 benchmark risk.
4.3.2.2 Impact of storage time in environmental buffer
Among treatment trains that utilized an environmental buffer (either surface water or
groundwater), TT1 (S1) (i.e., de facto reuse with the lowest concentration of Cryptosporidium)
and TT1 (S2) (de facto reuse with a moderate concentration of Cryptosporidium) were the most
sensitive treatment trains to changes in storage time when targeting Cryptosporidium. The annual
risk of infection started to increase significantly when storage time decreased from 270 days to
120 days and 60 days for S1 and S2, respectively (Figure 4.6a). In other words, storage time is a
significant factor when conventionally treated wastewater is discharged into relatively high
quality surface water supplies. These results are slightly different from Amoueyan et al. (2017),
which identified 150 days and 90 days as critical storage times for S1 and S2, respectively. This
is because an exponential dose response parameter of 0.09 was used in the current study vs.
0.00419 in Amoueyan et al. (2017).
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The annual risk of infection for Cryptosporidium was also sensitive to storage time for
TT2 (IPR with FAT and groundwater replenishment), albeit to a lesser extent. The change
became significant when storage time in the groundwater decreased from the baseline value of
two months to one month (Figure 4.6b). However, the final risk for TT2 was still well below the
10-4 benchmark regardless of storage time. This was related to the efficacy of FAT in attenuating
Cryptosporidium and the assumption that Cryptosporidium was not present in diluent
groundwater. The other planned IPR systems (TT3-TT5) were not significantly impacted by
changes in storage time because of the low Cryptosporidium concentrations in the advanced
treated wastewater, which made the Cryptosporidium concentration in the upstream surface
water the dominant factor. AdV was also sensitive to storage time because of its resistance to
environmental stress. The results of the sensitivity analysis (Figure 4.6c) indicated that storage
times less than 150 days for TT1 (de facto reuse) led to significantly higher risk of infection.
Similar to Cryptosporidium, the risk of adenovirus in the planned IPR systems (TT2-TT4) were
not impacted by changes in storage time due to the very low AdV concentrations in the advanced
treated wastewater.
With respect to NoV and Salmonella, storage time was not a significant parameter.
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Figure 4-6. Sensitivity analysis on storage time in environmental buffer a) TT1 (de facto reuse) targeting
Cryptosporidium for scenario 1 and 2, b) TT2 (IPR with groundwater replenishment) targeting
Cryptosporidium, and c) TT1 (de facto reuse) targeting adenovirus. (Asterisk * indicates the baseline
conditions). FS values greater than 0.3 and less than -0.3 indicates significant changes in risk. For
example, an FS value of 0.3 indicates the risk has increased by a factor of 2 due to the changes in storage
time.

4.3.2.3 Impact of recycled water contribution in the environmental buffer
With respect to Cryptosporidium, annual risk of infection was inversely related to RWC
in IPR systems with surface water augmentation and the baseline storage time of 270 days
(Figure 4.7a). When RWC increased to 40% and 80%, annual risks of infection in the IPR
systems with surface water augmentation (TT1, TT3, and TT4) decreased by 25% and 75%,
respectively. However, these results may vary with shorter storage times, as explained previously
in Amoueyan et al. (2017).
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Figure 4-7. Sensitivity analysis on RWC for a) TT1, TT3, and TT4 (IPR with surface water augmentation
at storage time of 270 days and temperature of 20°C) and b) TT2 (IPR with groundwater replenishment at
storage time of 60 days and temperature of 10°C). These results may vary with shorter storage times, as
explained previously in Amoueyan et al. (2017). (Asterisk * indicates the baseline conditions)

Similar results were obtained for NoV, AdV, and Salmonella in the IPR systems with
surface water augmentation. However, the results were different for TT2 (IPR with FAT and
groundwater replenishment), for which higher RWCs led to slightly higher risk of infection for
Cryptosporidium (Figure 4.7b). When RWC increased from 15% to 20%, the annual risk of
infection increased by 34%. Also, decreasing the RWC from the baseline value of 10% to 5%
resulted in a 68% reduction in risk. This is due to the assumption that Cryptosporidium was not
present in the diluent groundwater. For NoV and AdV, there were no significant changes in
annual risk of infection with higher RWCs. Also, the Salmonella risk for TT2 was below the
level that could be assessed by the model.
4.3.2.4 Impact of water temperature in the environmental buffer
Similar to the storage time, Cryptosporidium risk was impacted the most by varying
water temperature in the environmental buffer for TT1 (S1 and S2) and TT2. Temperature
changes did not significantly impact TT1 at scenario 3 (ie., with the highest concentration of
Cryptosporidium in surface water) due to robust treatment provided at the drinking water
treatment plant. The risk of infection increased 4-fold in TT1 (S1) and 0.3-fold in TT1 (S2) when
temperature dropped from 20°C to 10°C. This was due to slower inactivation kinetics at lower
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temperatures and the lower level of treatment employed for S1 at the conventional drinking
water treatment plant (consistent with LT2). Also, the risk significantly increased for TT2 when
the temperature of the groundwater dropped from 10ºC to 5ºC, which again was attributed to
slower inactivation kinetics. The other planned IPR systems (TT3 and TT4) were insensitive to
temperature changes in the environmental buffer. With respect to AdV, surface water
temperatures lower than 20ºC resulted in up to 2 orders of magnitude higher risks than the
baseline condition, while no significant reduction in risk was observed at temperatures higher
than 20ºC. Temperatures changes were insignificant for NoV and Salmonella.
4.3.2.5 Impact of treatment process failure
No significant differences in risk were observed in the event of treatment process failures
for the planned IPR systems with surface water augmentation (TT3 and TT4) or the DPR system
with surface water blending (TT5). Therefore, only the results for TT2 (IPR with FAT and
groundwater replenishment), TT6 (DPR with ozone-BAC and direct distribution), and TT7 (DPR
with FAT and direct distribution) were impacted by failures (Table 4.8).
Table 4-8- Sensitivity analysis on treatment process failures

Pathogens
Crypto
NoV
AdV
Salmonella

Planned IPR
MF
RO
UV
3.17
3.58
6.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.05
2.27
0.22
N/A
N/A
N/A

Ozone-based DPR
UF
pre-O3
UV
5.86
1.92
6.00
N/A
N/A
N/A
5.34
6.89
1.92
2.78
0.00
4.56

FAT-based DPR
MF
RO
UV
4.02
4.11
6.00
0.65
4.25
6.08
3.55
4.63
1.92
2.15
3.29
3.40

Note: N/A indicates the risk for Salmonella was below the limits that could be assessed by the model

Although AdV was less impacted by UV failure due to its inherent resistance to UV,
failures during UV disinfection were particularly important for Cryptosporidium, NoV (in FATbased DPR), and Salmonella (in both DPR systems) because their overall LRVs decreased by up
to 6 logs. Therefore, even though DPR systems with direct distribution achieved a lower risk of
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infection compared to the planned IPR systems (except TT2), the planned IPR systems were
more robust in the event of treatment process failure due to the effects of the environmental
buffer. Generally, UF and UV were identified as critical processes for Cryptosporidium
attenuation; RO and UV as critical processes for norovirus and Salmonella attenuation; and preozonation and UF were identified as critical processes for adenovirus attenuation.
4.3.2.6 Impact of dose-response model
The fractional Poisson model was also used as an alternative dose response model for
Cryptosporidium, as suggested by Messner et al. (2016). The results showed that by using
fractional Poisson, the final risk due to exposure to Cryptosporidium in all treatment trains
increased about 7-fold. Previous studies on fractional Poisson dose response model for
Cryptosporidium showed similar results (Soller et al., 2016). However, in DPR systems with
direct distribution (TT6 and TT7) and planned IPR system with groundwater replenishment
(TT2) the risk was still well below the benchmark of 10-4. While, in the IPR systems with surface
water augmentation (TT1, TT3, and TT4) and DPR with blending (TT5), employing fractional
Poisson model instead of exponential model increased the risk up to 7.3×10-2.
4.4

Conclusion
All potable reuse treatment trains evaluated in this study could achieve the 12-10-9-log

reduction of viruses, Cryptosporidium, and bacteria, respectively, recommended by NWRI
(2013). However, potable reuse treatment trains with surface water utilization (IPRs with surface
water augmentation and DPR with blending upstream of the drinking water treatment facility)
resulted in similar risks which all exceeded the benchmark of 10-4 for each individual pathogen
and for the combined effect of all pathogens. This indicated that the risks for these treatment
trains were dominated by concentration of pathogens in the upstream surface water. DPR
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treatment trains with direct distribution and planned IPR system with groundwater replenishment
typically resulted in risk of infection less than the benchmark of 10-4. Although the combined
risk of all pathogens in TT7 (DPR with FAT and direct distribution) exceeded the 10-4
benchmark at the maximum value (7.3×10-4) but the 95th percentile was below the benchmark
(1.5×10-5) and this treatment train was still more reliable than the IPR systems with surface water
augmentation. TT6 led to the lowest combined risk among all other treatment trains ranging from
6.0×10-11 to 6.7×10-5 annual risk of infection per person per year.
Although DPR systems resulted in lower risk than IPR systems with surface water
augmentation, the performance of DPR systems were significantly impacted during outbreak
conditions. The results of this study indicated that, risk of infection from Cryptosporidium during
outbreak conditions increased by a factor of 10 in DPR systems while, IPR systems could
sufficiently mitigate the higher wastewater loading, if at least 270 days at 20ºC and 2 month of
storage time at 10°C could be provided in surface water and groundwater, respectively.
Nevertheless, the final risks for the DPR systems (6.7×10-10 and 7.7×10-10 for TT6 and TT7,
respectively) were still several orders of magnitude lower than the benchmark risk. With respect
to AdV, this study suggested TT6 was the most robust treatment train during the outbreak
conditions.
The study also identified 120 days and 150 days as the critical storage times in surface
water in the de facto reuse systems when targeting Cryptosporidium and AdV, respectively.
Also, when temperature in surface water dropped from 20°C to 10°C, risk of Cryptosporidium
and adenovirus increased up to 4-fold and 20-fold, respectively. This was due to slower
inactivation kinetics at lower temperatures especially for AdV. With respect to NoV and
Salmonella, storage time and temperature were not significant parameters.
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Also, the results identified UV disinfection as a significant treatment process in the DPR
systems when targeting Cryptosporidium and norovirus. However, no significance impact was
observed in planned IPR systems with surface water augmentation (TT3 and TT4) or the DPR
system with surface water blending (TT5) in the event of treatment process failures.
The conclusions from this model can be used to better characterize public health risk
associated with different waterborne pathogens in potable reuse applications and to better
understand the critical parameters and operational conditions that could significantly impact the
performance of potable reuse systems.
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5.1

Introduction
In 1996, the Pathogen Risk Assessment Working Group of the International Life

Sciences Institute (ILSI) collaborated with the United States (U.S.) Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to develop a revised framework for quantitative microbial risk assessment
(QMRA). Specifically, the working group emphasized the need for inclusion of secondary
transmission and immunity to improve risk estimates for waterborne disease (ILSI, 1996). Soon
thereafter, Eisenberg et al. (1996) described the first dynamic model for waterborne disease, and
then Eisenberg et al. (2002; 2004) expanded the model to account for the unique properties of
target pathogens, including asymptomatic vs. symptomatic infection rates; the duration of
incubation, infection, and immunity; and shedding rate (Eisenberg et al., 2002; 2004).
Most QMRAs for waterborne pathogens involve static models, in which the probability
of infection is calculated as a single exposure event. However, outbreaks caused by highly
contagious pathogens (e.g., norovirus; NoV) often involve a significant number of ‘secondary’
cases (Zelner et al., 2010). Most static models do not capture the effects of secondary
transmission, thereby underestimating the true risk of waterborne disease within a community. In
contrast, dynamic QMRAs allow for differentiation of major pathogen sources, waterborne vs.
foodborne exposure, primary vs. secondary transmission, etc. A typical dynamic framework with
various epidemiological states [susceptible (S), exposed (E), carrier state 1 (C1), diseased (D),
carrier state 2 (C2), and post-infection (P)] is illustrated in Figure 5.1. Dynamic disease
transmission models have been used to characterize risk due to recreational exposures to Giardia
(Eisenberg et al., 1996), the Milwaukee cryptosporidiosis outbreak (Eisenberg et al., 1998;
Eisenberg et al., 2005; Brookhart et al., 2002), risks due to exposure to biosolids-amended soils
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(Eisenberg et al., 2004); parsimony for static vs. dynamic modeling frameworks (Soller and
Eisenberg, 2008); and the duration of post-infection immunity to NoV (Simmons et al., 2013).

Figure 5-1. Graphical depiction of the dynamic disease transmission model.
The movement of individuals from one state to another is represented with solid lines, and
pathogen transmission routes are represented by dashed lines.
NoV is the most common cause of acute gastroenteritis in the U.S., with approximately
20 million cases annually that affect up to 5% of the population (Hall et al., 2013a). NoV has
been implicated in several waterborne outbreaks linked to contaminated well water or
recreational water (Anderson et al., 2003; Parshionikar et al., 2003), but NoV is generally
transmitted through contaminated food, accounting for up to 50% of all foodborne outbreaks in
the U.S. (CDC, 2009-2011). Therefore, it is important to characterize the relative significance of
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waterborne vs. foodborne NoV outbreaks to aid in developing effective and cost-efficient
interventions.
Several studies have presented QMRAs on indirect potable reuse (IPR) and direct potable
reuse (DPR) systems for a wide variety of waterborne pathogens (Olivieri et al., 1999;
Amoueyan et al., 2017; Chaudhry et al., 2017; Lim et al., 2017; Pecson et al., 2017; Soller et al.,
2017). However, these models generally involve a static framework that does not account for the
impacts of alternative exposure routes (e.g., consumption of contaminated food), secondary
transmission, or the duration of post-infection immunity. Recent studies have also implicated
NoV as a major driver of risk in potable reuse systems (Soller et al., 2018; Soller et al., 2017),
thereby warranting further study.
The objective of this study was to develop a dynamic QMRA to evaluate the efficacy of
different potable reuse treatment trains in adequately mitigating risk of acquiring NoV-associated
gastroenteritis. This study not only characterizes the reliability of potable reuse treatment trains
in achieving relevant public health benchmarks under nominal conditions, but it also evaluates
the significance of treatment train failures, disease states and duration, endemic disease within
the community, alternative exposure routes (i.e., a foodborne outbreak), and secondary
transmission to identify the most influential model components, parameters, and assumptions.
Finally, this model allows for a direct comparison with Amoueyan et al. (in preparation; Chapter
3), which presented a static QMRA of NoV risk in potable reuse systems.
5.2

Methodology
A conceptual comparison of a static QMRA (Amoueyan et al., 2017) and the current

dynamic QMRA, which focuses on NoV as the primary hazard, is illustrated in Figure 5.2. In the
current study, a Monte Carlo simulation was used to capture stochastic variability in model
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parameters (e.g., pathogen concentrations, treatment process performance) based on assigned
probability distributions. The dynamic QMRA assumed susceptible individuals could contract
NoV through exposure to contaminated drinking water or food (i.e., primary transmission) or
contact with infected individuals, surfaces, or fomites (i.e., secondary transmission) (CDC, 2014;
Hall et al., 2012; Simmons et al., 2013). The model then simulated pathogen shedding into the
wastewater and pathogen attenuation during natural or engineered treatment in IPR and DPR
systems. Each of these model components is described in greater detail in the following sections.

Figure 5-2. Conceptual comparison of (A) static and (B) dynamic risk assessment frameworks.
The static framework represents the structure of the QMRA in Amoueyan et al. (2017; 2018),
and the dynamic framework represents the structure of the current QMRA. Transmission rate
constants are defined as follows: β1 = primary transmission rate constant for drinking water, β2 =
secondary transmission rate constant, β3 = primary transmission rate constant for food. The solid
lines represent travel of water through an IPR system, and dashed lines represent travel of water
through a DPR system. The dynamic model also uses a ‘distributed delay’ approach (Eisenberg
et al. 2004) to accurately capture time/duration effects.
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5.2.1 Norovirus epidemiology
Susceptibility to NoV is dependent upon the presence of histo-blood group antigens
(HBGAs) within the human gut, and fucosyltransferase 2 enzyme (FUT2) is required for
secretion of these HBGAs. In “nonsecretors”, inactivation of FUT2 prevents those individuals
from contracting a NoV infection (Currier et al., 2015; Nordgren et al., 2016). In the current
study, non-secretors were assumed to comprise 20% of the total population (Currier et al., 2015;
Simmons et al., 2013). Although these individuals were not at risk of developing or transmitting
NoV infections, they were still considered in the overall population-based risk calculation.
For the susceptible fraction of the population, the daily risk (i.e., β1) was based on NoV
concentration in the finished drinking water, an assumed water ingestion rate of 2 L/day
(USEPA, 2004; WHO, 2008), and a fractional Poisson dose response model (Eq. 5.1; Messner et
al., 2014).
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑓,𝑑 = 𝑃 × (1 − 𝑒
where,

−

𝐷𝑜𝑠𝑒
𝜇

)

(Eq. 5.1)

Pinf,d = daily probability of infection
P = fraction of susceptible subjects = 0.722 for NoV,
Dose = number of NoV ‘particles’ consumed (genome copies),
µ = mean aggregate size = 1106 genome copies for NoV.

The average incubation period for NoV (i.e., duration from exposure to infection) was
assumed to be follow a uniform distribution ranging from 12 to 48 hours (CDC, 2014), and the
duration of disease was assumed to follow a uniform distribution ranging from 1 to 3 days (CDC,
2014; Aoki et al., 2009). The infected population was also divided into symptomatic (69%) and
asymptomatic (31%) infections (Teunis et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2011), with symptomatic
individuals shedding at a rate of 250×109 genome copies/g feces and asymptomatic individuals
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shedding at a rate of 12×109 genome copies/g feces (Amar et al., 2007; Atmar et al., 2008).
Studies have shown that shedding can last for 2 to 3 weeks post-infection (Okhuysen et al., 1995;
Atmar et al., 2008), and post-symptomatic individuals sometimes shed at rates similar to when
they were symptomatic (Milbrath et al., 2013). Therefore, the shedding period was assumed to
follow a uniform distribution ranging 2 to 21 days. During this time, secondary transmission is
likely, with rates following a uniform distribution from 0.08 to 0.24 secondary infections per
shedding individual per day (Zelner et al. 2010). The acquired immunity that develops postinfection ‘wanes’ during the recovery period until the individual returns to the fully susceptible
state. Previously, the NoV post-infection period (i.e., duration of immunity) was suggested to be
at least 6 months (Johnson et al., 1990), but Simmons et al. (2013) proposed a longer immunity
period, which was modeled as a uniform distribution ranging from 3.2 to 5.1 years of immunity.
These values are all summarized in Table 5.1.
5.2.2 Model scenarios
Amoueyan et al. (2018) previously described a static QMRA for NoV in a de facto reuse
system, three planned IPR systems, and three DPR systems. Similar to the current dynamic
model, log removal of NoV was achieved through dilution, natural die-off in the environmental
buffer (i.e., surface water reservoir or groundwater aquifer), and inactivation/removal by
engineered water and wastewater treatment processes.
Amoueyan et al. (2018) demonstrated that planned potable reuse systems that utilize
surface water discharge (i.e., IPR) or blending (i.e. DPR) achieve similar annual NoV risks as de
facto reuse systems due to the dominance of upstream NoV concentrations. Therefore, this
dynamic QMRA focused on (1) a de facto reuse system, which was assumed to be representative
of each of the aforementioned surface water systems; (2) a planned IPR system with full
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advanced treatment (FAT) consisting of microfiltration (MF), reverse osmosis (RO), high-dose
UV disinfection, direct injection into the local aquifer, and final disinfection with free chlorine;
(3) a DPR system with ultrafiltration (UF), ozone (O3), biological activated carbon (BAC), UV
disinfection, an engineered storage buffer (ESB) with free chlorine disinfection, and direct
distribution to the consumer; and (4) a DPR system with FAT, an ESB with free chlorine
disinfection, and direct distribution to the consumer. A summary of the treatment trains is shown
in Figure 5.3.
Table 5-1. Summary of dynamic QMRA model parameters and values.
Parameter
NoV shedding rate (∅)
Symptomatic individuals
Asymptomatic individuals
Feces production rate
Wastewater generation rate
Community
Large community
Small community
Initial latent population
Birth rate
Death rate
Probability of symptomatic
response
Latency period (1/α)
Duration of disease (1/δ)
Duration of shedding (1/σ)
Duration of immunity (1/γ)
Proportion of nonsecretors (τ)
β1 (primary transmission through
water)
β2 (secondary transmission)

Unit

Value

Reference

gc/g-feces
gc/g-feces
g-feces/person
gallons/person-day

250×109
12×109
Uniform (200, 750)a
Uniform (50, 70)

Atmar et al. (2008)
Atmar et al. (2008)
Barker et al. (2013); Rao (2006)
USEPA (2002)

persons
persons
percent
day-1
day-1
percent

1,000,000
1,000
0% or 5%
3.4×10-5
2.3×10-5
69%

Assumed
Assumed
Eisenberg et al. (2005)
National Center for Health Statistics (2018)
National Center for Health Statistics (2018)
Teunis et al. (2015); Zhang et al. (2011)

hours
days
days
years

Uniform (12, 48)
1-3
Uniform (2, 21)a
Uniform (3.2, 5.1)

CDC (2014)
CDC (2014); Aoki et al. (2009)
Atmar et al. (2008); Aoki et al. (2009)
Simmons et al. (2013)

percent
infections/person-day

20%
Table 5.2b

Simmons et al. (2013); Currier et al. (2015)
Amoueyan et al. (2018)

infections/person-day

Uniform (0.08, 0.24)a

Zelner et al. (2010)

7×10-6c

Hall et al. (2012); CDC (2009-2011)

β3 (primary transmission through
day-1
food)
NoV dose response model (Eq. 1 in main text)
Fraction of susceptible subjects (P)
Mean aggregate size (µ)
NoV Occurrence
WW at time 0
gc/L
SW (prior to blending)
gc/L
SW RWC/storage time
percent and days
GW (prior to blending)
gc/L
GW RWC/storage time
percent and days

Messner et al. (2014)
0.722
1106

Messner et al. (2014)

Normal (8913, 13)d
Lognormal (888, 1643)e
20% and 270
Uniform (0, 0.6)a
15% and 60

Eftim et al. (2017)
Lodder & de Roda Husman. (2005)
Rice et al. (2015); Wu, 2015
Borchardt et al. (2012)
Sloss et al. (1996); CDPH (2014)

(minimum, maximum); bInitial conditions for β1 are summarized in Table 5.2 and were based on a previous static
QMRA model (Amoueyan et al., 2018); c The number is based on 35 people per 1,000,000 people per year which
was applied over a 5-day time period to simulate a foodborne outbreak; d(mean, standard deviation); e(mean,
standard deviation) with μ = 6.04 and σ = 1.22
a
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Figure 5-3. Potable reuse treatment trains included in the dynamic QMRA.
The conventional wastewater treatment plant (WWTP) included only secondary wastewater treatment.
The drinking water treatment plant (DWTP) represented a conventional filtration system with final
disinfection and was assumed to be compliant with the U.S. EPA Surface Water Treatment Rules. The
chlorination step following groundwater replenishment was assumed to be compliant with the U.S. EPA
Ground Water Rule. The chlorination step included in the engineered storage buffer (ESB) was assumed
to be compliant with guidelines for ESBs in DPR systems (Salveson et al., 2016). MF = microfiltration,
UF = ultrafiltration, RO = reverse osmosis, UV = ultraviolet disinfection, BAC = biological activated
carbon.

Pathogen attenuation was modeled with probability distributions for the expected log
removal values (LRVs) for the engineered treatment processes, which also accounted for unit
process failure and associated ‘domino effects’ (Amoueyan et al., 2017; Amoueyan et al., 2018).
In the IPR systems, pathogen attenuation was also achieved with dilution and natural die-off
based on recycled water contribution (RWC) [20% for surface water (Rice et al., 2015) and 15%
for groundwater (Sloss et al., 1996)], die-off rate (Amoueyan et al., 2018), and estimated storage
time in the environmental buffer [270 days for surface water (Wu, 2015) and 60 days for
groundwater (CDPH, 2014)].
5.2.3 Scenario 1: Simultaneous evaluation of primary and secondary transmission
In this scenario, exposure to NoV occurred through contaminated drinking water (i.e.,
primary transmission; β1) or through contact with shedding individuals (i.e., secondary
transmission; β2). Primary exposure through food was not considered in this scenario (i.e., β3 =
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0). The initial conditions for β1 for each treatment train were determined previously in
Amoueyan et al. (2018) and are summarized as the mean annual risks for the static model in
Table 5.2. Once susceptible individuals were infected, they potentially infected other susceptible
individuals and also shed pathogens to the wastewater, thereby allowing for calculation of timedependent raw wastewater concentrations based on the parameters in Table 5.1. The primary risk
due to exposure to contaminated drinking water then varied over time based on the stochastic
performance of the engineered treatment trains and environmental buffer (when applicable). In
other words, the daily risk (i.e., β1) was recalculated for each day of the simulation using the
simulated concentration of NoV in the finished drinking water.
5.2.4 Scenario 2: Relative significance of secondary transmission
This scenario focused on the relative contribution of secondary transmission (i.e., β2; Table
5.1) to overall disease incidence in the community. In this scenario, the pathogen shedding rate
was set to zero, but primary transmission could still occur due to a baseline level of NoV in local
drinking water. In other words, β1 was held constant at the static risk values shown in Table 5.1.
5.2.5 Scenario 3: Relative significance of time-dependent primary transmission
This scenario focused on the relative contribution of dynamic primary transmission to
overall disease incidence in the community. Because secondary transmission (i.e., β2) was set to
zero, the risk estimates in this scenario were expected to be approximately similar to the static
model, in which drinking water was the only source of NoV. However, the post-infection
immunity period considered in the dynamic model was also expected to reduce estimated risks
relative to the static model.
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5.2.6 Scenario 4: Relative significance of foodborne transmission
This scenario expanded the framework of Scenario 1 by including primary transmission
through contaminated food (i.e., β3) as an additional NoV exposure route. In addition to
evaluating the relative significance of a foodborne outbreak to overall risk in the community, this
scenario also allowed for an evaluation of potable reuse treatment train reliability through
robustness (Pecson et al., 2015) in the event of an outbreak condition. The additional primary
transmission route was applied to the model over a five-day period to simulate a foodborne
outbreak at a local food preparation center (e.g., a restaurant). The transmission rate constant
(i.e., β3 = 7×10-6 day-1) was based on data for reported illnesses associated with foodborne NoV
outbreak in the U.S. from 2001 to 2008 (Hall et al., 2012).
5.3

Simulation approach and initial conditions
The dynamic model was developed in STELLA 10.1 (ISEE Systems, Lebanon, NH). The

movement of individuals through the various epidemiological states was modeled using a series
of ordinary differential equations (ODEs) (Text S1; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Soller & Eisenberg,
2008) and the parameters summarized in Tables 5.1.
Two different population sizes—a small community of 1,000 and a large community of
1,000,000 people—were considered to evaluate the role of population size in propagating disease
throughout the community. As suggested by previous studies (Eisenberg et al., 1996; Simmons et
al., 2013), birth (3.4×10-5 day-1) and death (2.3×10-5 day-1) rates were also included (National
Center for Health Statistics, 2018). The birth rate was applied to the total population but only
added individuals to the susceptible state, and the death rate was applied to all epidemiological
states (S, E, C1, D, C2, and P). Each model scenario was simulated based on two initial latent
conditions: (1) an endemic scenario in which 5% of the community was ‘exposed’ at time zero
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(Eisenberg et al., 2005) and (2) a scenario in which all secretors were in the susceptible state at
time zero (i.e., no initial latent population). The 5% latency scenario allowed for a simulation of
real-world conditions, and the 0% latency scenario allowed for a direct comparison with the
static model in Amoueyan et al. (2018). There were no further distinctions for sex, age, or
immunocompromised individuals.
All states except the susceptible state (S) were characterized as distributed delays and
described by gamma distributions with a shape parameter of 4 (Soller & Eisenberg, 2008; Zelner
et al., 2010), as shown in Figure 5.4.

Figure 5-4. Dynamic disease transmission model used to simultaneously evaluate the impacts of primary
and secondary transmission.

To incorporate waning immunity, it was assumed that the level of protection during the
immunity period (1/γ) decreased linearly from full protection to no protection (Eisenberg et al.,
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2004). Four different compartments with different levels of immunity were used to simulate the
post-infection state (P1, P2, P3, and P4), with P1 representing full protection and P4 representing
the least protection. Therefore, individuals in P2, P3, and P4 could theoretically move to the
exposed state (E) through primary or secondary NoV exposure, or ultimately return to the
susceptible state with no protection. Eq. 5.2 was used to define the rate constant of movement
from P2, P3, and P4 to the exposed state (E) (Soller & Eisenberg, 2008).
𝛽𝑗𝑖 =

𝛽𝑗 (𝑖−1)
𝑛

(Eq. 5.2)

where, j = 1 for primary transmission or 2 for secondary transmission,
i = 1, 2, 3, or 4 depending on the protected state,
n = total number of compartments in the protected state = 4.

5.4

Risk Calculation
Annual cumulative incidence (CI) was used as the principal measure of risk and was

calculated as the number of individuals who entered either the diseased state (D) or the
asymptomatic carrier state (C1) during each simulated year divided by the total population for
that year (Eisenberg et al., 2004; Soller and Eisenberg, 2008). Therefore, CI can also be
described as the annual risk of infection per person for the dynamic QMRA. Because the model
simulated true travel times for each ‘parcel’ of water and for movement of individuals between
epidemiological states, a typical 365-day simulation would not have been adequate to achieve
steady state conditions (Eisenberg et al., 2004). Instead, each model iteration simulated 10 years,
and the results were based on 1,000 model iterations.
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5.5

Model Validation
The model was validated as suggested by Sterman (2000). These tests included structure

assessment, dimensional consistency, behavior reproduction, integration error, extreme
conditions, and sensitivity analysis. Moreover, to ensure consistency between the previous static
model (Amoueyan et al., 2018) and the current dynamic model, the following model validation
scenario was also evaluated: no secondary transmission (β2 = 0) and no post-infection immunity
(1/γ = 0). These conditions provided a more direct comparison with the static model than
Scenario 3 because the significant time lag associated with post-infection immunity was
eliminated. Different ‘delta time’ (DT) values (i.e., the time interval simulated by each model
calculation) were also evaluated to identify the DT with the most accurate simulation of
movement between the various epidemiological states. The optimal DT value was determined to
be 1/16 which means calculations were done 16 times per time unit. Time unit in this simulation
was considered as one day.
5.6

Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity analyses were conducted to evaluate the relative impact of various model inputs

and to identify the most influential parameters. Sensitivity analyses were performed on pathogen
shedding rate (∅), secondary transmission rate constant (β2), the duration of latency (1/α), the
duration of disease (1/δ), the duration of shedding in either carrier state (1/σ), and the duration of
post-infection immunity (1/γ). The Morris method (Eq. 5.3) was used to define the relative
sensitivity of the final risk to different model inputs (Wu et al., 2013b). Parameters with higher
relative sensitivity parameters were considered to be more influential for estimating disease
incidence.
Relative sensitivity =
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∆𝐶𝐼/𝐶𝐼0
∆𝑃/𝑃0

(Eq. 5.3)

where, ∆𝐶𝐼/𝐶𝐼0 = relative changes in cumulative incidence,
∆𝑃/𝑃0 = relative changes in the input parameter.
5.7

Results

5.7.1 Scenario 1: Simultaneous evaluation of primary and secondary transmission
Cumulative incidence (CI) was calculated for each year of the model simulation for initial
latent populations of 0% and 5% (i.e., endemic). The mean cumulative incidence for each
treatment train in the endemic setting was slightly higher than those of the 0% initial latent
population (Table 5.2). The percent differences ranged from 19% for de facto reuse to 30% for
FAT-based DPR, although the DPR systems achieved the lowest overall CIs for each latent
condition. The increase in CI for the endemic condition was simply due to the baseline level of
disease at time zero, which then propagated through the community.
Table 5-2. Comparison of mean annual risk of norovirus infection for the previous static model
(Amoueyan et al., 2018) and the current dynamic model under different scenarios. The static
model risks for each treatment train were used as the initial conditions (β1,time=0) for the
dynamic model.
Condition

Static Model

Dynamic Scenario 1

N/A
N/A

Dynamic
Uniforma

β1
β2
β3
Latent = 0%
A. de facto reuse
B. Planned IPR
C. O3-based DPR
D. FAT-based DPR
Latent = 5%
A. de facto reuse
B. Planned IPR
C. O3-based DPR
D. FAT-based DPR

N/A
Meanb
3.4E-04
1.2E-05
1.5E-09
2.8E-10
Mean
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

Dynamic Scenario
2
Static
Uniforma

0
SD
3.1E-05
3.7E-07
4.1E-08
3.7E-09
SD
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

Meanc
5.8E-02
5.5E-02
4.4E-02
4.4E-02
Meanc
6.9E-02
6.8E-02
5.6E-02
5.7E-02

Dynamic Scenario
3
Dynamic
0

0
SD
4.5E-02
6.6E-02
7.3E-02
7.1E-02
SD
9.6E-02
1.0E-01
1.1E-01
1.1E-01

Meanc
5.8E-02
5.5E-02
4.4E-02
4.4E-02
Meanc
6.9E-02
6.8E-02
5.6E-02
5.7E-02

SD
4.5E-02
6.6E-02
7.3E-02
7.1E-02
SD
9.6E-02
1.0E-01
1.1E-01
1.1E-01

2.6E-04
9.6E-06
2.3E-11
4.1E-11
Meanc
2.9E-03
2.6E-03
2.6E-03
2.7E-03

Dynamic
Uniforma
Pointa

0
Meanc

Dynamic Scenario 4

SD
5.7E-06
2.0E-07
6.5E-11
9.5E-11
SD
7.8E-03
7.8E-03
7.8E-03
7.9E-03

Meanc
1.6E-01
6.1E-02
4.7E-02
4.6E-02
Meanc
3.4E-01
3.4E-01
3.4E-01
3.4E-01

Defined in Table 5.1; bThese values (after conversion to daily risk) served as initial conditions for β1 in
the dynamic primary transmission scenarios; cThese values represent cumulative incidence

a
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SD
2.2E-03
4.5E-04
3.2E-04
3.2E-04
SD
5E-03
5E-03
5E-03
5E-03

The maximum CI for scenario 1 ranged from 0.18 for the DPR treatment trains to 0.23 for
the IPR treatment trains (Table S2), which are consistent with Phillips et al. (2010) (annual
incidence per person = 0.19) and Simmons et al. (2013) (annual incidence per person = 0.21).
The maximum CIs in the current study were associated either with the first year of the endemic
condition or with infections resulting from secondary transmission. Scallan et al. (2011) noted
that total acute gastroenteritis in the U.S. amounted to 0.65 cases/person-year, which is higher
than the current study, and that acute gastroenteritis linked to water was approximately 0.05
cases/person-year, which is lower than the current study. Therefore, secondary transmission may
explain the discrepancy between the current study and the water-specific values in Scallan et al.
(2011), and the lack of foodborne exposure in scenario 1 may explain the discrepancy between
the current study and the higher overall value in Scallan et al. (2011). The results showed that
including secondary transmission increased the risk of the dynamic model significantly
compared to the static model and none of the treatment trains could achieve the 10-4 benchmark.
There was no noticeable impact of community size on CI.
Based on a comparison of the static risks from Amoueyan et al. (2018) and the dynamic
risks for Scenario 1 (Table 5.2: Latent = 0%), the dynamic model resulted in notably higher
risks. In fact, estimated risks for the de facto reuse system increased by two orders of magnitude,
and risks in the FAT-based DPR system increased by eight orders of magnitude. The major
differences in model structure included (1) varying primary transmission based on disease
incidence within the community; (2) secondary transmission, which was expected to increase
risk; and (2) the distributed delays associated with the epidemiological states, which were
expected to decrease risk. Therefore, changes in primary transmission (focus of scenario 3) or
secondary transmission (focus of scenario 2) appeared to be driving the risk in the dynamic
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model. These results can potentially be explained based on observations in Phillips et al. (2010)
and predicted data in Simmons et al. (2013), both of which studied age-specific annual incidence
of NoV-associated gastroenteritis. Both studies noted that disease incidence was highest in
younger age groups, particularly among children less than 5 years old who were characterized by
higher rates of secondary transmission.
5.7.2 Scenario 2: Relative significance of secondary transmission
To further elucidate the role of secondary transmission, the primary transmission rate was
held constant in scenario 2. The results of this scenario are summarized in Table 5.2. The mean
risks in Table 5.2 were nearly identical for scenarios 1 and 2, which suggested that varying
primary transmission (i.e., scenario 1) had a negligible impact on CI and that secondary
transmission was primarily driving risk in the potable reuse systems. Particularly when
considering the 0% latent population condition, the risk posed by the baseline level of NoV in
any of the potable reuse systems was still sufficient to drive the secondary transmission pathway.
These results were consistent data from the national outbreak reporting system, which identified
secondary transmission as primary exposure route for acute gastroenteritis caused by NoV
(66.1% of all NoV cases in the U.S. from 2009-2010) (Hall et al., 2013b).
5.7.3 Scenario 3: Relative significance of time-dependent primary transmission
This scenario highlighted the potential role of varying primary transmission on CI by
eliminating the secondary transmission route. As expected based on the results from the previous
scenarios, the CI values were considerably lower in scenario 3 (Table 5.2). Moreover, the
dynamic risk values for scenario 3 were slightly lower than the static risk values from Amoueyan
et al. (2018), which could be explained either by long-term NoV attenuation within the potable
reuse systems or more likely the distributed delay structure of the dynamic model.
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Nevertheless, it is still important for potable reuse systems to achieve the recommended
benchmark risk of 10-4. If attenuation through the potable reuse treatment trains is inadequate,
the impact of the person-environment-person pathway (i.e., shedding to wastewater) may
become more significant. In the dynamic model, the CI in the de facto reuse with a 0% latent
population was 2.6×10-4, which is slightly higher than the 10-4 benchmark, but the planned IPR
and DPR systems were all well below the 10-4 benchmark. Brunkard et al. (2011) reported that
only 0.11% of waterborne disease outbreak in the U.S. between 2007 and 2008 were related to
NoV which resulted in 265 infectious cases (annual risk of 9.0×10-7 per person).
5.7.4 Scenario 4: Relative significance of foodborne transmission
The national outbreak reporting system identified foodborne transmission as the second
most important NoV exposure route (second only to person-person transmission) (Hall et al.,
2013b). Foodborne transmission accounted for 25.9% of all NoV-associated gastroenteritis cases
in the U.S. between 2009 and 2010 (Hall et al., 2013b). The results of this scenario are
summarized in Table 5.2. Relative increase in cumulative incidence in scenario 4 was attributed
to the combined effect of secondary transmission and primary exposure to drinking water. To
evaluate robustness of the treatment trains as a result of pathogen shedding into wastewater due
to outbreak event, primary transmission through drinking water (β1) was calculated for each of
the treatment trains during both normal and outbreak conditions and shown in Fig. 5.5. As
illustrated in Figure 5.5A, the additional cases of gastroenteritis caused by contaminated food
had no noticeable impact on primary transmission through drinking water at 5% initial latent
population. However, the primary risk was higher compared to Fig. 5.5B due to the initial level
of disease within the community. However, when not ‘masked’ by the initial latent population,
the foodborne outbreak resulted in a considerable increase in primary risk through drinking water
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(up to 5 orders of magnitude) for the DPR systems, although the overall annual risk of infection
was still well below the 10-4 benchmark (maximum of 9.5×10-7). On the other hand, neither IPR
system was impacted by the foodborne outbreak due to the robustness of the advanced treatment
train and/or environmental buffer. Additional simulations indicated that the foodborne outbreak
had significant impact on CI in the de facto reuse system when the storage time decreased to less
than ~10 days (Figure S1). The planned IPR system was sufficiently robust to mitigate the
impacts of a foodborne outbreak regardless of storage/travel time in the aquifer (Figure S2).
Therefore, it may be concluded that the planned IPR system with FAT and groundwater
replenishment was the most robust treatment train in the case of outbreak conditions. Again, the
size of the community had no apparent impact on CI.

Figure 5-5. Summary of results for dynamic scenario 4, specifically the relative impact of
foodborne transmission on primary transmission through drinking water (β1).
The normal condition referred to β3 = 0, and the outbreak condition referred to β3 = 7×10-6 day-1
which was applied over a 5-day period). The results represent risk of infection in one year of
simulation in which outbreak occurs.
5.7.5 Model validation
5.7.5.1 Comparison with static model
To ensure consistency between the previous static model (Amoueyan et al., 2018) and the
current dynamic model, the model was adjusted to eliminate secondary transmission (β2 = 0) and
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post-infection immunity (1/γ = 0). As noted earlier, these conditions provided a more direct
comparison with the static model than the aforementioned conditions for Scenario 3. The results
summarized in Table S1 indicate that there is consistency between the static model and the
dynamic model when the distinguishing model components are deactivated, thereby validating
the dynamic QMRA.
5.7.5.2 Extreme condition tests
Test 1: β1 = β2 = β3 = 0. This scenario simulated the condition in which there was no primary
exposure to NoV from contaminated drinking water (β1 = 0) or food (β3 = 0), and there was also
no secondary exposure to infected individuals (β12 = 0). Therefore, assuming a 0% initial latent
population, there should have been no incidence of disease within the community. Assuming a
5% initial latent population, there should have been an initial spike in disease incidence as the
latent individuals progressed to the diseased or carrier states, but the number of infectious
individuals was then expected to remain at zero once those individuals recovered. The results
shown in Figure 5.6 are consistent with these expectations. The peak value in the graph was
consistent with a 5% initial latent population (i.e., 5% × 80% × 1,000,000 = 40,000). Also, since
the maximum duration of exposed (E), diseased (D), and shedding (C1 or C2) was estimated to
be 2 days, 3 days, and 21 days, respectively (Table 5.1), infectious individuals were expected to
recover after a maximum of 26 days, as demonstrated in Figure 5.6.
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Figure 5-6. Extreme condition test (test 1): β1 = β2 = β3 = 0. Number of infectious individuals were
estimated based on endemic setting with 5% initial latent population.

Test 2: 1/γ = 0. Assuming no protection from disease (i.e., duration of immunity = 1/γ = 0),
infectious individuals return to the susceptible state immediately after leaving either carrier
states. Therefore, in the presence of primary and secondary transmission routes, it was expected
that the number of infectious individuals increase over time (Figure 5.7). The variations in the
number of infectious people were due to probability distributions assigned to each of the model
parameters. Also, as expected the results showed significantly higher number of infections
compared to the normal condition with immunity levels included. The number of infectious
individuals at both “immunity” and “no immunity” models are shown in Fig. 5.7. As expected, in
both models the number of infectious individuals increased until all initially latent population
went through the epidemiological states and became infectious. Meanwhile, the infectious
individuals spread the virus which could transmit the disease to other susceptible population and
therefore the number of infectious individuals was amplified due to secondary transmission. In
“no immunity” model, soon after infectious individuals left the carrier states, they became
susceptible and could get infected again by both symptomatically and asymptomatically
infectious persons.
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The cumulative incidence was about two orders of magnitude higher for the ‘no immunity’
dynamic model than the ‘immunity’ dynamic model for each of the potable reuse systems (Table
S3). Thus, including immunity in the model resulted in a lower cumulative incidence of disease,
which is consistent with Simmons et al. (2013) and Phillips et al. (2010).

Figure 5-7. Extreme condition test (test 2): 1/γ = 0. Number of infectious individuals were estimated
based on endemic setting with 5% initial latent population.

5.7.6

Sensitivity analysis

The sensitivity analyses identified the rate of secondary transmission, duration of immunity,
and duration of shedding as the most significant parameters affecting the risk estimates. Also,
sensitivity analysis on storage time in environmental buffer during outbreak conditions was
addressed earlier in section 3.4.
5.7.6.1 Secondary transmission (β2)
Secondary transmission was previously identified as the most important component
contributing to disease incidence in the dynamic model. Fig. 5.8 illustrates cumulative incidence
as a function of secondary transmission rate (β2 = 0 to 0.5 infections/person-day based on profile
likelihood of NoV outbreak by Zelner et al. (2010)) during normal condition (no outbreak, β3=0)
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where all other parameters set to the values in Table 5.1. As expected, a higher rate of secondary
transmission led to higher CI within the community.

Figure 5-8. Cumulative incidence as a function of secondary transmission rate at 5% initial latent
population. Β2=0 refers to scenario 3 in which the only source of NoV is from primary exposure through
drinking water.

As shown in Fig. 5.8, relative sensitivity of disease incidence to secondary transmission
rate decreased as the secondary transmission rate increased. For example, when secondary
transmission rate increased from zero to 0.1, disease incidence increased by a factor of 2.5×101
while, increasing secondary transmission rate from 0.4 to 0.5 increased the disease incidence by
a factor of 1.2×10-1. This result was consistent with Eisenberg et al. (2004) which showed lower
relative sensitivity at higher rates of secondary transmission compared to the lower rates of
secondary transmission due to exposure to enteroviruses. The importance of secondary
transmission for NoV infections can be illustrated with observed data for schools and child care
facilities in which young children with higher rates of disease incidence (annual risk of 1.22×10-1
per person among children who attended daycare in their first year of age; Hullegie et al. 2016),
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make up most of the population, or in other ‘high contact’ areas, such as nursing homes,
hospitals, or cruise ships. According to national outbreak reporting systems, approximately 3,500
outbreaks occurred from 2009-2012, of which 63% were related to health care facilities, 22% to
restaurants or banquet facilities, and 6% to schools or daycare facilities. Studies have reported
that the highest prevalence of NoV occurs in healthcare settings, with risk of illness ranging from
9-78% (Iturriza-Gómara and Lopman, 2014; Kambhampti et al., 2015; Weinstein et al., 2008).
5.7.6.2 Duration of immunity (1/γ)
Disease incidence was inversely related to the duration of immunity (Figure 5.9). A longer
duration of protection effectively led to larger portions of the population with some level of
protection at any given time, thereby limiting the number of new infections in any given year.
With a duration of immunity of at least one year, CI decreased dramatically. Therefore, it could
be suggested that if a vaccine could achieve a 1-year protection from NoV infection, especially
in children less than 5 years old, it could be significantly beneficial for public health protection.
However, Simmons et al. (2013) recommended development of NoV vaccine to provide
protection for a duration of 5 years for greater cost and health benefits per person vaccinated.
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Figure 5-9. Cumulative incidence of disease as a function of duration of immunity. The results are based
on one simulation at 5% initial latent population and β1 and β2 were set as listed in Table 5.1.

5.7.6.3 Duration of shedding (1/σ)
Studies have reported different NoV shedding rates ranging from several hundred viruses
per gram of feces to more than 1011 genome copies per gram of feces (Aoki et al., 2010; Atmar et
al., 2008; Teunis et al., 2015). Although a higher shedding rate was expected to result in higher
NoV concentrations in the raw wastewater and consequently the finished drinking water, the
results indicated that shedding rate (varied from 103 to 1013 gc/g feces for both symptomatic and
asymptomatic infections) did not significantly impact cumulative incidence (relative sensitivity
≈0). This was due to the robustness of the engineered treatment processes and/or natural die off
and dilution. For example, when die-off rate in the surface water was set to zero for the de facto
reuse scenario, the cumulative incidence increased by one order of magnitude for the higher
pathogen shedding rate (i.e., 3-orders of magnitude higher pathogen shedding than normal rate
listed in Table 5.1). On the other hand, the duration of shedding was demonstrated to have a
significant impact on cumulative incidence of disease (Figure 5.10). This was presumably linked
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to the importance of secondary transmission. When the duration of shedding increased from 2
days (minimum duration of shedding) to 21 days (maximum duration of shedding), cumulative
incidence increased about 9-orders of magnitude (depending on the treatment train) with de facto
reuse system resulted in highest incidence (Figure 5.10). Similar to duration of immunity,
relative sensitivity of disease incidence to duration of shedding decreased at higher duration of
shedding (relative sensitivity= 1.5×10+8, and 5.9×10-1 when duration of shedding increased from
2 days to 21 days and from 21 days to 40 days, respectively).

Figure 5-10. Cumulative incidence of disease as a function of duration of shedding.
The results are based on one simulation at 5% initial latent population and β1 and β2 were set as
listed in Table 5.1.
5.8

Conclusion
The main goal of this study was to evaluate performance of different potable reuse treatment

trains in case of NoV infection, outbreak conditions, and significance of secondary transmission
and immunity in NoV transmission through potable reuse systems. Results suggested that
incidence of NoV disease was mainly attributed to secondary transmission and that primary
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transmission through drinking water did not play a significant role in NoV infections. However,
it is important to provide the recommended benchmark risk of 10-4 in potable reuse systems to
limit the risk of infection associated with drinking water exposure pathway. Results of the study
indicated that the de facto reuse and planned IPR systems were sufficiently robust to handle the
impact of outbreak in the community. Increased number of infectious cases when employing
these treatment trains was mainly associated to secondary transmission pathway.
However, with less storage time in the environmental buffer, pathogen shedding into the
local wastewater became more important. For example, decreasing storage time in the de facto
reuse system from 270 days to 10 days resulted in more than 2-orders of magnitude increase in
primary transmission through drinking water during an outbreak event. On the other hand, with
planned IPR system, even very short storage times could sufficiently mitigate the effects of a
NoV outbreak. This was due to a lower concentration of NoV in the groundwater prior to
blending and the robustness of the advanced treatment train. Therefore, among the treatment
trains evaluated in this study, the planned IPR system suggested as the most robust treatment
train especially in case of outbreak conditions. This result may change if other planned IPR (i.e.,
ozone-based treatment trains with surface water augmentation) or DPR (i.e., FAT-based with
blending upstream of drinking water treatment facility) would also be considered in this dynamic
model.
The results of the sensitivity analyses indicated that secondary transmission, duration of
immunity, and duration of shedding were the most significant parameters in the dynamic
transmission model. Potable reuse treatment trains were able to adequately attenuate NoV
concentration in the raw wastewater through natural die-off, dilution, or advanced treatment
processes even when infectious individuals excreted as much as 1013 gc/g of feces into the
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wastewater which is higher than normally expected concentrations. However, since secondary
transmission drives the risk of NoV, longer duration of shedding or infectiousness increased the
incidence of disease through secondary transmission. Similarly, higher rates of secondary
transmission led to higher incidence within the community. Longer duration of immunity led to
lower disease incidence. Increasing the duration of protection from 0 (no protection) to one year
significantly impacted the cumulative incidence within the community. Therefore, it could be
concluded that if the potable reuse treatment trains could achieve the recommended benchmark
risk of 10-4 and if the secondary transmission pathway could be limited by developing a NoV
vaccine that could provide at least 1-year protection against the virus, the incidence of disease
within the community could be significantly reduced.
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6

Conclusion

6.1

Findings from current study that support previous literature
•

A previous study by Chaudhary et al. (2017) reported that in potable reuse systems that
utilize surface water as a discharge or blending point, the concentration of pathogens in
the upstream surface water dominates the risk calculation. The results of the QMRAs in
the current study provided further support for this statement. Two IPR systems (i.e.,
ozone-based and FAT-based) with surface water augmentation and one DPR system
(FAT-based) with surface water blending resulted in similar risks as a de facto reuse
system. The DPR systems with direct distribution and the planned IPR system with
groundwater replenishment achieved lower risks of infection for all pathogens due to the
robustness of the treatment trains and minimal/no pathogen contributions from the source
water. These results also confirm the statement by the National Research Council
suggesting that environmental buffers may not always be necessary to provide adequate
public health protection and that some engineered systems might achieve similar or
superior water quality than traditional systems incorporating environmental buffers
(NRC, 2012).

•

Potable reuse systems that employ surface water discharge or blending are more likely to
exceed the 10-4 annual risk benchmark for each pathogen or for the combination of all
target pathogens. Again, this is because of pathogen occurrence in upstream source
waters and not necessarily because of the inadequacy of the engineered treatment trains.
The DPR systems with direct distribution (both ozone-based and FAT-based) and the
planned IPR system with groundwater replenishment were generally able to achieve the
recommended benchmark. The only exception was adenovirus in the FAT-based DPR
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system with direct distribution, although the benchmark risk was only exceeded by the
absolute maximum risk simulated for that treatment train. In other words, the 95th
percentile annual risk was still less than the 10-4 benchmark. This was due to adenovirus
resistance to UV disinfection. These findings support Chaudhary et al. (2017), which
suggested that de facto reuse resulted in higher risks of Cryptosporidium, norovirus, and
combined pathogen risk than DPR systems.
•

Although Soller et al. (2017) and Soller et al. (2018) suggested that norovirus drives the
risk in DPR systems, the results of the current study indicated that Cryptosporidium and
adenovirus resulted in higher risks of infection in both IPR and DPR treatment trains.
Only in the IPR system with groundwater replenishment did norovirus result in a higher
risk than Cryptosporidium, although the risk was still lower than the 10-4 benchmark. The
results of the current study are consistent with Forss and Ander (2011), which involved a
QMRA on the DPR system in Windhoek, Namibia. They identified Cryptosporidium as
the most critical pathogen (as opposed to Giardia and norovirus). The results of the
current study also confirm statistics from the national reporting outbreak system.
Specifically, the data suggest a low rate of primary transmission of NoV through drinking
water (annual risk of infection of 9.0×10-7 per person in the U.S. between 2007 and 2008)
(Brunkard et al., 2011).

•

According to this study, potable reuse treatment trains employing ozone-biofiltration are
generally equivalent to RO-based treatment trains on the basis of public health, which is
consistent with the findings of Trussell et al. (2016). Gerrity et al. (2014) also evaluated
the applicability of ozone-biofiltration systems and concluded that ozone-based treatment
trains can provide adequate public health protection while also saving up to $51 million
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in capital costs and up to $4 million in O&M costs compared to FAT in a 10 MGD
potable reuse facility.
•

With respect to Cryptosporidium, the results of the current study showed that potable
reuse treatment trains that employ UV disinfection are superior to other treatment trains
and generally achieve annual risks that are several orders of magnitude lower than the 104

annual benchmark. The only exception was the DPR system with blending upstream of

a conventional drinking water treatment facility, for which the risk was dominated by
Cryptosporidium in the upstream surface water. Also, UF and UV were found to be
important treatment processes for Cryptosporidium removal/inactivation, which is
consistent with Forss and Ander (2011).
•

The results of this QMRA indicated that all of the potable reuse treatment trains
evaluated in the current study could reliably achieve the required 12-10-9-log reductions
of viruses, Cryptosporidium, and Salmonella that are recommended by the California
Division of Drinking Water (DDW) and NWRI (2013). However, potable reuse treatment
trains with surface water utilization (IPRs with surface water augmentation and DPR with
blending upstream of the drinking water treatment facility) resulted in similar risks which
all exceeded the benchmark of 10-4 for each individual pathogen and for the combined
effect of all pathogens. While, DPR treatment trains with direct distribution and planned
IPR system with groundwater replenishment typically resulted in risk of infection less
than the benchmark of 10-4.

•

Evaluating the significance of different norovirus transmission suggested that personperson transmission (i.e., secondary transmission) dominated the risk calculation,
followed by foodborne transmission and then waterborne transmission. These findings
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are confirmed by the national outbreak reporting system, which attributed 66% of all
norovirus infectious cases to secondary transmission pathway, 26% to foodborne
transmission, and only 0.2% to waterborne transmission in the U.S. between 2009 and
2010 (Hall et al., 2013b).
•

The results of the dynamic QMRA indicated a maximum cumulative incidence of 0.18
for the DPR treatment trains (both ozone-based and FAT based) and 0.23 for the de facto
reuse and planned IPR system with groundwater replenishment, although these risks were
dominated by secondary transmission. These results are consistent with Phillips et al.
(2010) (annual incidence per person = 0.19) and Simmons et al. (2013) (annual incidence
per person = 0.21). Eliminating the impact of secondary transmission resulted in several
orders of magnitude lower risk ranging from 2.6×10-04 to 4.1×10-11 (depending on the
treatment train) which supported the statement that the risk was dominated by secondary
transmission and not the drinking water.

•

The most important factors in the norovirus dynamic disease transmission model were the
secondary transmission rate constant, the duration of immunity, and the duration of
shedding. These results are consistent with the disease transmission model for enterovirus
performed by Eisenberg et al. (2004). Both studies also showed higher cumulative
incidence for higher secondary transmission and for shorter durations of immunity.

6.2

Novelty and findings specific to this study
Previous studies primarily focused on static QMRAs to evaluate risks associated with

IPR systems (Olivieri et al., 1999; Lim et al., 2017) and DPR systems (Pecson et al., 2017; Soller
et al., 2017; Soller et al., 2018). A few studies provided a QMRA framework for direct
comparison of IPR and DPR (Chaudhary et al., 2017) and for evaluating the potential impact of
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treatment process failure (Pecson et al., 2017). The current study provided a QMRA framework
for direct comparison of de facto, IPR, and DPR systems, while also incorporating the impact of
treatment process failures and the associated ‘domino effects’. This study also provided a
framework to compare the efficacy of both ozone-biofiltration and RO-based treatment trains,
the impacts of extreme conditions (e.g., outbreaks), and the most critical parameters/operational
conditions in potable reuse systems in a static and dynamic context.
Findings specific to the static QMRA
•

With respect to Cryptosporidium, this study found that storage time and temperature in
the environmental buffer were the most significant operational conditions affecting risk
in planned IPR systems. The study initially identified a storage time of approximately
105 days and a surface water temperature of 10°C as being critical conditions for
Cryptosporidium. These results were based on an exponential dose response model for
Cryptosporidium with a dose response parameter of 0.00419 (Barbeau et al., 2000).
However, use of a different dose response parameter (r = 0.09; USEPA, 2006b) resulted
in a revised critical storage time of 120 days at 10°C. Storage times shorter than these
critical values resulted in significant increases in risk. With respect to adenovirus, which
exhibits greater resistance to environmental stress than other viruses, a critical storage
time of 150 days was identified in de facto reuse systems. Storage time and temperature
were not significant parameters in other planned IPR systems with surface water
augmentation and also with respect to NoV and Salmonella, storage time and temperature
were not significant parameters.

•

Although surface water was not important for norovirus or Salmonella risk, a temperature
of 20ºC was identified as a critical condition for adenovirus. Temperature lower than
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20ºC resulted in up to 2 orders of magnitude higher risk for adenovirus compared to the
baseline condition because of this virus’ slower inactivation kinetics in the environment.
•

This study identified pre-ozonation and UF as critical processes for adenovirus
attenuation; RO and UV as critical processes for norovirus and Salmonella attenuation;
and UF and UV as critical treatment processes for Cryptosporidium.

•

The results of the static QMRA indicated that advanced treatment failures were generally
insignificant either due to the robustness of the advanced treatment train (i.e., DPR) or
resiliency provided by the environmental buffer (i.e., planned IPR).
Findings specific to the dynamic QMRA

•

In general, the results suggested that all potable reuse treatment trains were sufficiently
robust to handle spikes in norovirus concentration from an outbreak, although IPR
systems exhibited greater robustness than DPR systems. However, a storage time of at
least 10 days in surface water for the de facto reuse systems was critical for preventing a
foodborne outbreak of NoV from further propagating through the community via
drinking water.

•

Planned IPR with FAT and groundwater replenishment was identified as the most robust
treatment train which could sufficiently attenuate norovirus concentration in the event of
an outbreak even with very short storage time in groundwater (<5 days). However,
planned IPR systems with surface water augmentation and DPR systems with FAT and
blending were not considered in the dynamic framework. Including these treatment trains
may impact this conclusion.

•

The current study suggested that a duration of immunity to norovirus of at least one year
could dramatically decrease the cumulative incidence of disease within the community.
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Therefore, developing a vaccine that could provide at least 1 year of protection,
especially in children younger than 5 years old who are more prone to secondary
transmission, would be very beneficial to public health. This was consistent with reported
results by Simmons et al. (2013).
These findings could ultimately have implication for more widespread implementation of
potable reuse, thereby increasing water resource security by expanding water portfolios
throughout the United States in a sustainable manner. The conclusions developed from these
QMRA models can be used in the development of regulatory frameworks to aid in identifying
critical targets, such as storage time in the environmental buffer and overall reliability of the
advanced treatment trains. The research identified the components and operational conditions
that were most critical to minimizing public health risks due to exposure to different pathogens
in potable reuse systems in order to improve the decision-making processes in development and
operational designs of potable reuse systems.
The main sources of uncertainties in this study was related to failure in the treatment
processes and occurrence of pathogens in raw water sources, especially viruses. As suggested by
Forss and Ander (2011) employing methods such as a Fault Tree Analysis to calculate the actual
failure in all treatment processes improved the results of the QMRA. Also, information on
infectivity of norovirus and dose response model for norovirus could be beneficial to estimate
more accurate risk of infection for norovirus.
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6.3

Recommendations
According to this study, de facto reuse systems were the less reliable treatment trains on

the basis of public health protection with the highest sensitivity to operational changes such as
contribution of wastewater effluent, storage time, and temperature in environmental buffers.
Since many of the nation’s water systems utilizes de facto reuse as a source of drinking water
specially during drought or under low-flow conditions it is important to fully characterize the
quality of water in upstream source water and the performance of de facto reuse systems under
various operational conditions to ensure adequate public health protection. For example, for
surface waters with higher concentrations of pathogens than treated wastewater (e.g., bin 2, 3,
and 4 for Cryptosporidium) higher contribution of wastewater effluent is recommended to
decrease the final risk.
Higher risk of infection in potable reuse systems with environmental buffers (i.e., IPR)
than those with no environmental buffers (i.e., DPR) may suggest that even though “indirect”
reuse has a connotation that is safer than “direct” reuse, these are not correlated to the quality of
the final product water and therefore, may not be a good representative of adverse impact on
public health from a technical perspective.
This study can be expanded by including other pathogens, such as giardia, E. coli, and
rotavirus. Also, other potable reuse treatment trains could be developed and simulated in both
static and dynamic frameworks. Even though studies are under evaluation to estimate NoV
infectivity to be utilized in dose-response assessments, in case of potable reuse applications,
NoV was not identified as an important pathogen in risk assessment. Therefore, it is
recommended to better characterize the risk associated with pathogens such as Cryptosporidium
and AdV which drive the risk in potable reuse applications by performing the dynamic QMRA
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and evaluating the impact of secondary transmission of these pathogens in public health risk
estimation.
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Appendix 1

136

Text S1. Annual risk of infection by Cryptosporidium in the context of the LT2 framework
Annual risk of infection by Cryptosporidium was calculated assuming 2 liters of daily
water consumption and an exponential dose response parameter of 0.00419 oocysts-1. These risks
assume compliance with LT2 for conventional filtration (i.e., 3-log credit via filtration + bin
requirement) and direct filtration (i.e., 2.5-log credit via filtration + bin requirement). As
illustrated in Figure S1, conventional filtration and direct filtration are equivalent for influent
concentrations greater than 0.075 oocysts/L. The dashed line denotes the annual risk benchmark
of 10-4.

Figure S1. Annual risk of infection by Cryptosporidium in the context of the LT2 framework.
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Text S2. Determination of instantaneous ozone demand and ozone decay rate constant
Figure S2 illustrates data generated from ozone demand/decay testing of five different
secondary wastewater effluents (Snyder et al., 2014). The graph illustrates the relationship
between instantaneous ozone demand (IOD), which is standardized to total organic carbon
(TOC) concentration, and O3/TOC ratio at 25°C.

Figure S2. Relationship between IOD/TOC and O3/TOC for ozonated secondary effluents.
After aggregating all of the data from the five secondary effluents, a regression model
was developed to estimate the IOD/TOC ratio (Eq. S1) and the IOD (Eq. S2). A similar approach
was used to develop a regression model to estimate the TOC-standardized first order ozone
decay rate constant (Eq. S3) and the first order ozone decay rate constant (Eq. S4). The
corresponding regression models are illustrated in Figure S3 and Figure S4, respectively.

Instantaneous ozone demand (at 25°C):
𝐼𝑂𝐷
𝑇𝑂𝐶

𝑂

3
= 0.6025 × (𝑇𝑂𝐶
) 0.6679

(Eq. S1)

𝑂

3
𝐼𝑂𝐷 = 𝑇𝑂𝐶 × 0.6025 × (𝑇𝑂𝐶
) 0.6679

(Eq. S2)
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First order ozone decay rate constant (at 25°C):
𝑘𝑂3
𝑇𝑂𝐶

𝑂

3
= 0.1001 × (𝑇𝑂𝐶
) −1.605

(Eq. S3)

𝑂

3
𝑘𝑂3 = 𝑇𝑂𝐶 × 0.1001 × (𝑇𝑂𝐶
) −1.605

(Eq. S4)

Figure S3. Regression model for instantaneous ozone demand (at 25°C).

Figure S4. Regression model for first order ozone decay rate constant (at 25°C).
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Because of practical limitations of batch ozone demand/decay testing with the indigo
trisulfonate method, it is not possible to accurately characterize ozone residual kinetics for
O3/TOC < 0.25 unless a quench-flow approach is employed. As a result, the ozone decay rate
constant model was separated into two different equations (Eq. S5 and Eq. S6) with a threshold
O3/TOC of 0.25. For O3/TOC < 0.25, the IOD is assumed to be equal to the applied ozone dose,
thereby negating the need for a corresponding ozone decay rate constant. In the context of
disinfection, the model assumes O3/TOC values less than 0.25 result in an ozone ‘CT’ value of 0
mg-min/L.
𝑂3
𝑇𝑂𝐶
𝑂3
𝑇𝑂𝐶

≤ 0.25

𝑘𝑂3 = 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑

> 0.25

3
𝑘𝑂3 = 𝑇𝑂𝐶 × 0.1001 × (𝑇𝑂𝐶
) −1.605

(Eq. S5)
𝑂
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(Eq. S6)

Text S3. Cryptosporidium log inactivation for pre-ozonation and post-ozonation
Pre-ozonation process:
Because the main objectives of the pre-ozonation process are typically bulk organic
matter transformation and TOrC oxidation, the O3/TOC ratio is a highly useful parameter.
However, it is still necessary to estimate the corresponding IOD and kO3 for a particular O3/TOC
ratio because ozone “CT” still provides a more accurate estimate of Cryptosporidium
inactivation. The corresponding parameters for the baseline scenario in the system dynamics
model are summarized in Eq. S7-S10.

𝑂

3
𝐼𝑂𝐷 = 𝑇𝑂𝐶 × 0.6025 × (𝑇𝑂𝐶
) 0.6679

(Eq. S7)

𝑂

3 −1.605
𝑘𝑜3 = 𝑇𝑂𝐶 × 0.1001 × (𝑇𝑂𝐶
)

(Eq. S8)

In Gamage et al. (2013), the median TOC concentration of the five secondary effluents
was 7.2 mgC/L. Assuming a 13% reduction in TOC by UF (Trussell et al., 2016), the TOC
concentration in the UF filtrate/pre-ozone feed would be 6.3 mgC/L. Using this value and an
O3/TOC ratio of 1.1 mgO3/mgC, the corresponding applied ozone dose, IOD, and ozone decay
rate constant would be 6.9 mg/L, 4.0 mg/L, and 0.54 min-1, respectively. Assuming an ozone
contact time of 5 minutes, Eqs. S9-S11 can be used to calculate the corresponding ozone residual
(0.19 mg/L) and ozone CT (5.0 mg-min/L) in the pre-ozone effluent. An O3/TOC of 1.1
mgO3/mgC is assumed to be adequate to achieve significant oxidation of a wide range of TOrCs
(Gerrity et al., 2014), including the 69% destruction of 1,4-dioxane (Snyder et al., 2014) required
by the CA DDW potable reuse regulations (CDPH, 2014). A 5-minute contact time was selected
to achieve nearly complete ozone decay and also achieve 2-log inactivation of Cryptosporidium
based on the resulting ozone CT of 5.0 mg-min/L (Eq. S12).
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𝑂

3
𝑂3 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 = [(𝑇𝑂𝐶
) × 𝑇𝑂𝐶 − 𝐼𝑂𝐷] × 𝑒 −𝑘𝑜3 𝑡

𝑡

𝑂

3
𝑂3 𝐶𝑇 = ∫0 [(𝑇𝑂𝐶
) × 𝑇𝑂𝐶 − 𝐼𝑂𝐷] × 𝑒 −𝑘𝑜3 𝑡 𝑑𝑡

(Eq. S9)
(Eq. S10)

Ozone CT can be calculated with an analytical solution to Eq. S10, as shown in Eq. S11,
or estimated as the area under the curve of ozone residual versus contact time, as shown in
Figure S5.

𝑂3 𝐶𝑇 =

𝑂
[( 3 )× 𝑇𝑂𝐶−𝐼𝑂𝐷]
𝑇𝑂𝐶

𝑘𝑂 3

× (1 − 𝑒 −𝑘𝑂3 𝑡 )

(Eq. S11)

According to the LT2 guidance manual (USEPA, 2010), Cryptosporidium inactivation
with ozone can be estimated according to Eq. S12, in which T is the temperature in °C.
𝐶𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 Log Credit = 0.0397 × 1.09757𝑇 × Ozone 𝐶𝑇

(Eq. S12)

For the computed O3 CT of 5.0 mg-min/L and an assumed water temperature of 25°C, the
corresponding Cryptosporidium log removal would be 2.0.

Figure S5. Ozone residual as a function of contact time.
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Post-ozonation process:
Since the post-ozonation process is primarily used for disinfection purposes, it was
assumed that the process would be operated and monitored to achieve a target ozone CT value.
Considering the calculated/estimated removal and inactivation of Cryptosporidium prior to postozonation (7.0 logs; Table 3.3), an additional 3-log inactivation would be sufficient to meet the
10-log target established by the CA DDW and NWRI. Therefore, an ozone CT of 10 mg-min/L
was assumed based on the published data by Korich et al. (1990) and LeChevallier and Au
(2004), which demonstrated that constant exposure to 1 mg/L of ozone for 10 minutes could
achieve this 3-log target. In fact, an ozone CT of 10 mg-min/L and an assumed water
temperature of 25°C yields a Cryptosporidium log inactivation of 4.1 based on Eq. 12.
It is important to note that it will likely be acceptable to achieve the 10-log target in
California by combining log credits from the advanced wastewater treatment plant and the
conventional drinking water treatment plant (NWRI, 2016b), which will reduce burden on the
advanced treatment processes. In other words, it may be possible to decrease the target CT value
for post-ozone and still achieve the 10-log benchmark in the planned IPR system. This could
result in a series of benefits, including reduced cost, energy consumption, and bromate
formation. However, the proposed surface water augmentation regulations in California also
require a minimum hydraulic retention time of 2-4 months and a minimum dilution ratio of 100:1
(or 10:1 if an additional 1-log credit is demonstrated somewhere in the treatment train). Instead
of incorporating these requirements into the model, the higher post-ozone CT value was used as
an alternative source of conservatism.
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Text S4. Impact of process failures on ozone efficacy
Impact of UF and pre-ozonation on post-ozonation:
Ozone demand/decay and ozone disinfection efficacy are influenced by various water
quality parameters, particularly turbidity and bulk organic matter composition and concentration.
This model focuses exclusively on the effects of TOC in estimating the impacts of process
failures on ozone efficacy. While UF generally achieves a nominal reduction in TOC, the
combination of ozone and BAC can achieve significant reductions in TOC in potable reuse
applications. For this study, a 13% reduction in TOC was assumed for UF, and a 40% reduction
was assumed for O3-BAC (Trussell et al., 2016). A failure in the UF process was assumed to
result in 0% TOC reduction, and a failure in the pre-ozone process (i.e., minimal bulk organic
matter transformation) was assumed to result in a 5% TOC reduction after BAC. These
operational scenarios and the resulting water qualities are shown in Table S1.

Table S1. Failure scenarios for UF-O3-BAC and the effects on TOC concentration
Scenario
UF
O3-BAC
Reduction
TOC (mg/L)3
Reduction
TOC (mg/L)4
Normal (no failure)
13%1
6.3
40%1
3.8
UF failure
0%
7.2
40%1
4.3
1
2
Pre-O3 failure
13%
6.3
5%
6.0
UF and pre-O3 failure
0%
7.2
5%2
6.8
1

Trussell et al. (2016)
Minimal reduction by BAC assumed during ozone failure (unpublished data)
3
TOC for O3-BAC feed; initial TOC concentration assumed to be 7.2 mgC/L (Gamage et al., 2013)
4
TOC for post-ozone feed
2

For the baseline condition, the ozone CT for pre-ozonation (5.0 mg-min/L) was
calculated based on an initial TOC concentration of 6.3 mgC/L, an O3/TOC ratio of 1.10, and the
equations described in Text S2. These operating conditions result in an applied ozone dose of 6.9
mg/L.
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For post-ozonation, an ozone CT of 10 mg-min/L was specifically targeted to achieve
adequate Cryptosporidium reduction across the entire treatment train. By reversing the approach
described in Text S2, it is possible to determine that the applied ozone dose in the post-ozonation
process is 5.1 mg/L, assuming the ozone is allowed to decay completely (i.e., contact time > 30
minutes based on the aforementioned demand/decay model).
Failures in the treatment train will have significant effects on ozone disinfection efficacy.
For example, a UF failure will result in an increase in TOC in the pre-ozone feed. Assuming the
applied ozone dose remains constant (i.e., constant ozone generator power and feed gas flow
rate) during a UF failure, the resulting O3/TOC ratio will decrease, thereby resulting in a lower
ozone CT value and less Cryptosporidium inactivation. A similar effect would be observed in the
post-ozonation process during a failure in pre-ozonation or a simultaneous failure in UF and preozonation. The effects of these failure scenarios on TOC concentrations were summarized in
Table S1, and the effects on ozone CT and the corresponding levels of Cryptosporidium
inactivation are summarized in Tables S2-S3.
Table S2. Pre-ozonation CT values and log inactivation during process failures (at 25°C).
Scenario
TOC
O3/TOC1
Ozone CT
Inactivation
(mg/L)
(mg-min/L)
(logs)
Normal (no failure)
6.3
1.1
5.0
2.0
UF failure
7.2
1.0
3.4
1.4
Pre-O3 failure
N/A
0
0
0
UF and pre-O3 failure
N/A
0
0
0
1

Applied ozone dose assumed to be constant at 6.9 mg/L

Table S3. Post-ozonation CT values and log inactivation during process failures (at 25°C).
Scenario
TOC
O3/TOC1
Ozone CT
Inactivation
(mg/L)
(mg-min/L)
(logs)
Normal (no failure)
3.8
1.4
10
4.1
UF failure
4.3
1.2
6.6
2.7
Pre-O3 failure
6.0
0.9
2.4
1.0
UF and pre-O3 failure
6.8
0.7
1.6
0.6
Post-O3 failure
N/A
0
0
0
1

Applied ozone dose assumed to be constant at 5.1 mg/L
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Failure in the post-ozonation process:
Burns (2015) reported historical ozone CT values for a full-scale water recycling facility
in Australia. Table S4 summarizes the statistical distribution of these ozone CT values.
Table S4. Statistical distribution of observed ozone CT values in Burns (2015)
Parameter
P5
P50
P95
P99
Max.
N

Post-Ozone
3.4
5.1
7.0
8.3
9.8
8,579

Assuming a normal distribution with the given 5th and 95th percentiles, the mean and
standard deviation were estimated using a system of equations. Specifically, the corresponding Z
values for the 5th and 95th percentiles are -1.645 and 1.645, respectively. Coupled with the
historical ozone CT data, for which the 5th and 95th percentiles were 3.4 mg-min/L and 7.0 mgmin/L, the mean and standard deviation can be calculated as shown in Eqs. S13 and S14. Using
this approach, the mean (𝜇) and standard deviation (𝜎) were determined to be 5.2 mg-min/L and
1.09 mg-min/L, respectively. The corresponding distribution is shown in Figure S6.

𝑍=

𝑥−𝜇

(Eq. S13)

𝜎
3.4−𝜇

−1.645 = 𝜎
{
7− 𝜇
1.645 =

(Eq. S14)

𝜎
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Figure S6. Normal distribution of post-ozonation CT values.
According to Burns (2015), the primary objective of the post-ozonation process at the
full-scale facility was disinfection, specifically 0.6-log inactivation of Cryptosporidium.
According to Eq. S12, for a temperature of 25ºC and a log inactivation target of 0.6, the
corresponding ozone CT would be 1.5 mg-min/L. Assuming this is the treatment objective for
Burns (2015), failure can be described as any observed ozone CT < 1.5 mg-min/L. According to
the statistical distribution above, the corresponding probability of post-ozonation failure is
0.000325. This value was used as the probability of failure for the post-ozonation process in the
current study (Table 3.4 in main text).

147

Text S5. Impact of ozonation on UV absorbance
Microbial inactivation with germicidal UV light is highly dependent on water quality and
the performance of preceding treatment units, particularly unit processes that address turbidity
and UV transmittance (UVT). Water matrices with high levels of suspended solids may result in
significant shielding of target microbes, and water matrices with high absorptivity (i.e., low
transmissivity) within the action spectrum of the UV lamp will exhibit low inactivation
efficiencies. One way of estimating the expected level of microbial inactivation is to calculate
the average UV dose within a reactor. This UV dose is a function of the average UV intensity
and the exposure time. For this study, hydraulic inefficiencies were not considered (i.e., exposure
times remained constant), but the model did account for water quality changes, specifically
related to UV254 absorbance. The main text demonstrates how the incident intensity of a lowpressure (i.e., 254 nm light) UV disinfection system can be adjusted based on path length and the
UV254 absorbance of the water matrix to determine the average UV intensity.
Table S5 summarizes typical UV254 absorbance values (kA) for various wastewater
qualities. This study assumed values for nitrified secondary effluents (kA = 0.25 cm-1) and
filtered nitrified secondary effluents (kA = 0.175 cm-1) for modeling of the DPR advanced
wastewater treatment train. When the preceding UF system exhibits normal operation, the feed to
the ozone system is assigned a kA = 0.175 cm-1, but when the UF system is in failure mode, the
feed to the ozone system is assigned a kA = 0.25 cm-1. The subsequent effect of ozonation on
UV254 absorbance was determined according to correlations developed in Gerrity et al. (2012).
These correlations describe the percent reduction in UV254 absorbance, which relates to the
increase in UV254 transmittance, as a function of O3/TOC ratio, as described in Eq. S15.
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Although BAC achieves significant reductions in TOC in O3-BAC systems, BAC was assumed
to have no significant effect on UV254 absorbance.

Table S5. Typical base 10 UV254 absorbance values (kA) for various wastewater qualities.
Wastewater
Metcalf & Eddy
Chen et al.
This study
(2007)
(2006)
Secondary effluent
0.15-0.35
0.17-0.50
-Filtered effluent
-0.20-0.40
-Nitrified effluent
0.10-0.25
0.25-0.45
0.25
Filtered nitrified effluent
0.10-0.25
-0.175
𝑂

0.63

3
∆𝑈𝑉254 (%) = 100 × 0.51 × (𝑇𝑂𝐶
)

(Eq. S15)

Once the final UV254 absorbance is known, the expected UV dose can be adjusted to
account for water quality effects. The current study assumed a typical O3/TOC ratio of 1.1 for
bulk organic matter transformation and trace organic contaminant destruction, which would
result in a 54% reduction in UV254 absorbance during normal operation. Therefore, the final
UV254 absorbance under normal operational conditions (i.e., fully functioning UF and O3) would
be 0.080 cm-1. In the event of a UF failure, the feed to the ozone system would have a UV254
absorbance of 0.25 cm-1, and the O3/TOC ratio of 1.1 would achieve a UV254 absorbance of
0.115 cm-1. In the event of ozone failure, the water quality would be equivalent to a filtered
nitrified effluent with a UV254 absorbance of 0.175 cm-1. Finally, simultaneous failures in the UF
and ozone systems would result in a UV254 absorbance of 0.25 cm-1. These scenarios are
summarized in Table S6.

Table S6. UV254 absorbance values for different modeling scenarios.
Operational Scenario
UV254 absorbance or kA (cm-1)
Normal (no failure)
0.080
UF failure (with O3)
0.115
O3 failure (with UF)
0.175
UF and O3 failure
0.25
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Text S6. Model framework for UV disinfection
As described in the main text, the UV process in the DPR system can be modeled with
two different approaches. In the first approach, the primary treatment objective is disinfection,
and the target UV dose is 80 mJ/cm2, which is the minimum recommended dose according to the
National Water Research Institute’s UV disinfection guidelines (NWRI, 2012). In the second
approach, the primary treatment objective is NDMA photolysis. The model assumes an NDMA
concentration of 50 ng/L in the UV feed and a treatment objective of 5 ng/L, which is intended to
reliably achieve the 10-ng/L notification level in California (CPDH, 2014).
Given the parameters listed in Table 3.1 in the main text (i.e., I0 = 25 mW/cm2 and path
length = 10 cm), one can use the UV254 absorbance values in Table S6 to determine the Iavg for
the system and the required hydraulic residence time in the UV reactor to achieve the target UV
doses in each scenario. Again, the hydraulic residence times are calculated based on the ‘no
failure’ scenario, and the hydraulic residence times remain constant during the various failure
scenarios, thereby reducing the UV dose. The UV doses for the various scenarios were calculated
using Eqs. 13-15 in the main text and are summarized in Table S7. The UV-dose-based
photolysis rate constant for NDMA was assumed to be 4.5×10-3 (mJ/cm2)-1 (Lee et al., 2016).
The effects on Cryptosporidium inactivation and NDMA destruction are summarized in Table
S8.

Table S7. UV254 absorbance values and UV doses for different modeling scenarios.
Operational
UV254
UV Dose in
UV Dose in NDMA
Scenario
absorbance or kA Disinfection Scenario
Scenario (mJ/cm2)
-1
2
(cm )
(mJ/cm )
Normal (no failure)
0.0802
80
512
UF failure (with O3)
0.1146
62
395
O3 failure (with UF)
0.175
43
274
UF and O3 failure
0.25
30
194
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Disinfection scenario:
Normal (no failure): Iavg = 𝐼0 ×

(1−10−𝑘𝐴 𝑥 )
2.303 × 𝑘𝐴 𝑥

(1−10−0.0802×10 )

= 25 × 2.303×0.0802×10 = 11.4 mJ/cm2

Target UV Dose = 80 mJ/cm2 = Iavg × t = 11.4 mJ/cm2 × t  t = 7.0 seconds (constant)
NDMA scenario:
ln (C/C0) = -kNDMA,UV × UV Dose  ln (5/50) = -4.5×10-3 (mJ/cm2)-1 × UV Dose
Target UV Dose = 512 mJ/cm2 = Iavg × t = 11.4 mJ/cm2 × t  t = 45 seconds (constant)
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Table S8. UV254 absorbance values and theoretical treatment efficacy. The log inactivation
values assume linear extrapolation of published UV dose response curves for Cryptosporidium.
These estimated values are significantly higher than the values actually observed in experimental
samples and are assumed to be unreasonably high. Therefore, log inactivation credits are
typically capped according to regulatory frameworks (e.g., 6 logs in California) or based on
maximum observed inactivation levels in practice or experiments.
Operational
Scenario

Disinfection Scenario
Log Inactivation of Percent Reduction
Cryptosporidium1
in NDMA

Normal (no failure)
19
30%
UF failure (with O3)
15
24%
O3 failure (with UF)
10
18%
UF and O3 failure
7
13%
1
Cryptosporidium log credit limited to 6.0 in model (CDPH, 2014)

NDMA Photolysis Scenario
Log Inactivation
Percent Reduction
of
in NDMA
Cryptosporidium1

124
96
66
47

90%
83%
71%
58%

As described in the main text, an arbitrary failure probability of 0.01 was assumed for UV
due to a lack of failure data in the literature. The significance of this value was then evaluated
using a sensitivity analysis. The results of the sensitivity analysis for a range of failure
probabilities (0.0001-0.1) are shown in Figure S7. The results illustrated that probabilities of
failure less than 0.01 did not have a significant impact on the final risk of infection, but a
probability of failure of 0.1 caused the risk of infection to increase by 6 orders of magnitude.
Because a 10% failure rate (i.e., once every 10 days) is likely overly conservative, a value of
0.01 was deemed appropriate for the baseline condition.
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Figure S7. Sensitivity analysis on probability of failure of UV disinfection.
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Text S7. System dynamics models
System dynamics is a non-linear, mathematical simulation of complex, interrelated
system elements, which are represented as stocks, flows, convertors, and arrows (Forrester,
1958). Figure S7 illustrates how these key features are represented in the STELLA software
platform. For the current study, the system dynamics model was used to predict the concentration
of Cryptosporidium oocysts at each point in the potable reuse system. In this stock-and-flow
structure, each stock represents an engineered or environmental barrier, and the flows represent
the wastewater that passes through each component of the system. Each of the three potable
reuse systems modeled in this study (i.e., de facto, planned IPR, and DPR) incorporates different
sectors, as illustrated in Figures S8-S11 below.

Figure S8. A schematic diagram of the key features of system dynamics STELLA
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Figure S9. Schematic diagram of the flows and converters used in the advanced wastewater
treatment train sector in the planned IPR system. The schematic is adapted from the STELLA
system dynamics software program.
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Figure S10. Schematic diagram of the flows and converters used in the conventional drinking
water treatment plant sector. The schematic is adapted from the STELLA system dynamics
software program.
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Figure S11. Schematic diagram of the flows and converters used in the advanced wastewater
treatment train sector in the DPR system. The schematic is adapted from the STELLA system
dynamics software program.
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Text S8. Model output

Figure S12. Cryptosporidium concentrations for the scenario 2 baseline condition.
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Figure S13. Cryptosporidium concentrations for the scenario 3 baseline condition.
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Figure S14. Cryptosporidium concentrations for the scenario 2 critical condition.
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Figure S15. Cryptosporidium concentrations for the scenario 3 critical condition.
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Appendix 2
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Text S1. Pathogen probability (PDFs) and cumulative distribution functions (CDFs)

Figure S1. PDFs and CDFs of pathogen concentrations in raw wastewater.
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Additional discussion related to NoV concentrations in raw wastewater:
Jahne (2017) reported NoV concentrations in wastewater from a single office building,
with a maximum of 7.5log10 gc/L, but this may overestimate the levels that are expected in a
blended municipal wastewater from the larger community. The values in Jahne (2017) may be
appropriate when evaluating small-scale DPR systems—a single office building, for example—
but may not be appropriate at larger scale.
Simmons et al. (2011) reported a mean concentration of 7.7 log10 gc/L in eight samples
from a single wastewater treatment plant, although this value was inflated due to an extreme
spike in a sample collected in January. Seasonal effects were also observed for NoV in Eftim et
al. (2017). Excluding the maximum value from Simmons et al. (2011), the median concentration
was 5.8 log10 in the remaining 7 samples from that wastewater treatment plant.
Due to the small sample sizes in these studies, the more comprehensive review in Eftim
et al. (2017) was used as the basis for NoV concentrations in raw wastewater in the current
study. However, this highlights the importance of local pathogen characterization when assessing
public health risk.
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Figure S2. PDFs and CDFs of pathogen concentrations in surface water. For Cryptosporidium,
S1 = Bin 1 surface water, S2 = Bin 2 surface water, and S3 = Bin 4 surface water, in accordance
with the LT2ESWTR and LeChevallier et al. (1991).

165

Figure S2 (continued). PDFs and CDFs of pathogen concentrations in surface water.
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Figure S3. PDFs and CDFs of pathogen concentrations in groundwater. The Cryptosporidium
oocyst and Salmonella concentrations were assumed to be 0.
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Text S2. Recycled water contribution in groundwater replenishment projects
Table S1 summarizes the recycled water contribution (RWC) at 66 groundwater
replenishment sites in the Montebello Forebay (from 1960 to 1991) (Sloss et al., 1996). The
average RWC was determined to be 14% (and rounded up to 15% for the current study)
according to Eq. S1.
Table S1. RWCs in the Montebello Forebay (Sloss et al., 1996).
Number of service areas (f)
8
14
19
25

𝑥𝑔 =

RWC (%)
0
1-4
5-19
20-31

∑ 𝑓×𝑚
𝑛

=

900.5
66

m
0
2.5
12
25.5

= 14%

where, 𝑥𝑔 = mean of the frequency distribution data
f = frequency
m = midpoint of each group
n = total frequency
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f×m
0
35
228
637.5

(Eq. S1)

Text S3. Regulatory log removal value (LRV) framework
Because the data in Table 3.4 in the main text represent observed treatment performance,
they may differ from the typical regulatory credit awarded to each treatment process. The
regulatory credits summarized in Table S2 are provided as a basis for comparison.

Table S2. Typical pathogen regulatory log credits for engineered treatment processes.
Treatment Process
CASa
Conventional Filtrationb
MFa,i
UFa,g,i
ROa,g
BACa,g
Ozoneg
UVa,h
Chlorine
DWTP
ESB

Cryptosporidium
NCh
3
4
4
1.5-2.0
0
1
6

Norovirus
1g
2
0
1
1.5-2.0
0
6
6

Adenovirus
1g
2
0
1
1.5-2.0
0
6
6a,d

Salmonella
NC
NCc
4
4
1.5-2.0
0
4
6

0a
0a

2b
6a,e

2b
6a,e

4f
4f

a

Tchobanoglous et al. (2015)
USEPA (2006b)
c
LT2 does not provide direct guideline on log reduction of Salmonella
d
At a minimum UV dose of 235 mJ/cm2
e
based on maintaining a minimum free residual of 0.4 mg/L over 24 hour storage time
f
NRC (2012)
g
Trussell et al. (2016)
h
NC = no credit
i
CDPH (2011)
b
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Text S4. Ozone inactivation of E. coli as a surrogate for Salmonella
Because Salmonella disinfection kinetics are poorly defined in the literature, data
describing E. coli inactivation with ozone (Table S3; Zuma et al., 2009) were used as a surrogate.
The corresponding log inactivation and ozone CT values are summarized in Table S4 and Figure
S4.
Table S3. Kinetics of E. coli inactivation with ozone (Zuma et al., 2009)
Time (min)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6

0.91
8.28
7.78
7.02
6.28
5.70
5.20
4.70

O3 Concentration (mg/L)
1.78
2.78
3.44
Log CFU/mL
8.29
8.23
8.10
7.59
7.50
7.13
6.73
6.51
6.10
5.76
5.56
4.60
4.90
4.60
3.89
4.06
3.71
2.99
3.49
2.78
2.40

4.72
8.13
6.39
5.22
4.05
3.00
-

Table S4. CT table (mg-min/L) for log inactivation of E. coli
CT
0
0.91
1.78
2.78
3.44
4.72
1.82
3.56
5.56
6.88

Log Removal
0.00
0.50
0.70
0.73
0.97
1.74
1.26
1.56
1.72
2.00

CT
9.44
2.73
5.34
8.34
10.32
14.16
3.64
7.12
11.12
13.76

Log Removal
2.91
2.00
2.53
2.67
3.50
4.08
2.58
3.39
3.63
4.21

*CT values were calculated based on data from Table S3.
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CT
18.88
4.55
8.90
13.9
17.2
5.46
10.68
16.68
20.64

Log Removal
4.08
3.08
4.23
4.52
5.11
3.58
4.80
5.45
5.70

Figure S4. Inactivation of E. coli as a function of ozone CT. Adapted from Zuma et al. (2009).
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Text S5. Inactivation of norovirus by UV disinfection
Due to lack of information, MNV was used as a viral surrogate to evaluate the
effectiveness of UV disinfection for NoV inactivation (Lee et al., 2008). The MNV log
inactivation data from Lee et al. (2008) are summarized in Table S5 and plotted in Figure S5.
Based on linear regression, the first order inactivation rate constant was determined to be 0.15
(mJ/cm2)-1.

Table S5. Log inactivation of MNV as a function of UV dose (Lee et al., 2008).
UV dose (mJ/cm2)
0
10
20
25
30

Log reduction
0
-1.0
-2.9
-3.4
-5.0

Figure S5. Log inactivation of MNV as a function of UV dose (Lee et al., 2008).
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Text S6. UV254 absorbance values for different wastewater qualities

Table S6. Typical base 10 UV254 absorbance values (kA) for various wastewater qualities.
Wastewater
Secondary effluent
Filtered effluent
Nitrified effluent
Filtered nitrified effluent
MF filtrate
RO permeate

Metcalf & Eddy
(2007)
0.15-0.35
-0.10-0.25
0.10-0.25
0.04-0.10
0.01-0.05

Chen et al.
(2006)
0.17-0.50
0.20-0.40
0.25-0.45
-0.158-0.3
0.05-0.2

This study
--0.25
0.175
0.17
0.10

Table S7. UV254 absorbance values for different modeling scenarios.
UV254 absorbance or kA (cm-1)
0.08 (O3-based)
0.10 (RO-based)
0.10
0.17
0.25
0.115
0.175
0.25

Operational Scenario
Normal (no failure)
MF failure (with RO)
RO failure (with MF)
MF and RO failure
UF failure (with O3)
O3 failure (with UF)
UF and O3 failure
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Text S7. Risk characterization of Salmonella

Table S8. Health burden calculation for Salmonella.
Health
outcome
Mild diarrhea
Death

Outcome
fraction
0.9984
0.0016a

Duration of illness

Severity
weight
0.067d
1

DALYs/case

Morbidity
0.01918 years (7 days)b
1.29×10-3
c
Mortality
Life expectancy/age at death
0.0666
Health Burden
0.068
a
Calculated based on Ao et al. (2010) (93 million infections and 155,000 diarrheal death each year)
b
Health Canada. (2010)
c
U.S. life expectancy = 78.7 years (World Bank, 2015); Age at death (the mean weighted age of the population
assuming no difference in fatality rates) = 36.88 (Health Canada, 2010)
d
Based on mild diarrhea from Cryptosporidium, Giardia, and rotavirus

YLD= (outcome fraction × duration of illness × severity weight) for health outcome contributing
to morbidity
LYL= ([life expectancy – age at death] × severity weight) for health outcome contributing to
mortality
Conditional probability of illness given an infection: According to Jertborn et al. (1990), the
number of cases that developed symptomatic disease after infection was 7 out of 17 cases.
Asymptomatic disease of Salmonella is not considered to be an illness (Mangen et al., 2013).
𝑆𝑦𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑠

(𝑃𝑖𝑙𝑙 |𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑓 ) = 𝑆𝑦𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐+ 𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 =
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7
17

= 0.41

(Eq. S2)

Table S9. Annual risk of infection during optimal operation.
Pathogen
min
TT1, TT3, TT4, TT5
Crypto (S1)
1.8E-03
Crypto (S2)
2.6E-03
Crypto (S3)
8.7E-03
NoV
2.6E-04
AdV
1.1E-03
Salmonella
8.0E-04
TT2
0.0E+00
Crypto
NoV
1.1E-05
AdV
5.0E-06
0.0E+00
Salmonella
TT6
Crypto
1.2E-11
0.0E+00
NoV
AdV
2.7E-11
0.0E+00
Salmonella
TT7
Crypto
2.8E-12
0.0E+00
NoV
AdV
1.5E-07
0.0E+00
Salmonella

Annual Risk of Infection
P5
median
P95

max

min

P5

Disease Burden
median

P95

max

1.9E-03
2.7E-03
9.1E-03
2.9E-04
1.2E-03
8.7E-04

2.0E-03
2.8E-03
9.6E-03
3.4E-04
1.2E-03
1.0E-03

2.1E-03
2.9E-03
1.0E-02
4.0E-04
1.3E-03
1.2E-03

2.2E-03
3.1E-03
1.1E-02
4.5E-04
1.3E-03
1.3E-03

2.2E-06
3.0E-06
1.0E-05
7.6E-14
3.0E-05
2.2E-05

2.3E-06
3.2E-06
1.1E-05
1.3E-13
3.1E-05
2.4E-05

2.4E-06
3.4E-06
1.1E-05
2.2E-13
3.3E-05
2.8E-05

2.5E-06
3.5E-06
1.2E-05
4.9E-13
3.4E-05
3.2E-05

2.6E-06
3.6E-06
1.3E-05
1.7E-12
3.5E-05
3.6E-05

9.5E-14
1.2E-05
5.3E-06

5.7E-13
1.2E-05
5.6E-06

2.9E-12
1.3E-05
5.9E-06

6.8E-11
1.3E-05
6.0E-06

0.0E+00

9.7E-17
1.3E-07

1.1E-16
1.1E-16
1.4E-07

6.8E-16
1.2E-16
1.5E-07

3.4E-15
1.3E-16
1.6E-07

8.1E-14
1.3E-16
1.6E-07

0.0E+00

0.0E+00

0.0E+00

0.0E+00

0.0E+00

0.0E+00

0.0E+00

0.0E+00

0.0E+00

1.8E-11

2.9E-11

5.2E-11

1.4E-10

1.4E-14

2.2E-14

3.5E-14

6.2E-14

1.6E-13

0.0E+00

0.0E+00

0.0E+00

0.0E+00

0.0E+00

0.0E+00

0.0E+00

0.0E+00

3.7E-11

5.1E-11

6.8E-11

9.8E-13

1.4E-12

1.8E-12

0.0E+00

0.0E+00

0.0E+00

8.4E-11
8.2E-14

0.0E+00
0.0E+00
0.0E+00

0.0E+00

0.0E+00

0.0E+00

2.3E-12
2.3E-15

7.1E-12
1.2E-12
4.0E-07

1.9E-11
1.4E-12
1.0E-06

9.2E-11
1.5E-12
2.8E-06

6.2E-10
1.0E-11
5.7E-06

3.3E-15

8.4E-15

2.3E-14

1.1E-13

7.4E-13

0.0E+00

0.0E+00

0.0E+00

0.0E+00

0.0E+00

4.0E-09

1.1E-08

2.7E-08

7.5E-08

1.5E-07

0.0E+00

0.0E+00

0.0E+00

0.0E+00

0.0E+00

0.0E+00

0.0E+00

0.0E+00

0.0E+00
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Figure S6. Comparison of annual risk of infection during optimal and sub-optimal operations.
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Figure S7. Impact of Cryptosporidium outbreak on annual risk of infection during sub-optimal
operations. The results of TT4 (IPR with FAT and surface water augmentation) and TT5 (DPR
with FAT and blending upstream of the drinking water treatment facility) were similar to TT3
and therefore not shown in the Figure.
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Figure S8. Impact of norovirus outbreak on annual risk of infection during sub-optimal
operations. The results of TT4 (IPR with FAT and surface water augmentation) and TT5 (DPR
with FAT and blending upstream of the drinking water treatment facility) were similar to TT3
and therefore not shown in the Figure.
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Figure S9. Impact of AdV outbreak on annual risk of infection during sub-optimal operations.
The results of TT4 (IPR with FAT and surface water augmentation) and TT5 (DPR with FAT
and blending upstream of the drinking water treatment facility) were similar to TT3 and therefore
not shown in the Figure.
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Figure S10. Impact of Salmonella outbreak on annual risk of infection during sub-optimal
operations. The results of TT4 (IPR with FAT and surface water augmentation) and TT5 (DPR
with FAT and blending upstream of the drinking water treatment facility) were similar to TT3
and therefore not shown in the Figure. The risk with TT2 and TT7 was below what could be assessed
by the model and was calculated as zero
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Text S1. Ordinary differential equations used in dynamic QMRA.
𝑑𝐸1
1
1
2
2
= 𝛽2 𝑆(𝐷 + 𝐶1 + 𝐶2 ) + 𝛽1 𝑆 + 𝛽2 ( ) 𝑃2 (𝐷 + 𝐶1 + 𝐶2 ) + 𝛽1 ( )𝑃2 + 𝛽2 ( ) 𝑃3 (𝐷 + 𝐶1 + 𝐶2 ) + 𝛽1 ( )𝑃3
𝑑𝑡
4
4
4
4
3
3
+ 𝛽2 ( ) 𝑃4 (𝐷 + 𝐶1 + 𝐶2 ) + 𝛽1 ( )𝑃4 − 𝛼𝐸1
4
4
𝑑𝐸2
= 𝛼𝐸1 − 𝛼𝐸2
𝑑𝑡
𝑑𝐸3
= 𝛼𝐸2 − 𝛼𝐸3
𝑑𝑡
𝑑𝐸4
= 𝛼𝐸3 − 𝛼𝐸4
𝑑𝑡
𝑑𝑆
= −𝛽2 𝑆(𝐷 + 𝐶1 + 𝐶2 )/𝑁 − 𝛽1 𝑆 + 𝛾𝑃4
𝑑𝑡
𝑑𝑃1
= 𝜎1 𝐶14 + 𝜎2 𝐶24 − 𝛾𝑃1
𝑑𝑡
𝑑𝑃2
1
1
= 𝛾𝑃1 − 𝛾𝑃2 − 𝛽2 ( ) 𝑃2 (𝐷 + 𝐶1 + 𝐶2 )/𝑁 − 𝛽1 ( )𝑃2
𝑑𝑡
4
4
𝑑𝑃3
2
2
= 𝛾𝑃2 − 𝛾𝑃3 − 𝛽2 ( ) 𝑃3 (𝐷 + 𝐶1 + 𝐶2 )/𝑁 − 𝛽1 ( )𝑃3
𝑑𝑡
4
4
𝑑𝑃4
3
3
= 𝛾𝑃3 − 𝛾𝑃4 − 𝛽2 ( ) 𝑃4 (𝐷 + 𝐶1 + 𝐶2 )/𝑁 − 𝛽1 ( )𝑃4
𝑑𝑡
4
4
𝑑𝐷1
= 𝑃𝑠𝑦𝑚 𝛼𝐸4 − 𝛿𝐷1
𝑑𝑡
𝑑𝐷2
= 𝛿𝐷1 − 𝛿𝐷2
𝑑𝑡
𝑑𝐷3
= 𝛿𝐷2 − 𝛿𝐷3
𝑑𝑡
𝑑𝐷4
= 𝛿𝐷3 − 𝛿𝐷4
𝑑𝑡
𝑑𝐶21
= 𝛿𝐷4 − 𝜎2 𝐶21
𝑑𝑡
𝑑𝐶22
= 𝜎2 𝐶21 − 𝜎2 𝐶22
𝑑𝑡
𝑑𝐶23
= 𝜎2 𝐶22 − 𝜎2 𝐶23
𝑑𝑡
𝑑𝐶24
= 𝜎2 𝐶23 − 𝜎2 𝐶24
𝑑𝑡
𝑑𝐶11
= (1 − 𝑃𝑠𝑦𝑚 )𝜎𝐸4 − 𝜎1 𝐶11
𝑑𝑡
𝑑𝐶12
= 𝜎1 𝐶11 − 𝜎1 𝐶12
𝑑𝑡
𝑑𝐶13
= 𝜎1 𝐶12 − 𝜎1 𝐶13
𝑑𝑡
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𝑑𝐶14
= 𝜎1 𝐶13 − 𝜎1 𝐶14
𝑑𝑡

Table S1. Model validation: comparison of the static and dynamic risk. The results of the
dynamic model were based on 0% initial latent population, no primary transmission due to
contaminated food (β3 = 0), no secondary transmission (β2 = 0), and no duration of immunity (1/γ
= 0) to allow for a direct comparison with the static model. The minor differences in the models
were due to the distributed delays for the remaining epidemiological states (i.e., exposed,
diseased, and carrier) in the dynamic model.
Treatment trains
A. de facto reuse
B. IPR (FAT+GW replenishment)
C. DPR (O3-biofiltration)
D. DPR (FAT)

Static
Mean
3.4E-04
1.2E-05
0.0E+00
1.1E-12

SD
3.1E-05
3.7E-07
0.0E+00
1.6E-13

Dynamic
Mean
SD
3.4E-04
1.7E-06
1.0E-05
3.1E-08
0.0E+00
0.0E+00
9.0E-13
2.1E-15

Table S2. Annual risk of infection calculated by the static model and cumulative incidence
calculated by the dynamic model. The results of the dynamic model were based on 0% initial
latent. The dynamic model includes secondary transmission which makes the risks higher than
the static model.
Static Modela
min
median
A. de facto reuse
2.6E-04
3.4E-04
B. Planned IPR
1.1E-05
1.2E-05
C. O3-based DPR
0.0E+00
8.2E-14
D. FAT-based DPR
0.0E+00
1.4E-12
a
These values represent annual risk of infection
b
These values represent cumulative incidence
Treatment trains
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max
4.5E-04
1.3E-05
1.3E-06
1.0E-07

Dynamic Modelb
min
median
max
6.4E-03
3.7E-02
2.3E-01
5.5E-04
2.7E-02
2.3E-01
8.9E-08
7.0E-03
1.8E-01
3.0E-08
7.4E-03
1.8E-01

Table S3. Comparison of the cumulative incidence calculated by dynamic model including
secondary transmission with and without immunity. The results are based on 5% initial latent
population.
Treatment trains
A. de facto reuse
B. IPR (FAT+GW replenishment)
C. DPR (O3-biofiltration)
D. DPR (FAT)

Dynamic with Immunity
Mean
SD
6.9E-02
6.8E-02
5.6E-02
5.7E-02

9.6E-02
1.0E-01
1.1E-01
1.1E-01

Dynamic with No Immunity
Mean
SD
3.7E+00
1.1E+00
3.6E+00
1.2E+00
3.0E+00
1.7E+00
2.9E+00
1.8E+00

Figure S1. Annual risk of infection for the de facto reuse system for scenario 4 (i.e., foodborne
outbreak) as a function of storage time in the environmental buffer. The base e inactivation rate
constant for NoV in surface water with a temperature of 20°C was assumed to be 0.875 day-1
(Amoueyan et al., 2018; Yang & Griffiths, 2013).

184

Figure S2. Annual risk of infection for the planned IPR system for scenario 4 (i.e., foodborne
outbreak) as a function of storage/travel time in the aquifer. The base e inactivation rate constant
for NoV in groundwater with a temperature of 10°C was assumed to be 0.055 day-1 (Amoueyan
et al., 2018; Nevecherya et al., 2005).
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